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Abstract 
The aim of the current research program was to explore safety culture in one 
of Australia’s largest construction and mining companies, with a view to 
understanding how theory and practice can be integrated to improve safety culture 
and related outcomes within the construction and mining industry. The research 
undertaken within this PhD comprised three studies that explored safety culture in a 
large and diverse construction and mining company, investigated factors that 
influence the relationship between safety culture and safety behaviour, and examined 
differences in perceptions of safety culture across the organisation. Together, the 
research program has generated important insights into how safety culture is 
understood theoretically versus how it is applied in practice, and resulted in a number 
of recommendations that can guide the development of future safety culture 
interventions in the construction and mining industry.   
Workplace safety incidents are a significant global issue, and in particular, 
the construction and mining industry is over-represented in workplace injury and 
death statistics. At the time this research program project commenced, the Australian 
construction industry recorded 40 fatalities in 2008–9, the highest number of 
fatalities across all industries (Safe Work Australia, 2010). The economic and social 
costs of workplace safety incidents have been tackled by industry and academia on 
several fronts in the past, including legislative and compliance-based responses, and 
a focus on engineering controls and management systems. Following several major 
disasters in the nuclear, oil, and mining sectors, safety culture has been identified as a 
critical concept for organisations in reducing workplace safety incidents. Whilst its 
importance is not questioned, the safety culture field remains fragmented on a 
number of conceptual and practical issues, to the extent that despite over thirty years 
of research, agreement has not been reached on a definition for the concept, an 
integrative theoretical model or the relationship between it and safety performance. It 
is in this context that the current research program was conducted.    
The research program was informed by a review of safety culture and climate 
literature, and used a number of established theories and models from the 
organisational psychology discipline to develop a guiding theoretical framework. By 
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drawing on these established models, the research design had a strong foundation for 
application in a new context. The theoretical framework guiding the research 
incorporated concepts of safety culture, climate and safety behaviour and provided a 
comprehensive perspective on the role of safety culture and related outcomes in the 
construction and mining organisation.  
Study One comprised theoretically driven exploratory research undertaken 
with a panel of experts (safety leaders) within the target organisation. A modified 
Delphi method, including qualitative interview data and quantitative survey data, was 
used to gain insight into 41 safety leaders’ perceptions and understandings of safety 
culture within the organisation. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted, 
followed by a quantitative perception survey with the same sample.  Participants 
included Senior Executives, Corporate Managers, Project Managers, Safety 
Managers and Site Supervisors. The study found that leaders’ definitions and 
descriptions of safety culture were primarily action-oriented and some confusion was 
evident due to the implicit nature of culture in organisations. Leadership was 
identified as a key factor for positive safety culture in the organisation, and there was 
an emphasis on leaders demonstrating commitment to safety, and being visible to the 
project-based workforce. Barriers to a positive safety culture were also identified, 
including challenges of managing a transient subcontractor workforce, pace of 
change, and reporting requirements. The survey data provided a quantitative 
confirmation of the key interview themes through a ranking process with the safety 
leaders. As such, the findings highlighted that safety culture is a complex construct, 
which is difficult to define, even for safety leaders with considerable experience and 
exposure in the organisation. Findings on the key factors indicated consistency with 
the current literature regarding the importance of management commitment to safety; 
however the perceptions of barriers to safety culture offered a new understanding as 
to how safety culture operates in practice.  
Study Two was informed by the findings of Study One and the review of the 
existing literature. It involved a quantitative exploration of safety culture perceptions 
and related safety behaviour, with a cross-section of the organisation. The sample 
included 2,957 employees from various organisational levels and divisions. Analyses 
explored the relationship between safety climate, safety motivation, leadership, stage 
of change, and safety behaviours (compliance, participation and non-compliance). 
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Safety climate, safety motivation and leadership were all significant predictors of 
variance in safety behaviours, and safety motivation and supportive leadership were 
significant partial mediators of the climate–behaviour relationship. The results 
suggest that current focus on safety climate and safety motivation is warranted in 
safety culture research, and that these factors can explain a notable amount of 
variance in self-reported safety behaviours. 
Group differences were also explored in this study by comparing 
organisational divisions and workforce levels on key measures. The results illustrate 
that frontline workers and supervisors are distinct from middle and senior managers 
in their perceptions of safety climate and personal safety motivation. Middle and 
senior management have higher perceptions of climate and report higher personal 
safety values. Additionally, the results suggest some differences in climate and 
motivation perceptions across different functional areas in the organisation. In 
contrast, the facilitators and barriers to safety culture were perceived similarly across 
the safety leader and workforce samples in Studies One and Two, which is an 
important leverage point for future safety interventions in the organisation.   
Study Three was designed to further explore a key finding from Study Two 
relating to safety motivation. The importance of safety motivation in explaining 
safety behaviour was established in Study Two; however, the underlying 
mechanisms of motivation were not explained in the survey data. Semi-structured 
group interviews were conducted with 29 frontline workers and supervisors, to 
explore how safety values were internalised and transformed into safe behaviours. 
Motivation was examined through the framework of Valence–Instrumentality–
Expectancy  (VIE) theory (Vroom, 1964), which demonstrated utility in 
understanding the drivers of workers’ safe behaviour. Important organisational 
implications around reward systems and supervisory discretion were identified from 
the results. Findings indicate that workers do not always receive rewards that are 
valued when they meet safety performance expectations. Further, a consistent link 
between valued rewards and safety performance needs to be clearly articulated both 
at the organisational level and, critically, through the frontline supervisors. The 
results of this study indicate that the workers in this organisation understand the level 
of safety performance required of them, and they know what they are expected to do 
in order to meet those requirements. However, as long as the outcomes for safety 
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performance are not valued, or are inconsistently provided, or if outcomes for other 
performance metrics are more valued, or more consistently provided, the worker may 
experience conflicting motivations to perform safely. 
Overall, this thesis presents findings from three studies investigating safety 
culture and related outcomes in a large and diverse construction and mining 
organisation. The findings from these studies highlight a number of theoretical and 
practical implications for safety culture theory and practice. The research program 
aimed to translate these research findings into applied recommendations for 
improving safety culture and related outcomes within the industry. The 
recommendations arising from the research addresses issues such as: the approach 
that needs to be taken in safety culture research within the industry; the importance 
of gaining a foundational understanding of safety culture meaning amongst leaders; 
the relevance of considering the barriers and facilitators to safety culture 
development and maintenance in order to contextualise safety culture findings; the 
significance of encouraging the internalisation of organisational safety values to 
personal safety motivation for employees; and the need to support supervisors around 
their safety leadership in order to realise improved safety outcomes for the 
individual, organisation and industry. 
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Chapter 1:   Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis. First, a background to 
workplace safety is provided, including a brief overview of the safety culture concept 
and how it has been applied to reduce incidents. Next, the rationale and scope of the 
research program are presented, followed by the research aims and objectives. 
Finally, an outline of the thesis chapters is provided.  
1.1 BACKGROUND TO WORKPLACE SAFETY 
It is estimated that 640,700 persons suffer a work related injury each year in 
Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010), and the economic cost of work 
related injuries in Australia is estimated to be approximately $60.6 billion each year 
(Safe Work Australia, 2013). In addition to the economic costs, work related injuries 
also have social and business impacts, such as loss of goodwill and business 
reputation, as well as considerable impact on the individual’s networks at work, at 
home, and in the broader community (Safe Work Australia, 2012a).  
The economic and social costs of workplace incidents are being addressed by 
industry on several fronts. Legislating and enforcing minimum safety standards is 
important; however, this approach is not fully sufficient for facilitating the safety 
performance desired by many organisations. Many different approaches have been 
taken to improve workplace safety and reduce the number and severity of incidents. 
These approaches include legislative and policy responses, behaviour-based safety 
initiatives, and safety culture change programs. Increasingly, safety culture 
improvement approaches are being implemented by organisations across a variety of 
industries. This “third age” (Johnson, 2007) of safety research suggests that safety 
culture is now broadly acknowledged as a significant concept in workplace health 
and safety approaches. Significantly, despite over thirty years of research into safety 
culture, there is currently a lack of adequate models providing an integrated view of 
safety culture, climate, and related constructs, and more importantly, how to link 
such concepts with subsequent operational risk management and safety performance 
(Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000).  
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The safety culture field is home to a number of different disciplines, and 
remains conceptually fragmented and confused—to the extent that there remains no 
universally accepted definition (Zohar, 2010). Glendon (2003) describes the concept 
of safety culture as problematic, with definitions often blurred and inconsistently 
applied. Perhaps the most cited definition adopted considers safety culture “the 
product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of 
behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and safety management” (Advisory Committee for Safety in 
Nuclear Installations [ACSNI], 1993). It is common for researchers to make their 
own adaptations to this definition, based on their theoretical position or industry 
context. In a review of safety culture theory and research between 1980 and 2000, 
Guldenmund (2000) cited at least 18 different definitions of the safety culture / safety 
climate construct, highlighting the fragmented nature of the field. Cooper (2000) 
suggested that the broadness of safety culture definitions to date has contributed to 
the inconsistent operationalisation of the concept, and a heavy reliance on safety 
climate as a surrogate measure for safety culture. Despite this, whichever definition 
is employed, scholars agree that safety culture is an important concept in modern 
approaches to improving safety performance outcomes (Guldenmund; Zohar, 2010).   
Researchers of workplace culture tend to take one of two approaches: 
interpretive or functionalist
 
(Glendon, Clarke & McKenna, 2006). Interpretive 
approaches view culture as an emergent property that is a complex outcome of all 
employees, not just senior managers, and that culture cannot be ‘engineered’ quickly, 
but evolves through organisational learning over time (e.g., Cox & Cheyne, 2000). In 
contrast, functionalist approaches view culture as something that can be deliberately 
manipulated by management to support corporate interests, and is largely top-down 
driven (e.g., Hopkins, 1995; Reason, 2000). Both approaches have considerable 
support in the literature, and many now take an integrated approach (Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000). For example, a functionalist approach to culture would be reflected 
in thorough risk management processes, whereas an interpretive approach may focus 
on developing a shared vision and identity for organisational members. Furthermore, 
some researchers view safety culture as a desired state which is rarely attained 
(absolutist position; e.g., Reason, 1997), whereas others view safety culture as a 
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continuum whereby organisations are placed according to the extent to which safety 
is a part of their core business and practices (relativist position; e.g., Hudson, 2007). 
 
 
The current research program takes an integrated approach to examining safety 
culture, adopting both an interpretive understanding of safety culture as a relativist 
concept (i.e., all organisations have a safety culture, but differ in their maturity and 
effectiveness) and a functionalist view of culture change (i.e., that it is driven by the 
leaders of the organisation and can be deliberately improved through targeted 
interventions). This approach is aligned with the applied research context of this 
program, and reflects a balance of theoretical and practical perspectives in safety 
culture research and industry application.  
Several models of safety culture have been proposed, and many of these will be 
discussed in Chapter 2 as part of the review of the literature. There have been more 
recent attempts to synthesise several models within the safety field (Guldenmund, 
2000; Neal, Griffin & Hart, 2000; Zohar, 2010), however, it is still generally 
accepted that the field remains fragmented and misunderstood (Guldenmund, 2010). 
Whilst a large body of research has investigated the relationship between safety 
culture and performance in various forms, a criticism of the safety culture literature 
is that many models do not adequately articulate the relationship between dimensions 
of safety culture and safety performance or outcomes. In particular, it remains 
uncertain how such concepts interact to influence the risk of workplace incidents 
(Robson et al., 2007; Walker & Tait, 2004).   
With regard to the content of safety culture, this research program takes an 
approach from organisational culture theorists (Guldenmund, 2000; Schein, 1992), 
where culture is described as having three distinct layers, namely, basic assumptions 
(core); espoused values (middle); and artefacts (outer layer). Each layer differs in its 
visibility to outsiders and its consciousness with members, with the outer layers 
being easier to identify and measure in research. Guldenmund suggests a causal 
pathway between the layers, using the more common terms of safety culture, safety 
climate and safety behaviour. This causal pathway considers the combination of 
individuals’ safety perceptions (safety climate) a consequence of the basic 
assumptions of the organisation’s members (safety culture). The evaluative responses 
to the safety climate are then revealed in the organisation’s artefacts. A more in-
depth discussion of organisational culture and safety culture models is provided in 
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the review of the literature in Chapter 2. The middle layer of this cultural model, 
espoused values, is predominantly where researchers operate, as these values are 
relatively explicit and conscious (Guldenmund), and can be measured using common 
research techniques such as self-administered questionnaires.  
Safety climate is often confused with safety culture, as they are somewhat 
different though related concepts. Safety culture is the shared values and beliefs that 
interact with an organisation’s structures and control systems to produce behavioural 
norms. Whereas safety climate refers to the workers’ perceptions of the value and 
importance of safety within the organisation, typically reflected in policies, 
procedures and practices (Huang et al., 2013). Further discussion of safety culture 
and climate definitions is provided in Chapter 2.  
The measurement of espoused values or attitudes towards safety has been 
conducted under the umbrella term of ‘safety climate’. The distinction between 
safety culture and safety climate has been discussed extensively in the literature, 
where safety climate has been viewed as an antecedent, an element or a 
manifestation of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2007). There is also disagreement on 
whether safety climate is an individual or organisational concept (Cooper, 2000; 
Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991). That is, whether the safety climate is embodied in 
individual perceptions of safety, or only exists as a shared perception at the group or 
organisational level. The view adopted on this issue has important implications for 
construct measurement and interpretation. There is general agreement, however, that 
safety climate is a measure of perceptions about safety, and safety climate 
questionnaires are common in both academic and industry literature (Guldenmund; 
Hahn & Murphy, 2008). It is argued that these distinctions are largely a result of 
operationalisation, and research on both concepts is relevant to the broader 
understanding of safety culture (Dingsdag, Biggs & Sheahan, 2008; Guldenmund).  
In addition to culture and climate distinctions, the factors that comprise safety 
climate are also frequently debated in the literature. Early empirical research on 
safety culture and climate focused on exploring its multi-dimensional nature (Brown 
& Holmes, 1986; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Zohar, 1980). In one of the earliest 
studies on safety climate, Zohar (1980) proposed an eight-factor model, which was 
later tested and refined to a three-factor model (Brown & Holmes, 1986). 
Interestingly, of those reviewed by Guldenmund (2000), the majority of studies were 
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exploratory, and those that were confirmatory did not support previous factor 
structures, further highlighting the disparity in safety climate descriptions. In a study 
with construction workers, two factors were found to provide the best fit: 
management’s commitment to safety, and worker’s involvement in safety 
(Dedobbeleer & Beland). Later studies on the role of safety leadership and 
management corroborate this result (Biggs, Sheahan & Dingsdag, 2005; Dingsdag, 
Biggs & Sheahan, 2008; Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Zohar, 2010).  
Whilst the academic literature has struggled to define, describe and measure 
safety culture, high-risk industries have been applying the safety culture concept to 
their safety practices for decades (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; International Atomic Energy 
Agency [IAEA], 1991). In Australia, the mining industry has adopted safety culture 
assessment tools and programs (Minerals Council of Australia, 1999), and more 
recently considerable work has been undertaken in the construction industry 
(Dingsdag, Biggs, Sheahan & Cipolla, 2006; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; 
Mohammed, 2002) and in the road safety field (Banks, Davey & Brownlow, 2006; 
Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2009). Safety culture is increasingly recognised as a useful 
concept for understanding and manipulating the processes through which 
organisational leaders influence frontline workers (Dingsdag et al., 2008). 
From an industry perspective, questions remain regarding the gap between the 
operationalisation of the elements of safety culture and their link to safety outcomes, 
particularly at different levels within an organisation. Rather, the research literature 
has been occupied with reviews, meta-reviews, rebuttals and criticisms that have 
ranged from developing the most accurate definitions of such constructs as to how 
best to measure them (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Zohar, 2010). In fact, it is argued 
that research efforts have historically remained preoccupied with ambiguous debates 
regarding conceptual distinctions and factor dimensions, rather than on more 
industry-relevant outcomes such as building integrative frameworks using multi-
method approaches to understand the depth of culture and performance pathways, 
and to facilitate safety culture and climate research informing industry practices. 
There is a need to conduct further empirical research in this area, including the 
effective application of cultural theories to enhance industry safety performance.  
Given the above, the field is being increasingly directed towards developing 
theoretical models to outline how safety culture is embedded as a whole within an 
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organisation’s practices, system structure and employee behaviours (Guldenmund, 
2000, 2010).  However, there remains specifically the need to integrate theory and 
practice, highlight organisational level differences, map the relationship between 
safety climate and safety behaviour, and translate research into applied solutions 
relevant to large organisations in the construction industry. Understanding the 
underlying mechanisms for safety culture perceptions and drivers for safety 
behaviour is critical to effecting change at the workforce frontline.  
1.2 RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
As outlined above, despite the considerable research over the last 30 years, the 
safety culture field remains fragmented and misunderstood. Whilst academia 
continues to debate theoretical issues such as the distinction between safety culture 
and climate, industry is developing and implementing safety culture change 
programs without solid theoretical or empirical foundation. This gap between theory 
and practice needs to be closed through empirical, applied research aimed at 
improving safety outcomes in industry.  
The proposed research will address a number of significant deficits in safety 
culture research to date. Specifically, the research was undertaken with a large and 
complex international construction and mining organisation, with considerable 
influence in the Australasian industry. As discussed further in Chapter 3, the 
organisation operates as a primary and secondary contractor and is involved in many 
project alliances with other companies. The organisation belongs to a larger parent 
company and is viewed as a leader within the industry (see de Valence, 2014 for a 
compelling discussion on the influence and impact of the organisation and parent 
organisation within the construction and related industries). A mixed methods 
approach was adopted for the research program, benefiting from the richness of 
qualitative data and the breadth of perceptions reached in the quantitative survey. A 
strong theoretical framework, inclusive of safety culture, climate, outcomes and other 
predictive factors contributing to this relationship, also guided the research (see 
Chapter 3). This theoretical framework was balanced by the inclusion of industry-
specific views on culture, as experienced by the organisation’s employees and 
managers. The conclusions of this research program contribute a unique perspective 
to both the academic literature on safety culture and industry practices. 
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It is important to recognise here the demarcation of scope for the research 
program. Whilst the ultimate aim of the research is to provide recommendations for 
the improvement of safety culture and related outcomes, the program does not 
include the specific development or implementation of a safety culture intervention. 
The goals of the research program are to explore safety culture as it manifested in 
this organisation, and empirically investigate the relationship between safety culture 
and safety performance, with a view to identifying mediating factors that can be the 
focus of future interventions in a holistic plan for workplace safety improvement. 
This approach is necessary for targeted and effective intervention efforts.   
Also out of scope for the current research program is the formal testing of 
safety culture models or theories. The safety culture literature is replete with many 
definitions, models and frameworks that have been or are continuing to be tested in 
an empirical fashion. This research utilises a consolidated theoretical framework to 
inform the research design and methodology, rather than test the utility of any 
individual theory. A combination of safety culture models, safety climate and 
behaviour frameworks, and employee motivation and performance theories inform 
the research program.  
Finally, the research program was restricted to one time-point for quantitative 
data collection, meaning the design of Study Two was cross-sectional in nature. 
Whilst this does limit the ability to determine causality between variables of interest, 
cross-sectional designs dominate the safety culture literature (Zohar, 2010), and can 
be very useful for examining the key variable of interest. Conducting an 
organisational-wide survey is a challenging process in a large, complex organisation, 
and conducting a follow up survey was considered by the industry partner to be too 
onerous on business operations.  
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this research program is to explore safety culture in a large 
Australasian construction and mining company, with a view to understanding how 
safety culture theory and practice can be integrated to improve safety outcomes 
within the industry.  
The objectives of the research program are to:  
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1. Gain insight into how safety culture is understood in theory versus how it is 
applied in practice 
2. Explore workforce differences in perceptions of safety culture across the 
organisation 
3. Examine the relationship between safety culture and safety behaviour, and 
investigate additional factors that influence this relationship  
4. Translate research findings into applied recommendations for improving safety 
culture and related outcomes within the industry. 
The research program met these objectives through three empirical studies. 
Each study addresses one or more objectives, with specific research questions 
proposed in Chapter 2 after a review of the literature.   
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis has been structured around the three studies undertaken to address 
the research aim and objectives. The research design was based on an underlying 
theoretical framework derived from the research literature.    
Chapter 2 reviews the literature relating to workplace safety incidents in the 
construction industry and cultural approaches to workplace safety. Theoretical 
models of safety culture and related constructs are reviewed, as well as the 
relationship between safety culture and safety performance. The chapter concludes 
with the key research questions for this program of research that were identified 
based on gaps and opportunities in the reviewed literature.  
Chapter 3 describes the theoretical framework that guided the research 
program, and the subsequent research design to address current gaps in safety culture 
research. The methodology for each study is briefly described, as it relates to the 
overall research design. Also included are the benefits of applied research in this 
research context.  
Chapter 4 describes Study One, which involved semi-structured interviews 
with organisational safety leaders. The study aimed to provide a foundation for the 
program of research by obtaining an in-depth understanding of how safety culture 
was understood by those in the organisation. An earlier version of Chapter 3 was 
published as a peer-reviewed article: Biggs, Banks, Davey and Freeman (2013) 
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“Safety leaders’ perceptions of safety culture in a large Australasian construction 
organisation”, Safety Science, 52, 3–12 (Note. Biggs is the maiden name of Sarah 
Jebb). The findings from this study partly informed the direction of investigation in 
Study Two.  
Chapter 5 describes Study Two, which involved a quantitative survey of 
worker perceptions with a large cross-section of the organisation. The study utilised a 
safety climate – safety behaviour model to measure perceptions of how safety was 
valued in the organisation, how motivated workers were to behave safely, and a 
number of self-report measures of safety behaviour. The survey also measured 
related constructs around leadership and stages of change, as well as offering 
confirmatory findings around the factors and barriers to safety culture that were 
identified in Study One. Some findings from this study were published in the peer-
reviewed proceedings of the international Occupational Safety in Transport (OSIT) 
conference, Gold Coast, September 2013: Biggs and Banks (2013) “A comparison of 
safety climate and safety outcomes between construction and resource functions in a 
large case study organisation”. 
Chapter 6 describes Study Three, which further explored the influences on 
safety motivation from the perspective of frontline workers and supervisors. Semi-
structured group interviews were conducted across three organisational project sites 
and utilised an established work motivation theory to understand what motivated 
workers to behave safely on the job, and what rewards and outcomes were in place 
for good safety performance versus other types of work performance.  
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by synthesising the results from the three studies 
and discussing them in terms of the key research questions and broader objectives. 
Implications of the findings for theory, research and practice are discussed. 
Recommendations for future research are offered in light of the strengths and 
limitations of the research, and recommendations for industry applications are 
presented.  
1.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has briefly presented the background to the research problem, 
current approaches to the problem and a rationale for the current research program. 
Workplace safety incidents continue to be a concern for organisations and the 
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community more generally, and understanding the cultural aspects of safety is 
critical for improving safety behaviour and safety outcomes at the individual, 
organisational and industry levels. The current research program aims to explore 
safety culture in one of Australia’s largest construction and mining companies, with a 
view to understanding how safety culture theory and practice can be integrated to 
improve safety culture and related outcomes within the industry. 
The following chapter describes the literature that led to the research aims and 
questions for this program of research. Theoretical understandings of safety culture 
and related constructs are reviewed, as well as current frameworks and approaches to 
measuring the relationship between safety culture and performance outcomes. The 
chapter also outlines the specific research questions designed to address gaps in the 
existing literature, which the remaining chapters will address by describing the 
studies and research findings from the program of research.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to the research program. First, a 
background to the review is provided, including its context for the research 
objectives, and an overview of the scope and search methodology. Next, the extent of 
workplace safety incidents and current approaches to workplace safety are described. 
The current understanding of safety culture is presented, including origins and 
definitions of organisational safety culture, followed by a review of the safety culture 
and safety climate debate, and a summary of the common models of safety culture 
and climate. The review then explores the evidence for differences in perceptions of 
safety culture, followed by an analysis of the relationship between safety culture and 
safety performance and the factors that influence this relationship. Following this 
review, the research questions for this program of research are presented as they 
relate to the previously identified gaps in knowledge.    
2.1 BACKGROUND 
The following literature review contributes to the research program by 
providing necessary background to understanding the theoretical history and current 
context of safety culture theory and research. The review directly contributes to the 
first research objective of gaining insight into how safety culture is understood in 
theory, including differences in perceptions of safety culture and the factors that 
influence the relationship between safety culture and safety behaviour. This will later 
be contrasted to how safety culture is understood and applied in practice in the 
organisation investigated.  
The literature review is not intended to be a systematic literature review or 
meta-analysis, but instead is designed to provide the reader with relevant background 
through a synthesis of the current research literature relating to the program of 
research. The available literature on workplace safety and safety culture is vast and 
quite diverse; thus the review presents only the most pertinent information in the 
context of the current research.  
In terms of the review method, literature searches were conducted using 
research domain-appropriate electronic databases, including ScienceDirect, 
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PsycINFO, and EBSCO. Keywords in the literature searches included combinations 
of the following: safe* culture; safe* climate; safe* behaviour; workplace safety; and 
workplace injuries/incidents/ accidents. In addition, manual searches were conducted 
of well-known occupational-safety and organisational psychology journals including, 
Safety Science, Journal of Safety Research, Journal of Applied Psychology and 
Accident Analysis and Prevention. Cited-reference searches on seminal studies and 
reference list searches on recent studies provided additional relevant papers for the 
review. Grey literature was not included in the literature searches, with the exception 
of influential research reports that have been subsequently cited in the academic 
literature.   
2.2 WORKPLACE SAFETY INCIDENTS 
Workplace safety incidents are a significant global issue and both industry and 
academia are constantly searching for preventative strategies. This section describes 
the size and nature of the issue, and begins with an overview of workplace incident 
statistics. Then, construction and mining industry statistics are presented and the 
unique nature of the construction industry discussed. Legislative and policy 
approaches to workplace safety are briefly examined, followed by an overview of 
industry approaches to the same.   
2.2.1 Workplace incident statistics 
Workplace incidents are recognised as a significant issue across the globe. The 
International Labor Organisation (ILO, 2013) reports that 321,000 people are fatally 
injured every year due to work-related incidents. For example, there were 172 
workers fatally injured in the United Kingdom in 2011/12, equivalent to a rate of 0.6 
fatalities per 100,000 workers (Health and Safety Executive [HSE], 2013). In 
addition, a further 233,000 reportable injuries occurred, a rate of 840 per 100,000 
workers. In the United States, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA, 2013) reports that 4,609 workers died on the job in 2011, and approximately 
3 million further workers suffered a non-fatal occupational injury.  
In Australia, the most recent statistics estimate that 640,700 persons suffer a 
work-related injury each year (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010).  In addition to 
those suffering injuries in the 12 months from July 2010 to June 2011, a further 374 
people were fatally injured as a result of work-related activities in Australia (Safe 
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Work Australia, 2013). These fatalities comprise those who were directly involved in 
carrying out work-related activity (220), those that were killed commuting to or from 
their workplace (110), and bystanders (44) who were fatally injured as a result of 
others carrying out work-related activities. The economic cost of work-related 
injuries in Australia is estimated to be approximately $60.63 billion each year, 
representing 4.8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP; Safe Work Australia, 
2013). Economic costs do not adequately represent the impact of work-related 
injuries; there are additional intangible costs to the organisation, for example, 
business reputation, as well as the effect on an individual’s work-mates, family and 
community.   
2.2.2 Construction industry incidents 
The most recent data on global construction fatalities suggests that at least 
60,000 fatal incidents occur each year at construction sites worldwide, equivalent to 
one death every ten minutes (ILO, 2005). Furthermore, one out of every six fatal 
workplace incidents take place at a construction site, and this rate is increased in 
industrialised countries, where construction site fatalities account for 25–40% of all 
workplace fatalities. In the UK, the construction and agriculture industries had the 
highest rate of fatalities in the 2011–12 financial year, consistent with previous years, 
with 42 workers dying on the job in the construction industry (HSE, 2013). The rate 
of major non-fatal injuries was 172 per 100,000 employees. In the US, 798 
construction and mining industry workers died in 2011, making it the most 
dangerous industry after the transportation industry. In addition, over 244,000 non-
fatal incidents affected construction industry workers in the US in 2008 (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2013).  
In Australia, the construction industry is similarly over-represented in the 
occupational injury and death statistics. At the time of project commencement, the 
most recent data indicated that there were 40 fatalities recorded for 2008–09, which 
was the highest number of fatalities of all industries. This corresponds to a fatality 
rate of 5.9 fatalities per 100,000 employees in 2008–09, which was more than twice 
the rate of 2.3 for all industries (Safe Work Australia, 2010). Since then, the 
construction industry has recorded a reduction in fatalities, with 3.77 deaths per 
100,000 workers in 2010–11, the lowest rate in the eight years of fatality reporting for 
this industry (Safe Work Australia, 2012a). During the 2010-11 financial year, the 
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mining industry also recorded its lowest fatality rate since 2002 with 3.41 deaths per 
100,000 workers. While the seven fatalities in the 2010–11 financial year is similar 
to previous years, the industry has experienced over 100% growth in employment 
over the last eight years (Safe Work Australia, 2012a). Despite this decrease in 
fatalities in both industries in the last few years, both construction and mining remain 
hazardous industries for workers. In particular, the construction industry consistently 
accounts for a high proportion of fatalities compared to all industries, with the latest 
Safe Work Australia statistics putting it third, behind transport and agriculture 
industries.  
2.2.3 Nature of the construction industry 
Whilst the specific causes of workplace incidents in the construction industry 
vary, the nature of the work environment is an important factor in workplace safety 
incidents (Misnan & Mohammed, 2007). Construction industry workers are exposed 
to significant hazards and risks as part of their everyday work—such as working at 
height, working around mobile plant and live traffic, working with underground and 
above ground services. Many of these risks are well-identified and managed through 
project risk procedures. However, the reality of construction work is that these 
hazards are present in a dynamic and diverse environment where each job presents a 
unique combination of situation, person and task risk factors.  
Construction work is project-based, with works lasting anywhere from a week 
to a few years, making the establishment and maintenance of work group identities 
difficult. The type of work is also varied, with construction work including 
commercial and residential buildings, roads and motorways, tunnels and bridges, 
railway lines, electrical, gas and water services, and work in open-cut mines. In 
addition, the construction industry operates in a contractor environment, where 
primary project contractors regularly employ subcontractors, often contributing up to 
90% of the workforce on any given project (Biggs, Sheahan & Dingsdag, 2005). The 
high proportion of subcontractors means that the majority of the workforce is highly 
transient, with regular movement between construction companies, projects, and 
sites.  
The transiency of the subcontractor workforce adds to the already dynamic 
work environment, and increases workers’ exposure to risk as they are required to 
work on different job tasks and with different work teams in changing project 
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environments (Hoffmeister et al., 2014). Taken together, it is clear that although the 
hazards may seem simple to identify, managing safety on a construction project is 
not a simple task, and the complexity of the work type and workforce presents a 
challenge to safety professionals and management. Specific workforce issues 
include: remote management difficulties (Biggs et al., 2005) contract versus 
traditional employment (McKeown & Hanley, 2009); engagement issues in the 
contracting workforce (Bayer, 2013), and working time variations (Townsend, 
Lingard, Bradley & Brown, 2012).  
2.2.4 Legislative and policy responses to workplace safety incidents 
The traditional response to workplace safety incidents has been to legislate 
minimum safety requirements for workplaces, and provide supporting guidelines and 
standards to facilitate compliance. In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive is the 
national independent overseer for work-related health, safety and illness and acts as 
an independent regulator to reduce work-related death and serious injury in 
workplaces (HSE, 2011). The HSE stipulates a number of regulations and standards 
in relation to health and safety and enforces these through inspections, investigations, 
penalties and prosecutions. They also provide a large amount of guidance material 
and resources for businesses in various industries, including the construction 
industry. Furthermore, the HSE is part of the UK Construction Industry Advisory 
Committee (CONIAC) that includes industry stakeholder membership, and currently 
has a number of campaigns relating to improving health and safety within the 
construction sector. 
Similarly, in the US the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) is the Federal agency that enforces health and safety laws (covered under 
the Occupation Health and Safety Act of 1970). OSHA provides a number of health 
and safety regulations and standards for industry generally, and also specific 
standards for the construction industry. The safety and health provisions for 
construction outline requirements for safety training, incident reporting, 
housekeeping, and for specific health and environmental controls. Enforcement of 
these regulations is undertaken through inspections and referral to the Department of 
Justice for criminal prosecutions.  
In the European Union (EU), a number of directives are in place to ensure 
minimum standards in health and safety. Some of the recently introduced directives 
 16  
specifically apply to construction sites. In a recent review, Martinez Aires, Gamez 
and Gibb (2010) examined the impact of these directives on construction industry 
incident rates. EU Directive 92/57/EEC sets out minimum safety and health 
requirements at temporary or mobile work sites, including the requirement to appoint 
safety coordinators, and the inclusion of safety and health plans and procedures 
during project preparation and execution stages. The Directive also stresses worker 
consultation and participation throughout the project stages. Martinez Aires et al.’s 
(2010) analysis included 15 European countries, and overall found that ten countries 
experienced a moderately lower workplace accident rate (around 10%) after the 
Directive’s enforcement. This highlights that whilst legislation has an important role 
in injury reduction; legislation may have a limited influence on some, and there may 
be many other contributing factors to workplace safety incidents, such as safety 
culture.  
In Australia, the individual States and Territories legislate development and 
enforcement and govern workplace health and safety. State and Territory based 
safety authorities such as New South Wales’ WorkCover, Victoria’s WorkSafe and 
Workplace Health and Safety Queensland, provide health and safety standards and 
enforce these through inspections, investigations and prosecutions in association with 
relevant State courts. Recent attempts at harmonisation of legislation has resulted in 
the Commonwealth Work Health and Safety Act 2011, which is an overarching 
model to guide each State’s enactment of relevant state legislation (Safe Work 
Australia, 2013). In addition, the Australian Work Health and Safety Strategy 2012-
2022 (Safe Work Australia, 2012b), identifies targets for improving health and safety 
across the country. Within the OHS strategy, the construction industry has been 
identified as a national priority for prevention activities.  
Despite these national and international legislative efforts to enforce safety 
practices, there are concerns that compliance and deterrence based approaches to 
safety will not yield the desired safety outcomes (Haupt, 2003).  Legislative 
approaches have been criticised as encouraging company executives to focus on 
‘box-ticking’ and meeting minimum standards, rather than developing essential 
attitudes and behaviours that support good safety practices. Despite some 
improvements in recent years, the construction industry safety record highlights the 
limitations of a purely compliance-based approach (Hallowell, 2010). It is now 
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recognised that significant safety improvements may only be achieved by 
acknowledging the role of cultural factors such as organisational values, management 
attitudes to safety and workforce involvement in safety initiatives (Biggs, Sheahan & 
Dingsdag, 2005).   
2.2.5 Industry approaches to workplace safety 
Industry’s response to workplace safety incidents has naturally matured over 
time, and various programs purporting to improve safety culture are now reasonably 
common in large organisations. There are three major approaches to safety 
improvement in organisations: safety management systems (SMSs); behaviour based 
safety (BBS) approaches; and safety culture change programs. These approaches are 
not mutually exclusive, and in fact some argue that the most effective approach is to 
use a combination of all three (DeJoy, 2005). A brief overview of these approaches 
follows to provide a background to practical approaches to safety management 
applied in industry.  
Safety management systems 
The development of SMSs has been a large focus for organisations attempting 
to improve their safety performance. SMSs are structured processes for managing 
safety risk, often incorporated into electronic business systems. Guldenmund (2010) 
points to the need to integrate the current academic, analytical and pragmatic 
approaches and suggests that developments of safety management systems will 
provide a future focus and framework for people to give meaning and direction to 
their safety actions.  
In particular, high risk industries understand the importance of effective 
systems to manage risk. The literature has examined the approaches of many such 
industries, and refers to them as High Reliability Organisations (HROs). HROs are 
defined by the hazardous conditions they operate within, whereby adverse events are 
rare, but have serious implications both for individuals and the organisation (Reason, 
2000). Examples include nuclear power plants, air traffic control centres and military 
organisations. In particular, HROs are reported to meticulously report incidents, 
accidents and ‘near misses’ and encourage the view of ‘failures’ as learning 
opportunities. HROs are often cited as examples of organisations with effective 
safety culture (GAIN, 2004; Hudson, 2003; Reason, 2000; Weick, Sutcliffe & 
 18  
Obstfeld, 1999). In an analysis of HROs, Weick et al. (1999) suggest that their 
effectiveness can be attributed to the creation of collective mindfulness, essentially 
keeping safety ‘top of mind’ by being wary of potential failures and structuring 
groups and systems to be resilient and flexible to hazards.  
Behaviour based safety 
Behaviour based approaches to safety had considerable popularity with 
industry until recently, largely due to the well-known DuPont program, ‘STOP’ 
(Safety Training Observation Program; DuPont, 1991). The behaviour based safety 
(BBS) approach relies on a concept known as cognitive dissonance, which describes 
a state of psychological tension in individuals, produced by simultaneously having 
two opposing cognitions (Vaughan & Hogg, 2011).  This tension is thought to be 
quite uncomfortable and people are motivated to reduce it by changing or rejecting 
one of the cognitions. To give an example, a person might have two thoughts about 
safety procedures that do not align: 1. Safety procedures are important to keep me 
safe at work; versus, 2. Safety procedures are time-consuming and boring. In order to 
reduce cognitive dissonance, one of these thoughts will be rejected or changed to be 
more in line with the other. This makes taking an action much easier as the behaviour 
can follow from the attitude. BBS approaches have well-defined steps, including: 
defining the desired behaviour; setting performance goals for the behaviour; 
providing feedback and/or reinforcement when goals are met; and finally tracking 
individual and team results over time and publically displaying results for motivation 
(Dejoy, 2005).   
In traditional attitude–behaviour models such as the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; 
Ajzen, 1985), attitudes precede behaviours through behavioural intention. However, 
the BBS approach shortcuts this and attempts to influence behaviours first, and hopes 
that through cognitive dissonance, attitudes will change to be aligned with the 
dominant behaviours.  
Critics of BBS highlight a number of weaknesses with the approach. First, it is 
considerably resource intensive. The approach relies on structured observations of 
behaviour by people who have been trained in the required process. Observations are 
also required on a regular basis, to ensure optimal behaviour from employees. 
Second, due to the ongoing monitoring required, the sustainability of a BBS 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 19 
approach in a business environment is questionable. It may be effective for short-
term changes in individual behaviour, but it does not address broader elements of 
long-term change, including the supporting systems and management structure 
(DeJoy, 2005). Third, there is a risk that focusing on ‘safe behaviours’ may 
underestimate the importance of unsafe behaviours, thus producing a ‘blind-spot’ for 
behaviours that are most likely to increase exposure to risk (Hopkins, 2006b). An 
example of this might be observation protocol emphasising the wearing of personal 
protective equipment (PPE) whilst underemphasising principles of separation 
between people and plant. In this scenario, the protocol ‘loses the forest for the trees’ 
in that the greatest safety risk (people being near large machinery) has not received 
as much attention as a lower risk control (PPE). Fourth, behaviour-based safety 
approaches usually focus on frontline workers, rather than at management level. In 
fact, management often take on the observer role. This is counter to the advice from 
safety culture research—that managers have an enormous influence on the attitudes 
and behaviours of workers, and a supportive manager is more effective than a 
behavioural monitor (Cooper, 2000). It also encourages a focus on the last line of 
defence in incident trajectories (i.e., an individuals’ risk exposure during a specific 
job task), which is often insufficient in preventing organisational incidents as it does 
not address the potential impact of latent conditions (Reason, 1997). 
Safety culture change programs 
Safety culture programs are the latest trend in industry approaches to safety 
management (Guldenmund, 2010). In contrast to BBS approaches, safety culture 
approaches focus on articulating safety values with a top-down approach involving 
organisational leaders in the first instance. Rather than focusing on individual 
behaviours specifically, safety culture aims to create a self-sustaining environment 
based on a comprehensive understanding of the causes of workplace safety 
performance or lack thereof (Dejoy, 2005). The concept of safety culture is of great 
interest to modern researchers, to the extent that well-known journals including Work 
and Stress (Cox & Flin, 1998) and Safety Science (Hale, 2000) have published 
exclusively themed issues on the topic.  
In Australia, the mining industry has adopted safety culture assessment tools 
and programs in pursuit of their goal to achieve an “industry free of fatalities, injuries 
and disease” (Minerals Council of Australia, 1999, p.11). More recently, 
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considerable work has been undertaken in the road safety field (Wills, Watson & 
Biggs, 2006; 2009) and the construction industry (Dingsdag, Biggs & Sheahan, 
2008; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Mohammed, 2002) regarding cultural approaches 
to safety. Traditionally, the construction industry has been focused on lag indicators 
such as incident statistics and worker’s compensation claims (Mohamed, 2002). 
However, there is an increasing recognition within the Australian construction 
industry that safety culture is useful for understanding how organisational leaders 
influence frontline workers through their behaviour and actions (Dingsdag, Biggs & 
Sheahan, 2008). For example, the identification of key competencies for critical 
safety leadership positions has highlighted the importance of safety accountability in 
positive safety cultures in construction (Biggs et al., 2005). Additionally, it is posited 
that leadership style affects the level of concern for subordinate safety (Zohar, 2002), 
and that supervisory safety practices predict safety climate level and strength as 
moderated by leadership quality (Zohar & Luria, 2004).  
Whilst it is widely recognised that safety culture develops over a long time, and 
in a complex manner, this is often not considered in the development of change 
programs (Guldenmund, 2010). Interventions aimed at changing or improving safety 
culture are often taken off the shelf from consulting companies with the expectation 
that they will have radical impact on safety performance metrics—without taking 
into account the time and continuous effort needed to make a change, and to maintain 
it over time through natural organisational development.  
As Haupt (2003) suggests, an organisation’s readiness for change is dependent 
in part upon the degree to which the change differs from the existing dominant 
culture. In the case of attempted safety culture change, any culture which does not 
include safety as a core value is likely to struggle with adopting and integrating a 
new cultural framework. Furthermore, whilst the translatability of safety culture tools 
across industries is common but questionable (Zohar, 2010), the unique nature of the 
construction industry requires a customised and targeted approach to safety 
management and safety culture programs such as has been developed in the 
transportation industry for commercial truck drivers as solo operators (Huang et al., 
2012). The dynamic workforce, diversity of projects and variation of risk exposure 
for workers means cultural change is a difficult and complex process in the industry. 
Effective safety management systems are not sufficient to prevent workplace safety 
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incidents, and the cultural markers of safety need to be clearly identified and 
understood to ensure organisational learning and improvement.  
2.3 SAFETY CULTURE ORIGINS AND DEFINITIONS 
This section discusses the organisational culture and climate constructs as 
relevant to the current state of safety culture research; the origin of safety culture as 
an accepted term in the safety field; and the definitional difficulties that continue to 
plague the growing safety culture literature.   
2.3.1 Organisational culture and climate 
Whilst the origins of safety culture are often considered from an industry 
perspective, conceptually its foundations are in the organisational culture paradigm, 
and safety culture is still viewed by many as a component of an organisation’s 
broader culture (Guldenmund, 2010). ‘Culture’ was a term originally associated with 
nationalities rather than organisations. National culture expresses shared beliefs, 
behaviours and social norms, as developed within a specifically defined population 
(Hofstede, 1991). It was not until the late 1970s and 1980s that culture was 
considered a valuable construct to understand the complex nature of an organisation.  
Similar to nations, organisations have their own history, shared learning and 
leadership, which shape members’ attitudes and behaviours (Schein, 1992).  
Organisational culture is a multidimensional construct that provides organisational 
members with a frame of reference for behaviours and practices within the 
organisation (Guldenmund, 2000). 
 Organisational culture is understood to develop over time, but once formed it 
remains relatively stable throughout an organisation’s existence. However, culture is 
also viewed as dynamic, and susceptible to change (Parker, Lawrie & Hudson, 
2006). In fact, safety culture change programs aim to deliberately influence 
organisational culture. This apparent paradox is reflective of the interpretative and 
functionalist perspectives adopted in this field (see Chapter 1 for further information 
on these perspectives), and further muddies the waters in relation to both theoretical 
conceptualisations and practical measurement of organisational culture.  
Schein (1992, p12) defines organisational culture as “a pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation 
and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
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therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel 
in relation to those problems.” This view highlights the functional nature of 
organisational culture and the reciprocal interplay between organisational members 
and their environment.  Schein also emphasises the indoctrination of new members 
into the accepted normative framework for the organisation. This stability, over time 
and membership change, is one of several characteristics of organisation culture 
identified by Guldenmund (2000), who also proposes that culture can be 
characterised by its holistic and integrative qualities, suggesting that in this case, the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts. Guldenmund argues that organisational 
culture is a complex construct which is further complicated by the variety of ways it 
is revealed in organisational practices.   
Schein’s (1992) model of organisational culture includes three distinct layers, 
namely: basic assumptions; espoused values; and artefacts. Each layer differs in its 
visibility to outsiders and its consciousness with members. Basic assumptions are the 
core layer of culture and comprise the organisation’s collective assumptions around 
the nature of: reality and truth; time; space; human nature; human activity and human 
relationships. These are not visible to outsiders, and have to be deciphered from the 
outer two layers. The middle layer, espoused values, is more explicit and is often 
communicated in organisational mission statements, spoken management values and 
employee attitudes about different cultural aspects (such as safety). Artefacts are the 
final layer in Schein’s model and are possibly most often associated with culture due 
to their high visibility. Artefacts include slogans and logos, organisational 
celebrations and rituals, reporting and organisational documents. Also included in 
this layer is individuals’ behaviour within the organisation – a reflection of the 
influence of all cultural layers. The body of safety culture literature has largely been 
driven by social and organisational psychology approaches to the concept 
(Guldenmund, 2000). Therefore it is not surprising that safety culture has 
traditionally been viewed as a component of an organisation’s broader culture as 
articulated by Schein (1992). The implications of Schein’s model will be discussed in 
further detail later in this review, however it is important to highlight here, as it 
provides the foundation for understanding safety culture research. 
An important way in which organisational culture is revealed is through 
organisational climate. Glendon and Stanton (2000) view organisational climate as 
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the perceived quality of an organisation’s internal environment. Climate is usually 
considered a more superficial concept than culture, as it reflects an organisation’s 
current state, but not necessarily the enduring assumptions, values and beliefs that 
define the underlying culture. Organisational climate encompasses a wide range of 
individual evaluations about the work environment – including general dimensions 
such as leadership and communication, and also more specific dimensions such as 
the climate for safety (Neal, et al., 2000).  
Despite its complexity, other scholars prefer to view culture more 
pragmatically. Reason (1997; p192) argues that Uttal’s (1983) definition of 
organisational culture is the most functional: “shared values (what is important) and 
beliefs (how things work) that interact with a company’s people, organisational 
structures and control systems to produce behavioural norms (the way we do things 
around here)”. The latter part of this description—the way we do things around here 
—has been widely adopted by industry as not only a way to talk about organisational 
culture, but also about how safety is managed within an organisational group (Parker 
et al., 2006).    
2.3.2 Origins of safety culture 
The nuclear industry was the first to recognise safety culture as a significant 
concept in workplace safety. Safety culture rose to the forefront of industry’s 
collective mind after the Chernobyl nuclear incident of 1986 and the subsequent 
reports by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, published by the 
International Atomic Energy Authority (Flin et al., 2000; IAEA, 1991). Despite the 
concept of safety culture being presented prior to this (e.g., Zohar, 1980 discusses 
safety climate), the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group reports were the 
first to define and elaborate the concept as it related to the nuclear industry (Reason, 
1997). The events at Chernobyl highlighted the industry’s lack of understanding 
around the cultural aspects of safety, and its high reliance on engineering levels of 
controls for complex safety systems. Since then, poor safety culture has been 
recognised as a major cause of other large-scale incidents, (for example, the Piper 
Alpha offshore oil disaster in 1998), and is now considered a pivotal factor for the 
safety performance of organisations.  
Safety culture soon became a term that was accepted in both ‘technical’ fields 
such as engineering, construction, oil and mining (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Flin 
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et al., 2000; Hopkins, 1995), as well as health fields (Hudson, 2003; Reason, 2000) 
and academia (e.g., Cooper, 2000). In particular, the academic literature has studied 
safety culture primarily from the social psychological and organisational 
psychological traditions, proposing a number of models relating to safety knowledge, 
attitudes, beliefs in individuals and groups, as well as exploring the relationships 
between organisational policies, management behaviours and individual safety 
behaviours (e.g., Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar, 2010).    
2.3.3 Definitions of safety culture 
Although research on safety culture has been active for more than thirty years, 
there is not unanimous agreement on a definition (Guldenmund, 2010). This has led 
to considerable conceptual confusion, which will be discussed in the overview of 
safety culture models and the safety culture and climate review. However definitions 
also have practical implications, as they are critical as to how safety culture 
initiatives are operationalised, and how anticipated outcomes are measured. Indeed, 
definitions are utilised in organisations both to describe the desired end-state, and to 
monitor progress towards it.  The lack of clarity around the concept of safety culture 
makes the development and implementation of safety culture approaches all the more 
difficult (this is why several key researchers focus on the concept of ‘climate’—see 
section 2.3.4 for further discussion). Some commonly cited definitions are provided 
in Table 2.1. 
  
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 25 
Table 2.1  
Commonly cited definitions of safety culture  
Reference Definition  
Uttal (1983) Shared values and beliefs that interact with an organisation’s structures 
and control systems to produce behavioural norms 
Cox and Cox (1991) Safety cultures reflect the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values that 
employees share in relation to safety 
IAEA (1991) Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in 
organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by 
their significance 
Pidgeon (1991) The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical 
practices that are concerned with minimising the exposure of employees, 
managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered 
dangerous or injurious 
ACSNI (1993)  The product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and 
patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety management 
Geller (1994) In a total safety culture, everyone feels responsible for safety and pursues 
it on a daily basis 
Reason (1997) An ideal safety culture is the engine that continues to propel the system 
towards the goal of maximum safety health, regardless of the leadership’s 
personality or current commercial concerns 
Cooper (2000) That observable degree of effort by which all organisational members 
directs their attention and actions towards improving safety on a daily 
basis 
Guldenmund (2000) Those aspects of organisational culture which will impact on attitudes and 
behaviour related to increasing or decreasing risk 
Hale (2000) The attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining 
norms and values, which determine how they act and react in relation to 
risks and risk control systems  
Mohammed (2003) A sub-facet of organisational culture, which affects workers’ attitudes and 
behaviour in relation to an organisation’s on-going safety performance 
U.S. Department of 
Transportation 
(2011) 
The shared values, actions, and norms that demonstrate a commitment to 
safety over competing goals and demands 
 
 26  
The definition put forward by IAEA (1991, p.4) describes safety culture as 
“that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which 
establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive attention 
warranted by their significance”. In a report to the UK Health and Safety 
Commission, the ASCNI (1993, p23) defined the safety culture of an organisation in 
a more explicit manner as “...the product of individual and group values, attitudes, 
competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the 
style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety management”.  
In reviewing the definitions listed, it is clear that many scholars understand 
safety culture to be intrinsically linked to organisational culture, and the definitions 
are understandably similar to organisational culture definitions (Cox & Cox, 1991, 
Guldenmund, 2000; Hale, 2000, Mohammed, 2002). Some definitions specify the 
priority placed on safety (IAEA, 1991; Reason, 1997) and others point to the daily 
effort required to maintain safety standards (Cooper, 2000; Geller, 1994).  
In one of the few construction-specific culture definitions, Choudhry et al. 
(2007, p.1008) define construction safety culture based on the ACSNI’s (1993) 
definition: “The product of individual and group behaviours, attitudes, norms and 
values, perceptions and thoughts that determine the commitment to, and style and 
proficiency of, an organisation’s system and how its personnel act and react in terms 
of the company’s ongoing safety performance within construction site 
environments.”  
The range of safety culture definitions has meant that the concept is not 
consistently operationalised, and many scholars rely solely on safety climate 
measures in culture research. That is, despite the acknowledged complexities of 
culture, safety climate is often the proxy measure of culture in published literature. 
As will be discussed later in this review, this may be due to the difficulty of directly 
measuring cultural aspects, as well as a preference for more quantitative data 
collection methods. However, the definitions also share similarities around 
emphasising values and culture impacting on behaviour. Industry is arguably most 
interested in the behavioural outcomes of culture, as these are more tangible and 
most accessible in day-to-day business operations. Despite this variation in 
conceptualisation and operationalisation, scholars agree that safety culture is an 
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essential concept in modern approaches to improving safety performance outcomes 
(Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar, 2010).  
2.3.4 Safety culture and safety climate 
The safety culture literature is divided on a number of conceptual issues, 
arguably the most significant of which is the distinction between safety culture and 
safety climate. Early research on the concept referred to safety climate (Zohar, 1980), 
as a term borrowed from the organisational climate paradigm used in management 
literature. More recent research has tended to focus on safety culture, at least in 
phrasing; however the theoretical and practical distinction is not always clear 
(Guldenmund, 2000; Hale, 2000). Commonly cited differences include:  
1. Culture is a more holistic construct whereas climate is often seen as a 
manifestation or ‘slice’ of broader culture (Hale, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999). 
2. Culture is thought to reflect a group level idea, whereas climate was traditionally 
viewed as an individual/ perceptive measure (Zohar, 1980). 
3. Climate has its origins in psychological traditions, whereas culture is more 
familiar in anthropological and sociological research (Guldenmund, 2000). 
4. Culture and climate are measured differently—culture is often determined 
through qualitative research such as observations and interviews, whereas 
climate is commonly measured through quantitative questionnaires that measure 
individual’s perceptions and attitudes (Cooper, 2000). 
Furthermore, Mearns and Flin (1999) distinguish between the two concepts by 
viewing safety climate as a snapshot of employee’s perceptions, attitudes and beliefs 
about safety, whereas safety culture is viewed as a stable trait that reflects 
fundamental values, norms, assumptions and expectations. This view is supported in 
other models of safety culture, discussed in section 2.4.  
In addition to the culture versus climate debate, there are also variations in how 
safety climate is defined. Some common definitions of safety climate are provided in 
Table 2.2. Most definitions refer to perceptions; however some also include beliefs 
and attitudes (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Cooper & Philips, 1994; Coyle, Sleeman & 
Adams, 1995). Another difference relates to the level of measurement. Most 
definitions reflect a group level measurement with references to ‘molar’ or ‘shared’ 
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perceptions (Zohar, 2000), whereas others refer to individual perceptions (Neal et al., 
2000; Neal & Griffin, 2006).   
Table 2.2 
Commonly cited definitions of safety climate 
Reference Definition  
Zohar (1980) A summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their 
work environments 
Brown and Holmes 
(1986) 
A set of perceptions and beliefs held by an individual and/or group 
about a particular entity  
Dedobbeleer & 
Beland (1991) 
Molar perceptions people have of their work settings  
Cooper and Philips 
(1994) 
Safety climate is concerned with the shared perceptions and beliefs 
that workers hold regarding safety in their work place 
Coyle et al. (1995) The objective measurement of attitudes and perceptions toward 
occupational health and safety issues 
Neal et al. (2000) A specific form of organisational climate, which describes individual 
perceptions of the value of safety in the work environment 
Zohar (2000) Safety climate as a multi-level construct rests on the differentiation 
between respective sources of climate perceptions at the 
organisational and group levels of analysis  
Mohamed (2002) Workers’ perception of safety in the work environment 
Neal and Griffin 
(2006) 
Individual perceptions of policies, procedures, and practices relating 
to safety in the workplace 
Hahn and Murphy 
(2008) 
Shared perceptions of employees about the safety of their work 
environment 
 
 
2.3.5 Safety climate dimensions 
The multi-faceted nature of safety culture and climate has largely been 
investigated in the safety climate research stream, with a focus on categorising and 
defining the elements involved in safety climate perceptions. In particular, the 
exploration of safety climate dimensions or factors has been a major focus for many 
safety climate researchers. Since Zohar’s first paper in 1980, several studies have 
been published relating to safety climate questionnaires and the key factors that 
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comprise safety climate. Resulting dimensions from factor analyses have revealed 
anywhere from two (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991) to 28 (Lee & Harrison, 2000) 
factors. However, as will be discussed later, it is possible that these factors may be 
more similar than current comparisons suggest (Glendon & Litherland, 2001).   
Zohar’s (1980) paper was one of the first studies that defined, measured, and 
tested safety climate. Operationalised as a specific type of organisational climate, a 
safety climate scale was developed to assess employee’s perceptions about the 
relative importance of safe behaviour as part of their work. The research found that 
the organisations studied had definable safety climates, that is, the safety climate 
scores were more similar within an organisation than between organisations. The 
results from a production industry sample of 20 workers from 20 factories supported 
safety climate as an organisational construct. Zohar (1980) proposed an eight-factor 
model, namely: (a) management attitudes towards safety; (b) importance and 
effectiveness of safety training; (c) level of risk at workplace; (d) effects of work 
pace on safety; (e) status of safety committee; (f) effects of safe conduct on social 
status; (g) effects of safety conduct on promotion; and (h) status of safety officer.  Of 
these, it was found that two dimensions were most predictive of the level of safety 
climate: worker’s perceptions of management attitudes about safety and their 
perceptions regarding the relevance of safety in general production processes (Zohar, 
1980).  
The safety climate dimensions were later tested by Brown and Holmes (1986) 
and Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991), making this one of the few safety climate scales 
that has been subjected to confirmatory studies (Guldenmund, 2000). Brown and 
Holmes (1986) failed to confirm Zohar’s factor structure with an American 
production industry sample, and so conducted exploratory factor analysis on a 
refined scale and determined three-factors, including: employee perceptions of 
management concern with their well-being; employee perception of management 
response to this concern, and employee physical risk perception.  
In a subsequent study with construction industry workers, Dedobbeleer and 
Beland (1991) found two safety climate dimensions provided the best fit, namely: 
management commitment to safety and workers involvement in safety. Management 
commitment to safety was a dimension that reflected workers’ perceptions of 
management’s attitudes to safety, and management’s safety practices. In contrast to 
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the production workers’ studies, the construction workers viewed managers’ words 
and actions as a single dimension. This is an important finding which reflects the 
critical association of safety policy and safety practice in the construction 
environment. Management words and deeds were inseparable in worker judgements 
of management commitment to safety. Workers involvement in safety included 
workers’ physical risk perception, workers’ perceptions of control, and workers’ 
perception of safety responsibility. This industry difference may be important in 
understanding safety culture perceptions and influences on worker motivation to 
perform safety behaviours as it indicates that construction workers perceive safety as 
a joint responsibility between individuals and management.  
In a slightly different approach, Guldenmund (2007) considers safety climate 
dimensions as management processes or attitude objects. The nine dimensions 
include: risks, hardware design and layout, maintenance, procedures, manpower 
planning, competence, commitment, communication, and monitoring and change. In 
a construction industry study, Mohamed (2002) proposed ten constructs: 
management commitment, communication, safety rules and procedures, supportive 
environment, supervisory environment, workers’ involvement, personal appreciation 
of risk, appraisal of work environment, work pressure and competence.  
Guldenmund (2007) argues that safety climate research to date has two things 
in common. First, most analyses provide many different factors that are hard to 
replicate, and second, these analyses invariably point to an overarching higher order 
factor relating to higher management or organisational factors (for example, Griffin 
& Neal 2000). In fact, although Guldenmund presents nine factors in his paper on 
safety climate, he also acknowledges that these factors probably reflect an 
overarching evaluation of management’s consideration and management of safety. In 
a later publication, Guldenmund (2010) reports that the trend is now towards a one-
dimensional scale known simply as ‘safety culture’. For example, Jiang, Yu, Li and 
Li (2009) conducted exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses on their chosen 
safety climate scale and found that a single factor model was the best fit. Similarly, 
O’Toole (2002) found that employees’ perceptions of management commitment to 
safety were most predictive of injuries over time. This likely reflects the recognition 
of a higher order safety climate factor relating to management commitment (c.f. 
Griffin & Neal, 2000). The single factor scale also reflects a functionalist 
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understanding of safety culture and safety climate, such that management’s approach 
to safety is the most critical aspect of an organisation’s culture and climate.  
In recent Australian research, safety climate has been measured as a single 
factor, with other dimensions—including motivation, compliance and participation—
re-conceptualised as determinants and components of safety behaviour (Griffin & 
Neal, 2000; Neal et al., 2000; Neal & Griffin, 2006). When viewing safety climate as 
a predictor of safety outcomes, it becomes relevant to consider the predictors of 
performance in regards to proximal influence. Neal et al.’s framework will be 
discussed in more detail in section 2.6.  
2.3.6 Group differences in safety climate 
Another perspective on safety climate suggests that the organisation-level is 
not the only level at which people can share climate perceptions (Zohar, 2000). 
Particularly in large or diverse organisations, it is possible that work groups or 
workforce levels may differ in their perceptions of how safety is valued and 
prioritised due to different working environments and management approaches. This 
multi-level understanding of safety climate has implications for both the conceptual 
and practical aspects of culture and climate.  
A number of studies have identified differences in safety climate scores 
between sub-groups in organisations (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Glendon & Litherland, 
2001; Lee & Harrison, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005). In particular, Zohar and 
colleagues have been influential in pursuing the development and testing of a multi-
level model of safety climate. The model recognises that safety policies, procedures 
and practices are implemented at different organisational levels and what is 
implemented at the workgroup level may vary according to supervisory execution.  
In a recent Australian study, Lingard, Cooke and Blismas (2009) investigated 
the concept of group-level safety climate in a road administration organisation. Work 
groups of construction and maintenance crews were tested for within-group 
homogeneity and between-group variance to determine the existence of workgroup-
level safety climates. Results were supportive, with findings indicating group-level 
safety climates do exist, and that this is a possible explanation for differing safety 
performance within areas of an organisation.  
 32  
Different working environments can also impact on perceptions of safety 
climate. In their study in the mining industry, Cui, Fan, Fu and Zhu (2013) found a 
significant effect for hazardous environment on safety climate. Specifically, they 
found that higher perceptions of a hazardous environment (in the coal mining context 
this includes dust, gas, flood and fire) were related to higher safety climate 
perceptions, possibly because of a heightened awareness of safety issues by 
management. These results suggest that the immediate work environment can result 
in different safety climates. Large and diverse organisations within the construction 
industry are likely to have a variety of working environments across functional 
groups. Further research on organisational size and differentiation suggests that 
larger mines are safer than smaller mines, possibly due to greater availability of 
safety resources, and mines with less task diversity are safer than those with greater 
task diversity (Page, 2009). This argues strongly for the relevance of Zohar’s (2000) 
assertion that shared climate perceptions exist not only at organisational level but 
also at work group level. This multi-level understanding is important at both 
conceptual and practical considerations of culture and climate.  
There is also evidence that safety climates may differ between different 
position types within an organisation. Morris et al. (1999) investigated differences in 
health climate perceptions amongst blue and white-collar workers, and found that 
blue-collar workers generally had a less positive view of the safety climate. Prussia, 
Brown & Willis (2003) found that when safety climate was positive, managers and 
workers had a similar view on the causes of safety incidents. However, when safety 
climate was poor, workers tended to attribute safety responsibility to managers, and 
vice-versa for managers’ attributions. The results from this study suggest that 
workers and managers exhibit group differences on perceptions of safety 
responsibility and blame when safety climate is poor. Taken together, the literature 
on group differences and safety climate indicate that further research is needed to 
examine the nature of workforce differences, particularly in large and diverse 
organisations. An organisation cannot be assumed to be homogenous just because 
senior management state shared safety values.  
2.4 MODELS OF SAFETY CULTURE 
It has been highlighted in this review that the safety culture literature suffers 
from ambiguity and confusion, and the various theoretical models are no exception. 
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Whilst safety climate has been reasonably well conceptualised, this has been largely 
detached from a broader safety culture perspective, such that theoretical development 
has been parallel rather than synergetic. Some models describe ‘components’ of 
culture, others attempt to explain the relationship between safety culture/ climate and 
safety outcomes, and some models in the area describe the factors that interact to 
cause a workplace safety incident, and the role of culture in this interaction. This 
section provides an overview of the influential models in the safety culture and 
climate literature, including accident causation models, safety triad models, 
component models, and safety culture maturity or change models.   
2.4.1 Accident causation models 
As previously discussed, the investigation into the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster resulted in safety culture becoming a legitimate causal explanation for safety 
failures. Despite its reactive beginning, safety culture was a concept that was 
designed to allow more proactive analysis, prior to incidents taking place. Accident 
causation models attempt to map the various factors that interact to create an 
organisational accident.  
Reason’s safety pyramid model (1990). Reason’s model is a well-known 
accident causation model that represents the interaction of active failures (human 
errors, mistakes, procedural violations) and latent pathogens (existing system 
conditions arising from management decisions, e.g., understaffing) increasing the 
likelihood of incident.  Whilst safety culture is not explicitly defined, Reason’s 
model implies a cultural influence through the latent condition pathways. That is, the 
overall safety culture is reflective of how safety is resourced and supported by 
management, and how it is operationalised in policies and procedures. This is 
described in more detail in Zohar’s (2010) extension of the model.   
Zohar’s (2010) safety climate and safety pyramid model. Zohar (2010) has 
proposed a conceptual model linking organisational climate literature with safety 
management literature, drawing on Reason’s (1997) Safety Pyramid model. As 
shown in Figure 2.1, Zohar (2010) suggests that incorporating an organisational and 
safety climate ‘filter’ (represented in the grey boxes) in the model will allow it to be 
used in a preventative sense rather than just as an incident analysis tool.   
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Figure 2.1. Integration of safety climate and safety pyramid models (Adapted from 
Zohar, 2010)   
The model provides a link between the safety management and safety 
culture/climate literatures by reconsidering latent pathogens as safety climate 
perceptions, particularly employee perceptions around espoused versus enacted 
priorities and policies. Safety climate can be measured periodically to provide a lead 
indicator of organisational safety, as opposed to just assessing the contributing 
factors once an incident has already taken place. What this model does not do 
however, is consider safety culture in its broadest sense, including core basic 
assumptions, nor how one might manipulate certain factors in an organisational 
change program. This model is clear in articulating the role of leadership, and has 
been utilised in safety interventions (Zohar, 2002).  
The construction accident causality (ConAC) model. A further example of 
accident causation models is the construction-specific causation model published by 
the UK Health and Safety Executive (Haslam et al., 2003). The model was derived 
from research investigating construction accidents from the perspective of accident 
victims and supervisors. The model is not dissimilar from Zohar’s (2010) integrated 
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model, in that it considers proximal and distal factors in the accident trajectory. The 
model describes originating influences such as client requirements, the economic 
climate and the safety culture; shaping factors such as work schedules, individual 
attitudes/motivations and supervisory behaviour; and immediate accident 
circumstances including both worker and site factors.  The model is comprehensive 
in its consideration of influences in construction accidents and could certainly be 
useful as a tool to analyse accidents.  
2.4.2 Safety triad models 
In contrast to accident causation models, safety triad models of safety culture 
focus on the interaction between the individual perceptive elements, behavioural 
elements and the environment in the management of safety. Safety triad models are 
generally based on Bandura’s (1986) Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1986). 
Social Cognitive Theory extends earlier research on social learning and behaviour by 
considering environmental influence on individual behaviour, in addition to 
cognitions. 
Geller’s (1994) total safety culture. Geller (1994) outlines ten principles for 
achieving what he refers to as a “Total Safety Culture”. The principles are designed 
to be applied in organisations aiming to achieve a culture where safety is pursued by 
all levels of employees on a daily basis, and focuses on the ‘human’ elements of the 
person–behaviour–environment triangle. Geller’s model describes three elements or 
domains that provide a foundation for the principles:  
1. Person—knowledge, skills, abilities, intelligence, motives, personality; 
2. Behaviour—complying coaching, recognising, communicating, demonstrating 
active caring; and 
3. Environment—equipment, tools, machines, housekeeping, engineering.  
The principles follow a psychological approach, and include statements around 
actively caring, and increasing self-esteem, belonging and empowerment in 
employees. Specifically, the principles state: 1. The culture, rather than regulatory 
bodies, should drive the safety process; 2. Behaviour-based and person-based factors 
determine success; 3. Focus on process, not outcomes; 4. Behaviour is directed by 
activators and motivated by consequences; 5. Focus on achieving success, not on 
avoiding failure; 6. Observation and feedback leads to safe behaviours; 7. Effective 
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feedback occurs via behaviour-based and person-based coaching; 8. Observing and 
coaching are key actively caring processes; 9. Self-esteem, belonging and 
empowerment increase actively caring for safety; and 10. Shift safety from a priority 
to a value. 
Intervention domains or processes are then suggested based on the culmination 
of the principles, namely (Geller, 1994, p. 23): interpersonal observation and 
feedback; safety coaching for interpersonal feedback; incentives and rewards for 
process activities; using techniques to increase actively caring behaviours; and 
evaluating environment, behaviour and person factors. The last process suggests 
periodic assessment of each of the three domains, monitoring progress via audits, 
surveys, interviews and focus groups to provide a measure of overall safety 
performance. Whilst Geller’s (1994) model is highly translatable to practice, it does 
not provide conclusive empirical evidence for the principles, providing generally a 
superficial explanation of the theoretical reasoning behind them. For example in an 
extensive study of employer-based programs to motivate safety belt use, findings 
indicated that intrinsic motivation proved more effective than extrinsic rewards, 
extrinsic rewards required intermittent reiteration to be effective, and a no-reward 
condition utilising awareness and commitment discussions only provide the most 
effective in the medium and long term (Geller, Rodd, Kalsher, Streff, & Lehman, 
1987).  
Cooper’s (2000) reciprocal model of safety culture.  Cooper’s reciprocal 
model (Figure 2) includes person, behaviour and situation factors, not dissimilar 
from Geller’s (1994) model. Cooper highlights the encompassing nature of the 
model, whereby it includes subjective internal psychological factors, observable 
safety-related behaviours and objective situational factors. It is also argued that the 
model promotes methodological triangulation (combining methodologies to cross-
validate the results gained from each), a principle also encouraged by others in the 
field (e.g., Guldenmund, 2000). Methodological triangulation is argued to be critical 
for investigating multi-faceted constructs, as each method is necessarily limited in 
what it can reveal about each facet.    
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Figure 2.2. Reciprocal safety culture model. (Adapted from Cooper, 2000).  
Choudhry et al.’s (2007) model of construction safety culture. Choudhry et al. 
(2007) offer a conceptual model of construction safety culture, which aims to 
integrate three related concepts—safety climate, behaviour-based safety, and the 
safety management system. In fact the model is essentially an extension of Cooper’s 
(2000) reciprocal model of safety culture, which has been extended to include 
construction-specific descriptions of each component (person, situation and 
behaviour). Adapting the language of the model for the industry facilitates effective 
translation of key concepts to project work tasks.  
2.4.3 Component and layer models 
Yet another perspective on safety culture includes describing the components 
and layers of culture, with the assumption that if the content of culture is understood, 
this allows for effective diagnosis and improvement of cultural aspects of safety.  
Reason’s (1997) components of safety culture.  In his book on managing the 
risks of organisational accidents, Reason (1997) provides a chapter on ‘engineering 
safety culture’. Reason tailors his message to a ‘safety professional’ audience rather 
than an academic one, and the resulting discussion outlines the four components of 
safety culture as applied primarily in high-risk industries: 
 Reporting culture: An organisational climate in which people are prepared 
to report their errors and near-misses. 
 Just culture: An atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged (even 
rewarded) for providing essential safety-related information, but in which 
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they are also clear about where the line must be drawn between acceptable 
and unacceptable behaviour. 
 Flexible culture: A culture in which an organisation is able to reconfigure 
themselves in the face of high tempo operations of certain kinds of 
danger—often shifting from the conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter 
mode.  
 Learning culture: An organisation that possesses the willingness and the 
competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety information 
system and implements major reforms based on this information.  
Reason suggests that these four components interact to create an informed 
culture, which he equates to an advanced safety culture. The components provide a 
prescriptive model of the various elements of safety culture, and are often cited in the 
literature. For example, Hudson (2003) has built on Reason’s model by including 
further components around mindfulness and risk wariness. There has been to date, 
however, no published empirical research on the validity of the components, nor any 
evidence of their effective application in an organisational change intervention. 
Furthermore, Reason’s components are not commonly reflected in safety climate 
factor scales, and so represent quite a different view of safety culture.  
Guldenmund’s (2000) framework for safety culture.  Guldenmund (2000; 
2010) extends Schein’s (1992) model of culture to a framework for safety culture. 
Table 2.3 displays the framework, which essentially outlines three layers of culture, 
their visibility in organisations, and safety-specific examples of manifestations.  
Guldenmund (2000) shares Schein’s view that ‘true’ culture is the core layer, 
but as it is the hardest to decipher, many researchers rely on the middle and outer 
layers to investigate culture. In the discussion, it is also suggested that the levels can 
be explained in a causal pathway, where the combination of individuals’ safety 
attitudes (safety climate) can be considered a consequence of the basic assumptions 
of the organisation’s members (safety culture). The evaluative responses to the safety 
climate are then revealed in the organisation’s artefacts, including personal protective 
equipment, safety training and site safety posters. 
 
 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 39 
Table 2.3 
Framework for safety culture. (Adapted from Guldenmund, 2010) 
Layers of culture Visibility Examples 
1. Outer layer—artefacts Visible, but often hard 
to comprehend in terms 
of an underlying culture 
 
Slogans/logos, buildings, dress 
codes / personal protective 
equipment, posters/bulletins, 
reports (accident, incident, 
inspection), minutes, training 
manuals, job descriptions, 
procedures, celebrations, rituals 
2. Middle layer—espoused 
values 
(Relatively) explicit and 
conscious 
 
All spoken 
statements/justifications, 
attitudes* (e.g., as determined 
through surveys), interviews and 
focus group data, 
ambitions/intentions, all 
perceptions.  
3. Core layer—basic 
assumptions regarding: 
1. The nature of reality and 
truth 
2. The nature of time 
3. The nature of space 
4. The nature of human nature 
5. The nature of human 
activity 
6. The nature of human 
relationships 
Mainly implicit: 
 Obvious to 
members 
 Invisible 
 Pre-conscious 
Have to be deciphered from 
artefacts and espoused values 
Note. Attitudes e.g., regarding safety measures, systems, people (self, colleagues, 
supervision, management) and risks (hazards, scenarios). 
 
2.4.4 Safety culture change and maturity models 
The final type of models in the safety culture literature reflects the element of 
individual and organisational change and maturity in relation to safety management. 
This approach is less focused on the content of culture or the mapping of culture to 
safety outcomes, but aims to describe how individuals and organisations travel 
through change stages in regards to their approach to safety and risk management.  
Hudson’s (2003) evolution of safety cultures. Hudson (2003) also puts 
forward a model in which he describes a hierarchy of cultural sophistication 
 40  
regarding safety. As shown in Figure 2.3, Hudson proposes that high levels of 
informedness and trust are critical to organisations reaching a mature safety culture 
where safety values are embedded in business philosophy and practices.  
 
Figure 2.3. The evolution of safety cultures. (Adapted from Hudson, 2003).  
The evolution model was based on Westrum’s (1996) three-level typology of 
an organisation’s culture—pathological, bureaucratic and generative cultures, and 
Reason’s (1997) proposed extension, including two extra levels—reactive and 
proactive. Hudson has also applied this model (re-named the “HSE culture ladder”, 
2007) in the implementation of safety culture in a major multi-national petroleum 
company. Known as the “Hearts and Minds” project, Hudson used the HSE culture 
ladder as a consultation tool to gain support from senior management for the 
development of their safety culture, and to monitor progress over time. The model 
has considerable popularity in industry, with corporate language often reflecting 
rungs of the ladder (e.g., ‘we are still reactive’).  
2.4.5 Utility of current models    
It is clear that the theoretical development in the safety culture field has 
progressed significantly over the past 30 years. A number of thoughtful models have 
been proposed regarding the content of safety culture, and the interplay between 
perceptive elements, behavioural components, and environmental factors. 
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 Chapter 2: Literature Review 41 
Developmental models are also influential in the field, recognising the individual and 
organisational change progression in relation to cultural maturity and readiness.  
Some progression has occurred with theoretical development, with researchers 
extending and adapting models to different contexts, however, there are still many 
new contributions to the field. The safety culture literature is growing and 
diversifying rather than being distilled into a broadly accepted framework and 
approach to understanding and measurement. Currently there is still a gap between 
conceptual thinking and research methodologies. Perhaps this is not surprising given 
the definitional, epistemological and practical divergences in safety culture theory 
and research.  
Each type of model has some utility for understanding aspects of safety culture, 
or a version of the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes and 
individual, group or organisational levels. However, it is rare that a framework 
incorporates all of these facets, and it is even rarer that a methodological approach is 
defined for applying the framework in an industry setting. There is a need for further 
research that utilises complementary models to provide an encompassing scaffold for 
understanding and measuring safety culture and climate elements and relationships. 
Furthermore, safety culture and climate are not well integrated in existing models. 
There is a need for these concepts to be considered simultaneously in safety culture 
research for the divergent approaches to be integrated into a meaningful and holistic 
understanding of the concepts.  
2.5 FACILITATORS AND BARRIERS TO SAFETY CULTURE 
If safety culture is predictive of safety performance, then it is important to 
know not only how this pathway operates, but also what factors help or hinder the 
development of this predictive element. A notable gap in the current research 
literature is the exploration of the facilitators and barriers to safety culture 
development and maintenance in an industry context. Previous research has explored 
barriers to health intervention success (Banks & Davey, 2010; Hart, Watson & Tay, 
2003), factors that help and hinder supervisor engagement in safety leadership 
(Conchie, Moon & Duncan, 2013), and more generally the job demands and 
resources affecting motivation, engagement and safety outcomes (Nahrgang, 
Morgeson & Hoffman, 2011).  
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In a study of food safety programs, Bas, Yuksel & Cavusoglu (2007) identified 
a number of barriers to implementation. Included in these were the safety system’s 
complexity, lack of employee motivation and complicated terminology. Research on 
barriers to the implementation of a health promotion initiative identified barriers 
around employee resistance to change, insufficient resources, managers’ lack of 
appreciation for the importance of health and safety initiatives and a prioritisation of 
production over safety (Whysall, Haslam & Haslam, 2006). Resistance to change and 
prioritisation of production over safety have also been identified in the automobile 
(Clarke, 2006) and health care industries (Blake et al., 2006).  
Nahrgang et al. (2011) take a different approach and consider barriers and 
facilitators from an individual, job-specific perspective, in the form of job demand 
and resources. Job demands included risks and hazards, physical demands and 
complexity of work. Job resources included knowledge, social support and 
leadership. Following from Nahrgang et al.’s meta-analysis, Conchie et al. (2013) 
investigated safety leadership in the UK construction industry and identified a 
number of contextual factors that facilitated or inhibited supervisor engagement in 
leadership practices. Factors that hindered supervisors’ engagement in safety 
leadership included role overload, production pressure, subcontractor safety attitudes, 
inadequately skilled employees, and language barriers with foreign workers. In 
contrast, factors that were perceived as helpful resources included social support and 
role autonomy.  
In a more recent empirical study on safety barriers, Banks and Davey (2010) 
identified a number of organisational characteristics perceived as barriers and 
facilitators to the implementation of occupational road safety initiatives. Perceived 
barriers included the prioritisation of production over safety and complacency 
towards risks. Perceived facilitators included management commitment and 
supportive systems for implementation. However, the focus of the study was on 
barriers and facilitators to road safety initiatives, rather than the development and 
maintenance of culture specifically. It is not known if these same characteristics are 
relevant in relation to safety culture in the construction and mining industry. 
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2.6 SAFETY CULTURE AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
As discussed previously in section 2.4, many models of safety culture have 
been proposed, however, not many specifically define the pathway between safety 
culture and safety performance at both individual and organisational levels. Much of 
the safety culture literature assumes a relationship between cultural indicators and 
safety performance. However, the mechanisms by which safety culture and safety 
climate influence the safety behaviours of organisational members are not well 
integrated in the literature.   
2.6.1 Safety behaviour, performance and outcomes 
Many studies, including this program of research, begin their discussion of 
safety culture by describing the burden of workplace incidents, injuries and fatalities 
to the relevant country/industry/organisation. Safety culture is then proposed as a 
solution to this problem; however, outcome variables are often not clearly defined. 
For example, injury rates may be stated as the outcome of interest, but details around 
how injuries are reported and classified are not always provided. It is a similar case 
with the measurement of lost time injury free periods, which may be measured as 
time or rates. This further contributes to the fragmented nature of the field; without a 
consistent approach to defining predictor and outcomes variables, the antecedents 
and determinants are naturally mixed.  
Christian, Bradley, Wallace & Burke (2009) note that safety performance is 
often considered in one of two ways: first, as an organisational metric for safety 
outcomes, such as incidents, injuries, and near misses; and second, as an individual 
metric related to safety behaviours of employees. These two understandings of 
performance are undoubtedly related, however, are conceptually distinct, particularly 
when considering antecedents and determinants of performance outcomes. 
Workplace safety incidents are comparatively rare events in organisations (Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004; Zohar, 2000), so are not always a useful metric for tracking the safety 
performance of an organisation. As explained in Reason’s safety pyramid model (see 
section 2.4.1), the resulting incident is a culmination of several factors over time to 
create the precise environment in which the incident occurs.  
From an individual behaviour metric perspective, Neal et al. (2000) consider 
individual safety performance to be comprised of two components: safety 
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compliance and safety participation. Safety compliance refers to individuals’ 
adhering to safety procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner, whereas safety 
participation refers to helping co-workers, promoting the safety program within the 
workplace, demonstrating initiative and putting effort into improving safety in the 
workplace. Neal et al. (2000) have applied the model to the safety context, arguing 
that safety compliance is similar to task performance, and safety participation is 
analogous to contextual performance. That is, safety compliance can be considered a 
core activity for an individual’s safety, whereas safety participation involves 
behaviour that does not directly impact on an individual’s safety, but does help 
develop an environment that supports safety over time.  
These components reflect conceptually distinct sets of behaviours, which 
potentially have different determinants and antecedents, and these in turn possibly 
have a differential effect on each component – for example, safety motivation may 
have a stronger effect on safety participation than on compliance. Therefore, it is 
important to consider them as discrete constructs in the climate-behaviour 
relationship. Further studies have also used this safety performance distinction in 
determining the influence of various predictive factors (Christian et al., 20009; Jiang 
et al., 2010; Newnam, Griffin & Mason, 2008; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010).   
2.6.2 Factors predicting safety performance 
In examining the relationship between safety culture and safety behaviour, a 
number of additional factors have been investigated in regards to the magnitude and 
nature of their influence on the traditional relationship.  Indeed, despite the assumed 
relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes, Johnson (2007) notes that a 
direct causal link between safety climate and observed safe behaviour was not 
established until Cooper and Phillips’ (2004) study comparing manufacturing 
industry employees’ behaviour before and after a behavioural safety intervention. 
Other researchers, however, had reported correlations between safety climate and 
self-reported safety behaviour (e.g., Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Mohammed, 2002; 
O’Toole, 2002; Seo, 2005; Zohar, 2000). However, safety climate is not the only 
reported factor predicting safety performance.  
A number of predictive factors have been explored in the literature, including: 
safety knowledge (Neal et al., 2000); safety motivation (Newnam, Griffin & Mason, 
2008), leadership (Clarke & Ward, 2006; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009; Zohar & Luria, 
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2005), environmental factors (Cui, Fan, Fu & Zhu, 2013; Nahrang et al., (2011), and 
individual factors (Christian et al., 2009). In a recent meta-analysis of person and 
situation factors predicting workplace safety, Christian et al. provide a 
comprehensive overview of existing constructs and hypothesised relationships. 
Factors receiving convincing support included safety climate and safety motivation. 
Similarly, Seo (2005) found both direct and indirect influences of safety climate on 
safety behaviour in a study on US grain workers. Using structural equation 
modelling, Seo found that perceived safety climate had a significant direct effect on 
unsafe work behaviour, as well as a significant indirect effect through perceived 
work pressure, perceived risk and perceived barriers.  
A well-cited safety performance framework has been developed and tested by 
Neal et al. (2000), presented in Figure 2.4. The framework adopts Campbell, 
McCloy, Oppler & Sager’s (1993) model of job performance, where the components, 
determinants and antecedents of performance are distinguished, with knowledge and 
motivation comprising the determinants. Campbell et al. suggest that an individual’s 
motivation to perform a task will greatly influence their resulting performance in that 
task, assuming that they have the basic knowledge required. 
 
Figure 2.4. Safety performance framework. (From Neal et al., 2000) 
 
Subsequent studies have omitted organisational climate and safety knowledge 
(Neal & Griffin, 2006) due to poor predictive results. Organisational climate was 
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later omitted because Neal et al. found that it had no direct effects upon their derived 
measures of safety. Glendon and Litherland (2001) argue that this finding supports 
the investigation of safety climate in its own right. Similarly, safety knowledge was 
omitted from later studies due to poor predictive results. Certainly, in large 
construction organisations in developed countries such as Australia, levels of safety 
knowledge could be argued to be reasonably similar due to the comprehensive 
induction processes and standardised policies and procedures. Given this, safety 
motivation has been found by both Campbell et al (1993) and Neal et al (2000) to be 
the stronger determinant in the journey to the performance components of safety 
compliance and safety participation.  
2.6.3 Motivation 
In the context of organisational behaviour, motivation is often cited as a critical 
influencing factor for performance. Pinder (1998) describes work motivation as the 
set of internal and external forces that initiate work-related behaviour, and determine 
its form, direction, intensity, and duration. Internal forces refer to individual needs 
and motives, whereas external forces include factors relating to the type of work and 
the reward systems operating in the organisation.  
In the safety context, motivation refers to an individual’s willingness to expend 
effort to act safely as well as the value an individual places on being safe (Neal & 
Griffin, 2006). Similarly, Newnam et al. (2008) consider safety behaviour to be a 
form of ‘motivated work behaviour’, whereby an individual’s compliance with and 
participation in safety activities at work is determined by their motivation to put in 
effort around safety. The positive relationship between safety motivation and safety 
performance has been established in a number of studies (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal 
& Griffin, 2002; Newnam et al., 2008).  
Theories of motivation 
There are two broad approaches to the understanding of motivation at work: 
content theories and process theories. Content theories describe the types of 
motivation individuals’ experience, whereas process theories attempt to explain how 
motivation influences individuals’ behaviour (Kalliath et al., 2010). Maslow’s (1943) 
hierarchy of needs theory is perhaps the most commonly cited content theory, with 
needs presented as a pyramid. The bottom level incorporates physiological needs, 
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which are the basic human needs for food, air, water, and sleep. The next level 
addresses safety needs, including needs for physical shelter, and for psychological 
security and stability. The third level refers to belonging and love needs, including 
social needs for love, affection, friendship and affiliation. The next level relates to 
esteem needs, including both self-esteem, and admiration and respect from others. 
The final level in Maslow’s hierarchy is reserved for ‘self-actualisation’. This need 
relates to self-fulfilment, achieving our full potential and realising our capabilities. 
The theory suggests that once physical safety/security and social needs are met, 
people are motivated to meet their needs of self-esteem, such as having autonomy, 
status and receiving promotions. Maslow’s hierarchy suggests that safety needs are 
core and immediate, implying that we should be highly motivated to meet those 
needs.  
Process theories are less interested in the motives or needs of individuals, and 
more focused on what processes might influence how people are motivated for 
certain behaviours or actions. Previous research on the content of motivation 
indicates that individuals vary widely in their motives (Pinder, 1998), and these 
individual differences are difficult to address in organisational policies and systems.  
As safety research is generally interested in how motivation works to influence 
safety behaviour, process theories are more relevant to guiding research.  
Goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990) has a conceptually simple 
premise stating that people make rational choices about what they do, based on 
internalised intentions and goals. The setting of specific, challenging but achievable 
goals allows a conscious articulation of desired achievements that provides direction 
and motivation for supporting behaviour. Goal-setting theory has some support in the 
literature (Miner, 2003), and is particularly useful for tasks of moderate difficultly 
and complexity. Ludwig and Geller (2000) report on several field studies undertaken 
by themselves and additional colleagues over a 10-year span. The investigations 
evaluated behaviour-based interventions designed to increase safe driving practices 
of pizza delivery drivers. Goal setting both at group and individual level was a 
consistent behavioural change strategy across six of seven of these investigations, 
and the outcomes of these studies have provided a roadmap for future research in 
developing, fostering, and maintaining (i.e., continuously motivating) durable safety 
behaviours.  
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Equity theory (Adams, 1965) offers an alternative view of motivation. The 
theory posits that a person’s motivation, and therefore behaviour, will be influenced 
by the perceived ratio of outcomes to inputs (Kalliath et al, 2010). That is, 
individuals consider the rewards of an activity (e.g., monetary payment), and the 
investment made in performing those behaviours (effort and contributions), as 
compared to the ratio of others in a similar environment. Empirical support for equity 
theory is also mixed (Levy, 2003). Ultimately Equity theory is about fairness in the 
workplace and derives its analysis of fairness from comparisons of one’s ratio of 
outputs to inputs to that of another. If the perception is that the referent other’s ratio 
is comparable, then a state of equity is said to exist. If this is not the case, inequity is 
perceived and a number of strategies are suggested as being available to reduce this 
inequity. Most of the early research on this theory related to pay and incentive 
outcomes, with more recent emphasis on status outcomes such as job title and office 
accommodation. Such outcomes as remuneration, financial incentives, and job status 
are typically not strongly linked to safety behaviours, which could explain why 
equity theory is not considered a motivation driver in safety research. 
Vroom’s (1964) Valence–Instrumentality–Expectancy (VIE) theory is a well-
accepted modern theory of work motivation. The theory assumes that individuals 
adopt a rational approach to decisions (person-as-scientist paradigm), and that 
behaviours are a result of individuals choosing among various options (Kalliath et 
al., 2010; Landy & Conte, 2010). Like equity theory and goal-setting theory, VIE 
theory attempts to explain how motivation determines behaviour. Moreover, the 
theory can both explain and predict behaviour, as it suggests that employees’ efforts 
are motivated by the belief that rewards will follow performance (Bartol & Durham, 
2000). The key characteristic of this theory is that it is a within-person decision-
making model. That is, the individual chooses to behave in accordance with the 
alternative that he or she associates with the highest subjective expected utility. The 
theory suggests that individuals make conscious choices among alternative courses 
of action based on perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes about those alternatives and 
their associated outcomes (Pinder, 1998; Vroom, 1964).  
Behaviour is guided by an individual’s consideration of three proximal factors: 
valence, instrumentality, and expectancy. Valence refers to the affective orientation 
that an individual has with respect to a given outcome. It is a preference that is 
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derived from the anticipated level of satisfaction associated with an outcome. 
Outcomes exist at two levels with task performance generally representing the first 
level, and intrinsic and extrinsic rewards occupying the second level in as much as 
these outcomes result from task performance. Instrumentality refers to the extent to 
which an individual believes that task performance will lead to second-level 
outcomes. High instrumentality motivates behaviour that facilitates performance as 
performance becomes valued by its association with a second-level outcome. 
Expectancy refers to the extent to which an individual believes s/he can accomplish a 
first-level performance outcome (Vroom, 1964).  
Motivation as a mediating factor 
A number of studies have investigated motivation in a safety context. Safety 
motivation is a key construct in Neal et al (2000)’s safety performance framework, 
suggesting it is one of the mediating factors between safety climate and safety 
behaviour components. Subsequent research has also tested safety motivation as a 
mediator finding support for an indirect climate-behaviour relationship, through 
safety motivation in both cross-sectional (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010) and 
longitudinal designs (Griffin & Neal; 2006; Probst & Brubaker, 2001).   
2.6.4 Leadership 
The role of leaders in workplace safety is well established in the research 
literature (Clarke & Ward, 2006; Griffin & Hu, 2013; Mullen & Kelloway, 2009; 
Zohar, 2000). Leadership has been investigated as a safety-specific behaviour 
(Barling, Loughlin & Kelloway, 2002), a general behavioural trait (Rafferty & 
Griffin, 2004) and as an interaction between leader and employee (Hofmann & 
Morgeson, 1999). The theoretical approaches to leadership in the safety context are 
discussed below. The following review focuses on traditional leadership theories, 
rather than alternative modern approaches such as complexity leadership theory as 
they are considered most relevant for the project-based, hierarchy-dominated 
industries such as construction and mining (as opposed to more knowledge based 
industries such as professional services). 
Theories of leadership 
Traditional leadership theories differentiate between transactional leadership 
and transformational leadership. Transactional leaders recognise the needs of 
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employees and the organisation, with a view to improving task performance (Burns, 
1978). Whereas transformational leaders also recognise these needs, but focus on 
higher order motivations and seek alternative ways of meeting performance goals 
(Bass, 1985). Both constructs are conceptualised as multi-dimensional, with the 
Multi-Factor Leadership Questionnaire (Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999) being widely 
used as a measure of transformational leadership. The Multi-Factor Leadership 
Questionnaire measures four related but conceptually distinct facets, namely: 
idealised influence, inspiration motivation, intellectual stimulations and 
individualised consideration. More recently, the dimensional model of 
transformational leadership has been refined by Rafferty and Griffin (2004). They 
argue that previous inconsistencies in transformational leadership research were due 
to blurring between the dimensions. They reconceptualised and refocused the 
dimensions, and found support for a five-factor solution including vision, 
inspirational communication, intellectual stimulation, supportive leadership and 
personal recognition. Zohar (2002b) found that transformational leadership predicted 
injury rates in a manufacturing and maintenance plant.  
Another approach to investigating leadership considers the quality of the 
relationship between the supervisor and employee, known as Leader–Member 
Exchange (LMX; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). LMX is derived from social 
exchange theory, in that a high quality relationship or exchange between the leader 
and the employee can obligate the employee to reciprocate through increasing 
citizenship behaviours (e.g., ‘going the extra mile’ in a job). In the safety context, a 
high degree of LMX has been associated with employees raising safety concerns and 
being more committed to safety in the workplace (Hoffmann & Morgeson, 1999; 
Hofmann, Morgeson & Gerras, 2003). Despite many perspectives on leadership in 
safety, a common element is the recognition of the immediate supervisor, and in 
particular, their support for employees (Nahrgang et al., 2011).   
Leadership as a mediating factor 
Leadership has been considered as a predictor of safety climate and safety 
participation, but is less often considered as a potential mediator between the two. It 
is clear from the literature that leaders can play a critical role in influencing safe 
behaviours at work (Flin & Yule, 2004), but the exact nature of this influence is not 
agreed upon. Leaders also have a role in reinforcing behaviour-outcome 
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contingencies for safety (Zohar, 2002a), thus making it an important variable to 
consider alongside employee motivation (see section 2.6.3).   
2.6.5 Stage of change 
An important individual factor considered in the climate–behaviour 
relationship is an individual’s stage of change. Prochaska and Diclemente’s (1982) 
transtheoretical model of change was traditionally used to map individual changes in 
readiness for behaviours such as smoking cessation and weight loss. However, more 
recently the model has been successfully applied to health and safety interventions 
(Banks, Davey, Biggs & King, 2008; Barrett, Haslam, Lee & Ellis, 2005; Haslam & 
Draper, 2000). Prochaska and DiClemente’s model identifies a series of pre-defined 
stages of change reflecting progress towards improving health-related behaviours. 
The five stages represent increasing readiness for change: 1. Precontemplation (not 
considering changing behaviour); 2. Contemplation (thinking about changing); 3. 
Preparation (making definite plans to change); 4. Action (actually engaged in 
changing behaviour); and 5. Maintenance (working to prevent relapse and 
consolidate gains made). There is also a sixth stage referred to as Relapse, where the 
changed behaviour is discontinued and an individual begins working through the 
stages again. 
In the safety context, Barrett et al. (2005) adopted the model to a questionnaire-
based tool designed to assess readiness for change amongst key stakeholders in a 
manufacturing company. Managers, supervisors and operators participated in 
targeted interviews as well as completing a safety climate questionnaire. It was 
concluded that the model was a useful addition to traditional culture measurement, as 
it allowed a more structured approach to identifying individual’s receptiveness to 
safety interventions, and provided a complementary measure of safety beliefs.  
More recently, Banks et al. (2008) used the stage of change questionnaire with 
a fleet safety sample. Participants included employees from a utility organisation and 
a not-for-profit service organisation, however, the overall sample size was quite 
small (N = 10). The authors concluded that the short stage of change questionnaire 
provided a useful framework for understanding employee readiness for road safety 
behaviour change. Importantly, it was also found that perceptions around initiative 
effectiveness were found to vary in relation to an individuals’ stage of change.  
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Stage of change as a mediating factor 
Given the relationship between stage of change and behaviours, it is possible 
that an individual’s stage of change acts as a mediator between safety climate 
perceptions and self-reported safety behaviours. This has not been explored as yet in 
the literature, so represents a gap for further research to consider.  
2.6.6 Summary of key factors predicting safety performance  
A wide variety of variables have been explored in the pursuit of explaining 
safety performance. The review undertaken here has highlighted the factors that have 
considerable support in the literature both theoretically and empirically. In addition 
to safety culture/climate, the factors that seem to have the most potential in 
explaining safety performance include motivation, leadership and stage of change. 
Motivation has been explored in a number of safety studies, and more recent research 
suggests it may have a mediating effect on the climate-behaviour relationship. 
Similarly, leadership is frequently investigated in safety climate research, and a 
consideration of perceptions of leadership alongside employee motivation is an 
important contribution to the literature in this industry. Finally, stage of change has 
not been extensively studied in the safety culture field, and has potential to be a key 
predictor given the links between individual readiness for change and broader 
organisational cultural maturity. These factors will be explored in depth in the case 
study organisation, alongside facilitators and barriers to safety culture. 
2.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research program addresses a number of significant deficits in safety 
culture research to date. As noted throughout the literature review, there is a need to 
further investigate how those who implement and manage safety culture initiatives 
within the organisation understand safety culture. There is also a need to better 
understand the factors that influence the relationship between safety culture and 
safety behaviour and related outcomes. This pathway is currently not well 
understood and articulated within the academic literature. Finally, it is important to 
explore how these influencing factors operate in an industry context, in this case the 
construction sector, from the perspective of frontline workers and managers. The 
research questions for this program were developed based on the gaps in the 
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literature and the objectives of the research program. Table 2.4 indicates how each 
research question addresses the research objectives.   
Table 2.4  
Research objectives as addressed by the research questions 
Research Objective Addressed by 
 RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4 RQ5 
1. Gain insight into how safety culture is 
understood in theory versus how it is 
applied in practice 
     
2. Explore workforce differences in 
perceptions of safety culture across the 
organisation 
     
3. Examine the relationship between safety 
culture and safety behaviour, and 
investigate additional factors that 
influence this relationship  
     
4. Translate research findings into applied 
recommendations for improving safety 
culture and related outcomes within the 
industry 
     
 
Research Question 1: How is safety culture understood and described by the 
safety leaders in the organisation? The current academic literature has a fragmented 
view of safety culture stemming from diverse theoretical positions and unresolved 
conceptual debates. It is important to understand how the leaders in an organisational 
setting understand safety culture, as this influences how cultural values and beliefs 
are translated through workforce levels. This research question will contribute to the 
first objective of the research program (see section 1.3) by providing an insight into 
the shared vision of safety culture, how safety culture is understood in terms of 
overarching concepts and principles, and the language used to describe and apply 
these principles in practice.  
Research Question 2: What are the key facilitators and barriers to safety 
culture? Also contributing to Objective 1, this research question specifically 
considers the most important facilitators and barriers to safety culture, from the 
perspective of the organisational safety leaders and the broader workforce. The 
research literature to date has not considered facilitators and barriers from this 
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perspective, so this will address a gap in the literature. It is not enough to simply 
explore descriptions of safety culture; the factors that help or hinder the development 
and maintenance of a positive safety culture need to be identified and explored in 
terms of impact for this organisation.  
Research Question 3: Are there intra-organisational differences in safety 
culture perceptions and safety behaviour? Specifically addressing Objective 2, this 
research question explores differences in perceptions of safety climate and safety 
behaviours of the workforce. Previous research suggests that perceptions vary 
amongst organisational workforce levels and functional areas, especially when 
organisations are large and diverse such as the current construction and mining 
contracting company. Determining any group differences within an organisation is 
critical to understanding the safety culture and to developing and implementing 
effective interventions that are tailored to the organisation’s needs.  
Research Question 4: What additional factors influence safety behaviour and 
related outcomes? In addition to understanding organisational variations in safety 
climate and behaviour, this research program aims to investigate the relationship 
between safety climate and safety performance, as well as any additional factors that 
influence this relationship (Objective 3). A number of factors have been suggested in 
the literature, and Study Two will empirically investigate the contribution of safety 
climate, safety motivation, leadership, and stage of change in predicting safety 
behaviour within the chosen organisation. Investigating these relationships in this 
way will provide guidance on the variables that should be the focus for any 
interventions and ongoing safety culture strategies.   
Research Question 5: How can workers be encouraged to perform desired 
safety behaviours? Also related to the third objective, this research question delves 
deeper into understanding how and why workers are encouraged to perform safety 
behaviours, and the influencing role of supervisors. Understanding this from the 
perspective of frontline workers is critical to informing practical safety culture 
interventions for the organisation, as these workers have the most risk exposure. A 
frontline perspective also assists in the translation of research findings to the 
organisational environment (Objective 4).  
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2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed the literature relevant to the research program. The 
burden of workplace safety incidents is evidently of concern to government and 
industry, and current approaches to workplace safety are now considering the 
cultural aspects of safety. This is particularly relevant in the construction and mining 
industries, as they bear much of the injury and fatality burden, and have challenging 
environments in which to operate. Despite safety culture being extensively discussed 
and researched, the academic literature is still undecided on some important 
conceptual and practical issues. Many models exist describing the content of safety 
culture and climate, but the relationship between safety culture and safety 
performance is not well defined. Factors suggested to influence safety performance 
include safety climate, leadership, safety knowledge and motivation. However, the 
exact recipe for predicting safety outcomes remains unclear. This research program 
will address a number of significant gaps in the current safety culture literature, and 
offers a unique, in-depth perspective of an influential industry organisation.  
The next chapter describes the theoretical framework guiding the research 
program, and the research design chosen to address the research questions. The 
theoretical framework is presented and described in terms of each study in the 
research program, followed by an outline of the methodological approach for each 
study. Ethical considerations are presented, and the strengths and limitations of the 
methodological approach. The benefits of applied research are also discussed as they 
relate to the current research program.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework and 
research design 
This chapter describes the theoretical framework guiding the program of 
research, and the research design adopted to address the research questions posed in 
the literature review. The basis for the theoretical framework is described, followed 
by an explanation of each component of the framework. Next, the research design is 
presented, including the methodological approach to each study within the research 
program. The ethical considerations are then discussed, including issues of 
confidentiality, anonymity and recruitment implications. Next, the strengths and 
limitations of the chosen methodology are presented. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the benefits of applied research as they relate to the research program.  
3.1 BACKGROUND 
Given the diversity of safety culture, climate and performance research 
described in the literature review, it was important to define a theoretical framework 
to guide the research program. The framework outlines the conceptualisation of 
culture, climate and behaviour underpinning this thesis. It also informs the research 
design for the studies in the program as safety culture research has a number of 
methodological challenges. Research methodologies vary widely dependent on the 
conceptual understanding of culture as well as the practical issues of measuring a 
construct that is by its nature difficult to define and observe.  
Safety culture is widely accepted (Glendon, 2003; Zohar, 2010) as an 
amorphous, complex construct, which is difficult to both define and measure, even 
by those operating within it. Safety culture improvement is a common aim amongst 
organisations in high-risk industries such as construction and mining. However, the 
relationship between cultural aspects and individual safety behaviour is often not 
well articulated, and other influencing factors are not always considered in a 
systematic way.  
In addition, safety culture and safety climate models are relatively diverse 
within the literature. It is difficult to navigate through the large amount of literature 
often tackling culture/climate and workplace safety from different perspectives, 
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whether this entails a human factors approach, an organisational psychology 
viewpoint or a business management slant. This thesis has synthesised frameworks 
from the organisational psychology literature, which has a strong history in 
organisational culture and climate theory and measurement, and more recently in 
safety culture and climate.  
3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework guiding the research program is depicted in Figure 
3.1 below. The key constructs are presented as they are investigated in each research 
study, and the arrows between the boxes represent the relationships between the 
constructs. Safety culture is investigated as a dependent variable in Study One, where 
the descriptions and content of culture are investigated alongside the facilitators and 
barriers to safety culture. Next, Study Two investigates safety climate within the 
organisation, as well as its relationship to safety behaviour and other mediating 
factors. Study Two also investigates perceptions of safety culture facilitators and 
barriers with a different sample (represented by the dotted lines). Finally, Study 
Three explores the nature of the relationship between the important mediating factors 
and resulting safety behaviour of frontline workers.  
Safety culture is conceptualised as a layered construct in this framework, as 
presented by Guldenmund (2010), extending upon Schein’s (1992) earlier model (see 
section 2.4.3). Safety culture is represented in the figure by the large purple box, 
encompassing safety climate. According to the layered model, the core of safety 
culture is very difficult to measure, and usually has to be inferred from the middle 
and outer layers, being climate and other artefacts respectively (Guldenmund). Thus, 
whilst safety culture is the construct of interest in this thesis, safety climate is 
measured in the workforce survey. Safety culture is the shared values and beliefs that 
interact with an organisation’s structures and control systems to produce behavioural 
norms. Whereas safety climate refers to the workers’ perceptions of the value and 
importance of safety within the organisation, typically reflected in policies, 
procedures and practices (Huang et al, 2013). Additionally, and in a unique 
contribution to the literature, the facilitators and barriers to safety culture 
development and maintenance are explored from the perspective of both 
organisational safety leaders and the general workforce. If safety culture is predictive 
of safety performance, then it is important to know not only how this pathway 
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operates, but also what factors help or hinder the development of this predictive 
construct.  
 
Figure 3.1. Theoretical framework and research program design 
Also represented in the framework is the relationship between safety climate 
and safety behaviour, which is conceptualised in a similar fashion to Neal et al.’s 
(2000) safety performance framework (see section 2.6). As previously described, this 
framework is an adaptation of a recognised employee performance model outlining 
the antecedents, determinants and components of job performance, with knowledge 
and motivation comprising the determinants (Campbell et al, 1993). Safety climate is 
conceptualised as a psychological (individual) measure of the perception of 
management commitment to safety, as is now common in the literature 
(Guldenmund, 2010; Jiang et al., 2009; Neal & Griffin, 2006). Whilst other 
measurement methods are also accepted in the literature (e.g., group safety climate; 
Zohar, 2002), the current research context calls for an individual measure. As will be 
discussed in later sections, the industrial environment does not suit a group safety 
climate approach. Work groups are not stable over time and thus group-level shared 
Mediating 
factors 
- safety 
motivation 
- leadership 
- stage of change 
Barriers to 
safety culture 
Facilitators of 
safety culture 
S
a
fe
ty
 C
u
lt
u
re
 
    
Safety 
Climate  
- management 
commitment to 
safety 
 
 
STUDY THREE 
S
T
U
D
Y
 T
W
O
 
STUDY ONE 
Safety 
behaviour 
- compliance 
- participation 
- procedural 
compliance 
- non-
 Chapter 3: Theoretical framework and research design 59 
perceptions would be difficult to accurately measure within the construction and 
mining industries.  
Safety behaviour is operationalised in a number of ways in this thesis. 
Primarily it is considered as two components—compliance and participation—in 
accordance with Neal et al.’s framework. Safety compliance includes behaviours 
around following safety rules and procedures, whereas safety participation includes 
behaviours around workers involvement in safety initiatives. Additional measures of 
compliance, including non-compliance (warnings received for non-compliance and 
self-reported incident involvement) and procedural compliance, are also 
operationalised in this framework based on Mohamed’s (2002) measure of safe 
behaviour, in order to provide a comprehensive measure of safety performance. 
Further detail on safety behaviour measures is provided in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.3).   
Finally, the framework incorporates mediating factors as an extension of 
existing literature, highlighting a number of variables potentially contributing to the 
explanation of safety performance components. Neal et al.’s framework included 
safety motivation as a proximal determinant of safety performance, with safety 
climate being an antecedent of these. Also evident in the literature and included in 
this framework are the influence of perceptions of leadership (e.g., Clarke & Ward, 
2006; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Nahrgang et al., 2011) and stage of change 
(Banks et al., 2008; Barrett et al., 2005).  
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research program comprises three studies that explore organisational 
safety culture, and attempt to unravel the experience of safety culture throughout 
various levels of a large Australasian construction and mining company. The three 
studies followed a sequential process, whereby Studies Two and Three were 
informed by the findings of the previous study. The research program was also 
informed by a review of both academic and industry literature. Participants for all 
three studies were organisational employees or managers, and were recruited from 
various sites across Australia.  
3.3.1 Approach to Study One 
Study One adopted a mixed-methods approach in the form of a modified-
Delphi method. The research questions addressed related to understanding safety 
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culture from the perspective of safety leaders in the organisation, so this was best 
explored using a qualitative interviewing technique. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with organisational safety leaders in order to determine: how safety 
culture was defined and described; the factors comprising safety culture; facilitators 
of safety culture; and barriers to safety culture development and maintenance.  
3.3.2 Approach to Study Two 
Study Two investigated safety climate perceptions with a cross-sectional 
sample of the organisation. The study employed a survey technique, administered in 
both hardcopy and online versions to all levels of the workforce. Gaining a large 
sample of self-report data on safety climate, motivation, performance and non-
compliance, as well as perceptions of leadership and stage of change, allowed the 
relationship between safety climate and safety behaviour to be investigated through 
statistical analyses. In addition, group differences such as divisional areas and 
workforce levels were explored on key constructs.  
3.3.3 Approach to Study Three 
Study Three also adopted a qualitative approach, in order to further investigate 
how the mediating factors identified in Study Two influence behaviour on site. 
Frontline workers and supervisors were interviewed in their respective groups in 
order to determine how different factors influence their safety behaviour, and the 
behaviour of others in their workplace. The first study investigated safety culture 
barriers from an organisational/managerial perspective, and the third study revealed 
how the workforce experiences these barriers from a frontline perspective.  
3.3.4 Ethical considerations 
The research program was awarded ethical clearance by the Queensland 
University of Technology Ethics Committee (Ethics number 1000000944). A 
number of ethical considerations influenced the design of this program of research. 
Although we did not ask participants to reveal personal details of their lives outside 
of work, we did ask about their opinions and perceptions of workplace safety, and 
their own safety behaviour. This has the potential to make some people feel 
uncomfortable. Participants were informed of the nature of their participation prior to 
providing their consent, including any further invitations they may receive for 
subsequent studies. The researcher’s details were clearly stated on the information 
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sheets and survey instruments, and business cards were distributed for any face-to-
face meetings. 
Another consideration was that the research was conducted with employees of 
a single organisation. It was important to ensure the confidentiality of participants’ 
responses in all phases of the research program. However, the geographical diversity 
of the organisation meant that organisational contacts were relied upon to identify 
possible participants and distribute invitations to participate. Therefore, complete 
anonymity regarding participation was not always possible for participants in these 
studies (some organisational contacts were aware of an individual’s participation in 
interviews, but not the information provided during their participation). This less 
than ideal situation was countered by providing participant information sheets with 
the initial invitation, as well as prior to participation commencing. The 
confidentiality of responses was emphasised in these information sheets, and verbally 
if possible. Of particular emphasis was the reporting of findings back to the 
organisation at a group level only, ensuring no individual could be identified in any 
written or verbal reports. By this means, anonymity and confidentiality were 
achieved for all respondents within the organisation for all studies, but respondents 
were not anonymous to the researcher in Studies One and Two due to the face-face 
qualitative research design.  
3.3.5 Methodological strengths and limitations  
The research design endeavoured to encapsulate a comprehensive view of 
safety culture and related outcomes in the construction and mining organisation. This 
was achieved through a number of design strengths. First, a theoretical framework 
that is a fusion of well-supported theories and models guided the research. By 
drawing on these established models, the research design has a strong foundation for 
application in a new context. In line with Guldenmund’s (2010) advice, the research 
presented here adopted a participatory approach to investigating safety culture, using 
a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. Using multiple methods and gaining 
multiple workforce perspectives can result in a more comprehensive view of culture. 
This methodological and sampling triangulation is recommended within the research 
literature (Cooper, 2000).  
However, the research program had a number of necessary limitations. First, 
the measurement of culture was primarily undertaken at the level of espoused values, 
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rather than objective observations of cultural markers. Second, the data collected was 
cross-sectional in nature, so causality cannot be directly assessed. Third, the 
investigation of safety culture in one organisation limits the external validity of 
findings. However, due to the size and influence of the organisation within the 
industry some extrapolation is possible to other similar organisations in the industry. 
The strengths and limitations of each study are further discussed at the end of the 
study chapter, and again in the thesis discussion (Chapter 7).  
3.4 RESEARCH SETTING 
The advantages of a case study approach in safety research are well established 
(Hopkins, 1995) and particularly utilised by regulatory bodies (Biggs et al., 2007) 
and by Workplace Health and Safety Authorities in safety leadership programs (e.g., 
Workplace Health and Safety Queensland in the Department of Justice and Attorney 
General, 2014). Single case studies provide a unique opportunity for depth of 
investigation and highly context-dependent understandings of complex human 
phenomena. The experience of an organisation’s safety culture is unique to the 
people in that organisation. Understanding the context in which the culture has 
developed and currently operates is important to effectively investigate and analyse 
both the content of safety culture and its impact on safety-related outcomes. A case 
study approach assists in translating research findings into practical 
recommendations for the business. In this case the organisation was carefully 
selected to maximise generalisation across the industry. The organisation has 
approximately 10,000 employees, and has a prominent place in the Australasian 
construction and mining industry. Primarily a contracting business, the company also 
often employs subcontractors and partners with other companies in project alliances. 
The company is also part of a larger holdings group with global business operations 
across a range of construction, resource and property sectors, and operates a number 
of companies throughout the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East and Europe. In 
particular, the organisational structure is replicated across the industry, as it operates 
as both a principal contractor and a subcontractor across a large variety of projects.  
The organisation is large and diverse, and provides a number of services or 
functions as a contracting business. These functions include construction work (road, 
rail, buildings), mining services, telecommunications services, and energy and gas 
projects. The organisation has undergone a period of rapid change, including 
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diversifying from primarily a construction company to the broad range of activities 
now conducted. Safety has become a keen focus for senior management in recent 
years, with high profile fatalities being a catalyst for seeking cultural change to 
balance technological advances in risk reduction across their business areas.  
In relation to the workforce characteristics, the research setting allowed an 
exploration of safety culture in a complex workplace environment. Management is 
often operating remotely from the frontline workforce, necessarily relying on 
frontline supervisors to communicate safety messages and organisational priorities. 
In addition, similar to other organisations in the construction and mining industry, 
the workforce is dynamic and transient – with workers coming and going between 
work groups, sites and projects. The workers may have been exposed to varying 
safety cultures from previous organisations, and inducting diverse employees into the 
desired culture is a challenge within the changing work environment.  These factors 
taken together with the broader organisational characteristics make this research 
setting both unique and important in the safety culture field.   
3.5 BENEFITS OF APPLIED RESEARCH 
This program of research benefited from many of the features of applied 
research.  Applied research can be defined as original investigations undertaken in 
order to acquire new knowledge. However, in contrast to basic research, applied 
research is directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective (OECD, 
2002). Characteristics of applied research include: considering available knowledge 
and its extension to solve a particular problem; determining possible uses for the 
findings of basic research and/or determining new methods to achieve specific 
objectives; and a limited scope of application, in that the results are usually intended 
to be predominantly valid for a limited number of operations, methods or systems 
(OECD, 2002). Therefore, this applied research program applies existing theoretical 
frameworks and methodologies, in combination with empirically derived data from 
one organisation. It does so in order to meet the practical objective of integrating 
safety culture theory and practice to improve safety culture and related outcomes 
with the organisation, and the industries in which the organisation operates.  
A number of benefits are derived from applied research in this context. First, as 
the program was industry-funded by a single, but noteworthy, organisation this 
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provided a unique sampling population for data collection. In this instance a large 
organisation has a number of benefits over smaller organisations in regards to 
available resources for applied research and potential outcomes of this research.  
Therefore whilst the findings of the research program reflect data from this specific 
organisational population, the implications of the findings are likely to be relevant 
across the Australasian sector.  
Second, applied research enables the ‘testing’ of theoretical frameworks for 
face validity and relevance in the target population. Academic literature has 
advanced considerably in its approach to understanding safety culture. A number of 
theoretical models have been proposed and a portion of these has been subjected to 
empirical testing. However, it is important to consider amorphous concepts such as 
culture from the perspective of the people that work within it. In applied research, 
theoretical frameworks are only useful to the extent to which they can be applied in 
the relevant population, and assist in the achievement of practical objectives for the 
organisation. Thus, applied research in the safety culture field is critical for 
advancing the relevance and usability of frameworks in order to improve safety 
outcomes.   
Third, the research program benefits from collaboration with an industry 
partner, including the translation of research findings back to the organisation in 
‘real-time’. This partnership is fundamental to successful research outcomes, in that 
the industry partner provides access to participants and resources, assists in defining 
the project goals, and ultimately applies the findings of the research to their business. 
The mutual reliance ensures that research objectives have relevance for both 
academic and applied environments, as well as providing an important feedback-loop 
for the progression of academic understandings of safety culture.  
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the guiding theoretical framework and research design 
for the three studies in the program of research. The theoretical framework is a 
synthesis of both the content of safety culture and the relationship between safety 
culture and behaviour through climate and other mediating factors. Although not 
specifically tested in the current research, the framework provides a scaffold for 
investigating safety culture in the organisation, as well as understanding how safety 
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culture is related to safety outcomes, and what influences frontline workers to be safe 
on the job. 
The next chapter describes the first study in the research program that 
investigated safety culture content, facilitators and barriers from the perspective of 
safety leaders in the organisation. A brief background to the study is presented, 
followed by the method and results of the modified Delphi rounds. Finally, the 
results are discussed as they relate to the research questions and broader program of 
research.  
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Chapter 4: Safety leaders’ perceptions of 
safety culture 
This chapter documents the first study of the PhD research program.  A 
background to the research is provided, including the positioning of this study in the 
overall research design, and which research questions are addressed by the study. 
Next, a rationale is given as to why a modified Delphi method was chosen for this 
study, and a brief description of the application of the method in the context. Details 
of the participants, materials, procedure, and data analysis are then described. Results 
from the Delphi rounds are presented in two parts and are then discussed in relation 
to the implications for safety culture theory and practice, and as context for the rest 
of the research program.  
4.1 STUDY AIMS 
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis (Chapter 1), the research program 
takes an integrated approach to examining safety culture. Safety culture is viewed as 
a critical organisational culture, and it varies to the extent that it is positive or still 
maturing. However, in keeping with the applied nature of the research, safety culture 
is also understood as a top-down driven process, in that organisational leaders 
influence the culture, and interventions can be targeted to improve safety culture 
elements and therefore related outcomes. The implication of this approach is that it is 
critical to understand the perspective of the organisational safety leaders in order to 
understand how safety culture is articulated and led in the organisation.   
Therefore, as described in Figure 3.1, the first study of the research program 
aimed to gain an understanding of safety culture from the people who have safety 
management responsibilities within the organisation. This study contributes to the 
overall program of research by addressing the first research objective and more 
specifically, research questions 1 and 2: 
 RQ1: How is safety culture understood and described by the safety leaders 
in the organisation? Chapter 2 focused on providing a comprehensive 
review of the current understanding of safety culture in the research 
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literature. This first study investigates how safety culture is understood and 
described by the safety leaders in the organisation. This offers a critical 
perspective to balance the theoretical understanding of safety culture as 
presented in the academic literature.  
 RQ2: What are the key facilitators and barriers to safety culture? This 
first study addresses an important gap in the current research literature by 
investigating the key factors and barriers to safety culture, from the 
perspective of the organisational safety leaders. The methodological 
approach adopted aims to identify the most important factors and barriers 
through a ranking process.  
As discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2) there are considerable 
definitional difficulties in safety culture research. Not only are there a great variety 
of definitions within and across research areas, these definitions are most often 
developed without the consideration of organisational and industry contexts. Theory-
driven conceptualisations of culture are important; however they are not sufficient 
for understanding how culture is reflected in an organisation’s values and practices. 
Definitions provide the foundation for organisational initiatives designed to influence 
and improve safety culture. They are critical for determining the relative importance 
of values, including safety in the context of other organisational priorities, and the 
way in which these values are reflected in policies and practices throughout the 
workforce levels.  
 The research literature has identified a number of factors describing various 
elements of safety culture (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Geller, 1994; Zohar, 2010). 
However, there is a lack of consensus on the key factors contributing to a positive 
safety culture. Similar to the definitional difficulties previously discussed in section 
2.3.3, the factors that comprise safety culture and climate are often debated, and vary 
considerably depending on the theoretical position adopted (Glendon et al., 2006) 
and industry context (Hale, 2000). Additionally, the exploration of factors is most 
commonly reported in the safety climate literature. This has meant that the 
methodological approach has been focused on the development and refinement of 
safety climate survey items, and specifically focused on factor analysis techniques to 
determine underlying factor structures (Guldenmund, 2007). Whilst this is valuable, 
these studies do not consider the broader cultural factors that may be relevant to an 
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industry workforce trying to operationalise constructs into practical strategies to 
improve safety outcomes.  
As previously discussed, the factors that comprise safety culture have been 
explored and debated in the literature in some depth. However, these debates have 
mostly occurred in a methodological sense, in terms of determining the underlying 
factor structure of safety climate surveys (Flin et al., 2000). Additionally, the safety 
culture models presented often suggest core ‘elements’ or components for positive 
safety culture (e.g., Reason, 1997), but these models provide a generic description of 
these elements, rather than an empirical analysis of the factors that help different 
organisations develop and maintain a positive safety culture. For example, Reason 
(2000) suggests that organisations should strive to develop a “learning culture” in 
order to avoid repeating organisational incidents. However, it is not clear how an 
organisation might implement strategies to achieve this, and furthermore how this 
component would impact on perceptions of safety culture and ultimately individual 
safety behaviours that reduce the risk of incidents.  
Whilst the factors that contribute to positive safety culture are frequently 
discussed in the literature, there is a comparative lack of exploration into the 
practical barriers that can prevent safety culture improvement in organisations. A 
positive safety culture is something many organisations aspire to achieve, often 
utilising significant organisational resources, including time, money and people 
power. However, organisations are rarely just trying to improve their safety 
outcomes in corporate isolation, and the reality of operating in a competitive industry 
poses some challenges to balancing safety culture progress with other business 
imperatives such as quality, time and cost performance. Therefore, perceptions of 
facilitators and barriers to safety culture are important to investigate in safety culture 
research. 
4.2 METHOD 
An exploratory approach was considered most appropriate for this study as it 
was seeking to investigate safety culture perceptions of key organisational members. 
In depth, semi-structured qualitative individual interviews were conducted with a 
sample of safety leaders (described later in this section). Qualitative interviewing is a 
useful technique for assessing attitudes, perceptions and values, as these are difficult 
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to observe in situ (Silverman, 2006). The interviews followed a semi-structured 
format consisting of open-ended questions about various aspects of safety culture. 
The questions were based on the key issues identified in the literature review 
(Chapter 2), including defining safety culture, key factors for a positive safety 
culture, and barriers to creating and maintaining safety culture. The questions were 
designed around the identified gaps in the literature, and with the goal of 
understanding the organisational environment as a foundation for further studies in 
the research program. The follow-up online questionnaire was designed, based on the 
interview responses, and asked the safety leaders to rate the most important issues 
identified as part of a validation process.     
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods with a panel of 
experts is often referred to as a modified-Delphi method. Linstone and Turoff (1975) 
provide an underlying definition of the method: “Delphi may be characterised as a 
method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is 
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex 
problem.” The Delphi technique is a structured method used to gain consensus from 
a panel of experts (Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Keeney, Hasson & McKenna, 2001). The 
process involves a number of ‘rounds’ in which participants respond to questions 
with the aim of reaching consensus in the final round. Traditional Delphi methods 
usually include three or four rounds of surveys, with each round providing the same 
information as the previous, but with group statistical data included. Each panel 
member then has an opportunity to amend their responses in light of the group data, 
making it an iterative process (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).  
More recently, the Delphi method has been used with various modifications to 
shorten the process and ensure participant involvement throughout the rounds. 
Modified Delphi methods are particularly prevalent in health and policy research 
(Keeney, Hasson & McKenna, 2001). Benefits of the Delphi method include: panel 
members remain anonymous to one another, reducing the potential for influence or 
bias throughout the rounds; it suits groups that are geographically distant; 
information and opinions are gained from a wide range of experts; and importantly, 
the process ensures that key stakeholders are involved from the beginning, which can 
assist in the implementation of future policies or programs that may be developed 
from the results. Recent research in the safety area used the Delphi method to 
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establish causes of accidents in repair and maintenance work, with a two-round 
Delphi providing an eight-category list of causes, and relative rankings of the 
importance of these causes (Hon, Chan & Wong, 2010).   
The application of the Delphi method in this instance is an innovative approach 
in the safety culture field. It is particularly relevant in this context due to its focus on 
prioritising (ranking) key issues. As discussed, whilst there is a substantial body of 
research on safety culture, the issues raised and conclusions drawn are not 
universally agreed, and indeed appear to vary according to specific industry 
environments. This research employs the Delphi method in an attempt to find the key 
issues relating to safety culture from the perspective of safety leaders in a leading 
Australasian construction and mining organisation.  
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 41 safety experts from within the researched organisation. As 
noted in Chapter 3, the organisation is large and diverse. The organisational structure 
includes several functional and regional divisions, and has in the past operated as 
many individual businesses or silos. The formation of a Delphi panel for this study 
was therefore appropriate in encouraging discussion of the complex nature of safety 
culture, and in reaching a consensus across a diverse group of geographically 
dispersed participants.  
More specifically, the divisions researched included a cross section of 
construction functions operating across a variety of industry sectors (e.g., 
commercial building, roads and transport, resources), involving a diverse workforce 
in terms of size and employment type, and in a range of environments including both 
rural and urban settings. At the time of data collection, the organisation was trialing a 
safety culture initiative using values-based inductions and training workshops. This 
was not specifically investigated in this study; however, it is relevant to interpreting 
the findings.  
The interviewees were selected based on their current job position, relevant 
experience or through a peer nomination process. Potential participants were 
nominated by an organisational contact based on their position and experience within 
the organisation. Recruited participants were from a representative range of 
organisational positions and responsibilities, geographical locations and demographic 
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backgrounds. The intention was to be as inclusive and representative as possible 
within business operational constraints. The profiles of managers participating in this 
study were similar to those of others in the workforce who were unable to participate 
for business operational reasons at the time the study was undertaken, consistent with 
applied research in this area. In total, 48 people were invited to participate and 41 
completed interviews, representing an 85.4% response rate. Participants were 
recruited from various sites and divisions across the organisation, and all 
interviewees thought that safety was a significant part of their role. The breakdown 
of the participants roles were as follows: three Senior Executives; six Alliance 
Project Managers; 11 Project Managers; 10 Safety Managers; three Corporate 
Managers; three Construction Managers; one Zone Manager; one Building Manager; 
one Site Manager; one Operations Manager: and one Plant Manager. Typical of the 
workforce, the majority (n = 38; 93%) of interviewees were male. Participants in the 
follow up questionnaire included 35 of the 41 interviewees in the first sample, 
representing an 83% response rate in the second round. The response rate was 
considered acceptable in this context, given the turnover rate in the organisation at 
the time and other factors, such as personnel leave.  
4.2.2 Procedure 
Delphi method – round one 
Following nomination by the organisational contact, potential participants were 
contacted for interview. This initial contact was made via email, and followed up 
with a telephone call. All relevant study information and ethical clearance details 
were provided at the initial contact and prior to commencing interviews once 
arranged (see Appendix A for participant information sheet).  
A combination of face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews were 
conducted over a three-month period. Participants were asked to respond to questions 
about the key issues drawn from the literature review (see Appendix B for interview 
schedule). The questions were open-ended to solicit broad responses to questions 
about safety culture in their organisation. Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with 11 participants in private office spaces in the organisation’s premises. The 
remaining participants were interviewed via telephone during business hours at a 
mutually convenient time. Participation was voluntary and verbal consent was 
obtained from all participants. Participants were informed of the confidentiality of 
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the interview and the anonymity of their responses. The participants were 
interviewed individually to elicit responses free from any group bias.  Interviews 
lasted between 20 and 60 minutes, varying with individuals’ willingness to share and 
explain their perceptions. The first 14 interviews were recorded and transcribed as 
verbatim records and transcriptions were provided to the interviewees to confirm 
their accuracy. Following this, the rest of the interviews were recorded by the same 
researcher in note form, including verbatim quotes for key points. It was considered 
that full transcripts were not required beyond the first 14 interviewees, as saturation 
was being reached and the researcher was able to sufficiently capture confirmatory 
and/or contradictory themes in note form during the interviews.   
Delphi method – round two 
Once interviews were complete and analysis was conducted on the data, 
participants were contacted again and invited to participate in a follow-up 
questionnaire (see Appendix C for participation information sheet). This process was 
signalled to participants during the interview round. The online questionnaire 
(Appendix D) was designed to test the accuracy of themes that arose in the 
interviews, and to determine perceptions around the importance of the previously 
identified factors and barriers. The questions were developed from the results of the 
thematic analysis conducted on the interview data. The questionnaire was delivered 
through an online survey provider, and was accessed by participants via a unique and 
secure email link. The questionnaire was available for completion for approximately 
one month (approximately two months after the last interview), and participants were 
provided with two reminders via email during that period.  
4.2.3 Data analysis 
The interview responses were analysed through a qualitative thematic analysis 
process. Braun and Clarke (2006) consider thematic analysis a foundational method 
in qualitative analysis. They argue that its flexibility makes it a useful research tool, 
providing a rich and detailed account of the data. However, qualitative research is 
also notoriously misused in research (Silverman, 2006) and in particular, the 
approach is criticised as lacking rigour and transparency. To counter these 
limitations, a number of processes were followed.  
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The analysis was both theoretically and empirically driven, addressing the 
specific research questions as determined by the underlying theoretical framework, 
as well as remaining open to unanticipated themes that emerged from the interviews. 
Each interview record was carefully examined, giving equal attention to all data and 
identifying themes through a thorough, inclusive and comprehensive coding process 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Relevant extracts that were particularly reflective of certain 
themes were chosen to include in the findings summary. Themes were identified 
through collating data codes and creating a thematic map of key ideas and thoughts, 
which were reviewed to ensure that themes were internally meaningful, and distinct 
from each other. Themes are presented in the results as they relate to each category 
of interest. As indicated by Banks, Biggs and Dovan (2014), it was considered 
important to analyse all qualitative data before proceeding to quantitative data 
collection, in order to avoid prejudicing interpretations of the subsequent analyses.  
Data from the online questionnaire were analysed using a statistical software 
package (PASW Statistics 18). Descriptive analyses were performed, including 
identifying means, standard deviations and frequency statistics. These analyses were 
appropriate to explore the relative importance of different factors raised in the 
interviews and to simply assess agreement in ranking across the participants.  
4.3 RESULTS 
The research findings described in this section were derived from the two-
round modified Delphi method, and include data from thematic analysis of 
interviews and descriptive analyses of data from an online questionnaire with the 
same sample. Key themes and descriptive data are discussed and supported under 
four categories of interest: defining and describing safety culture; key factors 
contributing to positive safety culture; barriers to safety culture; and enhancing and 
improving safety culture. 
4.3.1 Defining and describing safety culture 
In the interviews, the safety leaders were asked how they defined and described 
safety culture. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the first major theme to emerge from the 
analysis was a focus on the practical side of safety culture, with many using action-
oriented definitions and descriptions. Whilst several interviewees mentioned values, 
beliefs and attitudes, it seemed that most emphasis was placed on the actions, 
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behaviours and practices of people in the organisation. This was evidenced by 
responses that related to how things were done in the organisation and the idea that 
safety culture is something created by the organisational members through their 
behaviours and actions. In particular, safety culture was understood to be largely 
created by the actions of influential organisational members, with many interviewees 
commenting on how safety standards are reinforced by management. This was 
further confirmed by additional responses that focused on how people acted when 
they were not being monitored by peers or management, reflecting the pervasive 
qualities of culture.  
Table 4.1  
Themes associated with safety culture definitions and descriptions 
Theme Examples 
Action-oriented 
descriptions 
“The way we do things around here” 
“It’s what we do and say and execute in relation to safety” 
“Safety culture doesn’t invent itself, it is what comes out of the 
actions of people in the organisation” 
“The standard you walk past is the standard you set”  
“What people do when no-one’s looking” 
“What people do when you’re not there” 
Related to 
organisational culture 
“An aspect of general team culture, that relates to people’s 
attitudes towards safe work” 
“Safety culture is part of an organisational culture where safety is 
treated [as] sacrosanct by the organisation” 
“I think that safety culture is a subset of organisational culture ... 
Safety is just one way an organisation expresses its culture”  
Implicit nature of 
culture 
“I don’t really use a definition of culture” 
“Culture is a funny word. It’s the way we do things and the way we 
think about things. But I’ve never really thought about it as 
culture” 
Another central theme identified from the data is the understanding of safety 
culture as a part of organisational culture. Definitions and descriptions of safety 
culture were often grounded as a component or a reflection of the broader culture. 
The strength of this theme is evidenced by a number of responses around safety 
leaders’ view of safety culture as an “aspect”, a “part” or a “sub-set” of the 
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organisational culture or team culture. Some responses included a statement about 
the relative priority given to safety, for example, whether safety was “treated as 
sacrosanct”.  
The final theme recognised in the safety leaders’ descriptions was around the 
implicit nature of safety culture. Many interviewees said that they did not use the 
term safety culture regularly, and did not have a working definition that they used. A 
common statement was that they “don’t really use a definition of safety culture”. 
Many preferred not to use the term culture, as interviewees considered it too difficult 
to define. Phrases including “what people do” were used to reflect the outer layer of 
culture (artefacts) in terms of observable behaviours. Another commented that they 
had not really thought about it as culture, reflecting the intangible qualities of culture 
and particularly the difficulty of viewing one’s own group in terms of cultural 
descriptions.  
4.3.2 Key factors contributing to positive safety culture 
This category of interest was investigated in both the interview round and 
follow-up questionnaire round of the Delphi method. Results are presented from each 
round respectively.  
Interview themes 
Another interview topic related to what the safety leaders thought were the key 
factors contributing to positive safety culture (Table 4.2). This was an open question 
designed to generate their thoughts on the topic, with no reference to previous 
literature. The first theme to emerge from the data was around leadership 
commitment. Emphasis was placed on leaders demonstrating their commitment, in 
particular through high visibility on project sites, and through personalised actions 
and stories around safety. However, some interviewees cautioned about commitment 
being genuine and with a practical focus. Cynicism towards senior leaders was talked 
about as reasonably common in the organisation, particularly in relation to leaders’ 
espoused values not matching actual behaviours. This extended to site practices as 
well, with responses indicating that safety culture should be reflected in processes 
and practices in project work. Responses within this theme also reflected an 
emphasis on the supervisory level as key to positive safety culture. It was viewed as 
a “pinch point” that facilitated successful implementation of safety practices.   
 Chapter 4: Safety leaders’ perceptions of safety culture 77 
A related theme identified from the data was around safety communication. 
The main points raised in relation to safety communication were around clarity and 
simplicity. Some interviewees felt that messages that were too complex were not 
effectively translated through the organisational levels. The various forms of 
communication were also mentioned, with slogans and visual communication tools 
such as posters being frequently cited as evidence of safety culture on site. The 
communication of leaders was also reflected in this theme, with their ability to 
effectively communicate the organisation’s vision, values, expectations and 
standards around safety seen as critical for positive safety culture.   
Another central theme identified in relation to factors contributing to positive 
safety culture was around worker involvement, engagement and participation in 
safety. It was recognised that safety culture, whilst driven by the leaders in the 
organisation, was largely a result of how the workforce thinks and acts in relation to 
safety. Emphasis was placed on getting everyone involved, and encouraging people 
to participate in the organisation’s safety agenda. The responses indicated that 
worker engagement in safety was considered vital to the overall safety effort, and 
interviewees talked about various methods for this, such as inductions, toolbox talks, 
videos, and workshops. Many interviewees also spoke about the involvement of 
workers in the improvement of safety processes and systems, with a focus on 
utilising their knowledge of the working conditions. In terms of safety education and 
competency, interviewees emphasised on-the-job training, coaching and mentoring 
as effective ways to engage workers in safety culture.  
Another key theme to emerge in the interviews was around the organisation 
having defined safety accountabilities for different roles and clear performance 
standards. Several interviewees felt that it was important to clearly define and 
articulate safety accountabilities at all levels in the organisation, and for senior 
leaders to make sure that people are taking personal accountability for safety. 
Reward and recognition were also tied to this theme, evidenced by responses around 
there being consequences for both positive and negative actions. Others suggested 
that safety performance should be a factor in both selecting and promoting 
employees. Rewards were not only considered in a monetary sense, and many 
managers said they use positive incentives such as prize draws and certificates to 
encourage safe behaviours, but it was also perceived that intrinsic motivations were 
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important for some workers. A safe work environment is important to employees as 
the potential consequences of unsafe behaviour can result in personal injury. Defined 
safety accountabilities and performance standards motivate employees be involved in 
safety and prioritise the safety components of their work.   
Table 4.2 
Themes associated with factors contributing to positive safety culture 
Theme Examples 
Leadership 
commitment 
 
 
 
 
“It’s very simple and it’s exceptionally difficult. I think the thing that 
makes the biggest difference is for people on the ground to see people at 
the top talking to them about it.” 
“It’s important to these guys to see their bosses because then they will 
work hard for them and it drives performance.” 
“You have to be seen, do what you said you would do, and what you 
would expect others to do.”   
“The frontline supervisor is critical for implementation. It’s the people 
under his control are the ones that get injured. If he’s not on board, then 
no matter how much effort you put in at leadership level, it’s going to fail 
at that pinch point.”   
Safety 
communication 
“It’s no good having the best systems in the world if you can’t 
communicate information effectively.” 
“Messages are already fairly diluted once they get to the paddock”. 
“Not all things are important, [we need to] identify the critical few things 
that are important.” 
Workers’ 
involvement 
“Everyone in the organisation needs to live and feel the values” 
“It’s really important for the guys to get involved. And the right guys, the 
passionate ones, the ones who see how safety impacts on them.” 
“[We] need to be more hands on with the guys. Videos are good, but more 
during the job.” 
Defined safety 
accountabilities 
and performance 
standards 
“You need accountability to make it happen. Any culture needs to have an 
element of fear around law and respect. If you take the Australian culture 
everybody knows you have to be a law-abiding citizen to live within the 
Australian culture, and there are consequences if you step outside the 
cultural norm. I think it’s exactly the same with safety culture.” 
“Actions have consequences – positive actions have positive consequences 
and negative actions have negative consequences.”  
Simple safety 
systems  
“I think safety culture is significantly enhanced when there is simplicity in 
terms of process and framework for the safety system” 
“Simplify the systems – make them work for you instead of you working 
for them” 
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A final theme to emerge from the data around safety culture factors was about 
safety systems and processes being simple. The responses indicated that interviewees 
thought systems needed to be streamlined in order to integrate safety processes with 
other business activities, and support cultural values. The concept of systems was 
considered quite broadly as the safety management system as a whole, including the 
processes involved in meeting legislative requirements and providing a safe 
workplace. Of those responses relating to systems as a part of the culture (rather than 
viewing them as parallel to culture, or as a pre-condition for culture), there was an 
emphasis on ensuring resources were devoted to systems to show that the 
organisation was ‘serious’ about safety.  
Questionnaire ratings 
In the follow-up questionnaire with the panel, the safety leaders were asked to 
rate the importance of various factors contributing to positive safety culture. In the 
thematic analysis, the factors were identified as belonging to three sub-categories 
reflecting Organisational, Leadership and Workforce factors. The rating required 
selecting the top three factors from each of the sub-categories. The ‘top three’ 
selection process was chosen to be consistent with the goal of panel consensus for 
Delphi methods (Keeney et al., 2001). Table 4.3 represents the number of people 
who rated each factor as one of their top three (that is, the item was ranked first, 
second or third in importance by at least one panel member), and the corresponding 
percentage. 
The organisational factors most often selected as one of the top three were 
around the systems and frameworks supporting the desired culture, clearly defining 
safety roles and accountabilities, and safety being fully integrated in organisational 
documents, processes and systems. The leadership factors most often selected as one 
of the top three included leaders demonstrating a commitment to safety, encouraging 
personal accountability, and articulating a clear vision and values around safety. The 
workforce factors most often selected as one of the top three were around workers 
understanding what safety means for them personally, being involved in decisions 
around safety, and looking out for each other on the job.  
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Table 4.3 
Frequencies and percentages of importance of factors contributing to positive safety 
culture (N=35) 
Organisational factors  Freq. % 
1. The organisation’s systems and frameworks support the desired safety 
culture 
24 68.6 
2. Safety roles and accountabilities are clearly defined  20 57.1 
3. Safety is fully integrated in organisational documents, processes and 
systems 
17 48.6 
4. The organisation has a clear stance on safety  11 31.4 
5. The organisation has a system for reporting on and learning from 
safety experiences 
11 31.4 
6. Safety policies are consistently applied across business units in the 
organisation 
11 31.4 
7. Communication channels are effective for safety messages  6 17.1 
8. The organisation’s business operating structure (eg. Divisions) 
supports safety goals  
4 11.4 
9. Business units customise safety policies to meet the needs of their 
business 
1 2.9 
Leadership factors    
1. Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety  32 91.4 
2. Leaders encourage personal accountability in relation to safety 19 54.3 
3. Leaders can articulate a clear vision and shared values around safety 16 45.7 
4. Leaders listen to workers’ ideas and concerns about safety 14 40.0 
5. Leaders have a clear understanding of safety culture  9 25.7 
6. Leaders support workers to “take safety on” in difficult situations  8 27.9 
7. Leaders provide practical support for safety   7 20.0 
Workforce factors    
1. Workers understand what safety means for them personally  24 68.6 
2. Workers are involved in decisions about safety 20 57.1 
3. Workers “look out for each other” on the job  19 54.3 
4. Workers are involved in improving safety processes  15 42.9 
5. Workers receive on-the-job safety training 13 37.1 
6. Workers understand what safety culture is about  12 34.3 
7. Workers receive formal off-the-job safety training   2 5.7 
 
In addition to rating the most important factors for positive safety culture, the 
panel were also asked to give a rating of how evident (on a 7-point scale from 1 
representing never evident to 7 representing always evident) they thought each of the 
factors were in the ogranisation currently (Table 4.4). With average ratings from the 
panel ranging from 3.89 to 5.80, all the factors were considered to be at least 
‘occasionally evident’ through to almost ‘mostly evident’ in the organization. The 
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factor rated as most evident was around the organisation having a clear stance on 
safety, whilst the least evident factor was around workers being involved in 
improving safety processes.  
Table 4.4  
Means and standard deviations of how evident the factors are in the organisation  
(N = 35) (rating scale: 1 = never evident, 7 = always evident) 
Organisational factors  M SD 
1. The organisation has a clear stance on safety  5.80 1.23 
2. The organisation has a system for reporting on and learning from safety 
experiences 
5.40 1.04 
3. The organisation’s business operating structure (eg. Divisions) supports 
safety goals 
5.26 1.22 
4. Safety roles and accountabilities are clearly defined 4.74 1.07 
5. Communication channels are effective for safety messages  4.74 1.44 
6. Safety policies are consistently applied across business units in the 
organisation 
4.57 1.15 
7. Safety is fully integrated in organisational documents, processes and 
systems 
4.51 1.25 
8. The organisation’s systems and frameworks support the desired safety 
culture  
4.40 1.19 
9. Business units customise safety policies to meet the needs of their 
business 
4.40 1.36 
Leadership factors  
  
1. Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety  5.14 1.26 
2. Leaders encourage personal accountability in relation to safety 4.94 1.21 
3. Leaders support workers to “take safety on” in difficult situations 4.91 1.25 
4. Leaders have a clear understanding of safety culture  4.83 1.34 
5. Leaders can articulate a clear vision and shared values around safety  4.83 1.34 
6. Leaders provide practical support for safety 4.54 1.36 
7. Leaders listen to workers’ ideas and concerns about safety   4.34 1.31 
Workforce factors  
  
1. Workers receive on-the-job safety training  4.89 1.28 
2. Workers “look out for each other” on the job 4.63 0.97 
3. Workers understand what safety means for them personally  4.63 0.97 
4. Workers are involved in decisions about safety 4.17 1.18 
5. Workers receive formal off-the-job safety training  4.09 1.31 
6. Workers understand what safety culture is about  3.94 1.28 
7. Workers are involved in improving safety processes  3.89 1.16 
 
 82  
When comparing the Tables 4.3 and 4.4, some interesting observations can be 
made. In particular, the ratings of the importance and evidence of key organisational 
factors are not aligned. The factor around systems and frameworks supporting safety 
culture was most often selected as top three for importance, but was rated as the 
second least evident factor in the organisation currently. Similarly, although not as 
stark, the factor around safety being integrated in organisational documents, 
processes and systems was selected as top three for importance by 48% of 
respondents, but rated third least evident.  
The importance and evidence of the leadership factors were much more 
aligned, with two of the top three important leadership factors being viewed as ‘often 
evident’ and ‘sometimes evident’ by the safety leaders. Finally, the workforce factors 
varied in their alignment of importance and evidence, with some factors viewed as 
similarly important and evident, and others—such as workers receiving on the job 
training—being perceived as ‘quite evident’, but not as important.  
4.3.3 Barriers to safety culture 
This category of interest was investigated in both the interview round and 
follow-up questionnaire round of the Delphi method. Results are presented from each 
round respectively.  
Interview themes 
The organisational safety leaders were also interviewed about what they 
thought were barriers to both creating and maintaining safety culture in the 
organisation. Table 4.5 provides an overview of the key themes and extracts from the 
interviews. The first major theme to emerge was around competing business 
priorities, including production and cost pressures, and workload and time pressures. 
One interviewee’s comments on safety being an add-on, with “perceived time and 
cost implications” reflected this theme by displaying how safety is viewed as an 
extra activity on top of usual business, rather than something that is integrated in 
existing business activities. The benefits of operating safely were seen as less 
tangible than the benefits of meeting production outputs and time/cost charts. The 
responses indicated a perception that middle management felt production and cost 
pressures the most, and that the organisation needed to support managers and 
supervisors in managing their workload, and ensuring safety is included when 
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scoping roles. The strength of this theme is evidenced by responses about the 
compromising of safety in order to meet production pressures. Additional responses 
further confirmed that the difficulty of maintaining safety awareness was a barrier to 
safety culture, and that it was important to keep it alive and avoid being complacent 
about safety risks when other issues appear more urgent.  
Another central theme to emerge in relation to barriers to safety culture was 
around workforce issues. These included the transience of the subcontractor 
workforce and the difficulties of managing individual differences. Subcontractor 
management was a significant barrier raised by many interviewees, not only in 
relation to the short work periods they perform, but also in terms of having to deal 
with cultural integration and competency gaps. Responses indicated that some safety 
leaders thought this issue increased risks on projects, and was seen as a significant 
barrier to safety culture in recent years and into the future. Also related to the theme 
of workforce issues were individual differences amongst the workers.  Responses 
recognised that people are different, and that different educational methods are 
required to get the safety culture message across. However, some safety leaders 
thought that education was not enough to change some workers’ behaviours, and that 
ultimately safety decisions will be made by individuals with different motivations 
and attitudes towards safety.  
The third theme identified from the data around safety culture barriers was in 
relation to the change process itself, including the amount and pace of change and 
putting things into practice. Responses indicated that the safety leaders felt the 
organisation was experiencing exponential growth and fast changes in both the 
workforce and organisational systems, and that this hindered positive cultural 
development. Other responses in relation to the change process theme suggested that 
some changes were not happening quickly enough, particularly in relation to 
operationalised safety culture initiatives. These two sub-themes are connected: the 
pace of organisational change makes the implementation of cultural initiatives 
difficult, which results in frustration when the initiatives are not implemented in time 
to match this pace of change.  
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Table 4.5  
Themes associated with barriers to safety culture 
Theme and sub-themes Examples 
Competing business 
priorities 
 
- Production and cost 
pressures 
 
- Workload and time 
pressures 
 
 
- Maintaining a high level 
of awareness 
“We live in a life where safety is an add-on, rather than a part of 
doing business. That means that there are perceived time and cost 
implications.”  
“The issue is middle management – they still feel the pressures of 
production and cost. They need to participate in it [safety culture].” 
 “People become daunted by the volume of what is required. They 
become overwhelmed and can’t see where to start. We need to help 
them see where to start by prioritising issues and providing 
support.” 
 “The reality is that compromises are made when the pressure is 
on.” 
“It’s hard to keep it as a priority – I find it hard – because there’s so 
much else on.” 
Workforce issues 
- Subcontractor transience  
- Individual differences 
 
 
“It’s like you’re starting from scratch all the time.” 
 “Each individual thinks about safety in a different way” 
“A common barrier is employee behaviour – people still willing to 
put themselves at risk. We provide all the encouragement and 
guidance and everything under the sun but sometime will still make 
a decision to do it a different way” 
The change process 
- Too much change too 
quickly 
 
 
- Putting things into 
practice 
 
 
“Culture takes a while to build, and it takes a while for that culture 
to mature.  If you are forever changing the leadership, the systems, 
the expectations or the values, the culture never has time to embed 
itself and mature. It generally just stays as more reactive.” 
“The issue is in changing from theory to practice” 
“Everyone is saying the right things but we’re just not seeing things 
getting done, it’s taking too long. Give us the tools—we want to do 
it, not just talk about it” 
Industry issues 
- Legislative complexity  
 
 
 
- Regulatory system 
 
 
- Competitive nature of 
industry 
 
“One of the biggest barriers I see is with the system that has been 
created to manage safety on big projects like this is, trying to comply 
with the multitudes of standards, regs, governing bodies, federal 
bodies. And they are constantly changing expectations and 
goalposts.” 
“It is a big call to ask [the company] to be a leader on this on their 
own. It would be much easier if all the big construction companies 
could come on board or if we had a similar regulatory system [as 
the oil and mining industries]”. 
“The building business is competitive and we compete against 
people who don’t have the same safety standards as us” 
 “Will [the company] still win work if we are more expensive?” 
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The final theme to emerge from the interviews with safety leaders related to 
industry barriers. These included issues around legislative complexity, a poor 
regulatory system for the industry and competition issues with other construction 
companies.  Responses suggested that there was a concern about the organisation’s 
safety goals not being supported by the legislative and regulatory systems for the 
industry. The legislative requirements around safety were viewed as complex and 
requiring a lot of ‘paperwork’. The impact was perceived to stretch to internal 
systems, that many felt were further complicating legislative requirements, and were 
not sufficiently integrated into other organisational processes. Within this theme, 
responses also reflected a concern about the company’s competitiveness within the 
industry, as other companies who did not have the same safety standards could 
potentially win more work if evaluated on a (financial) cost basis.  
Questionnaire ratings 
In the follow-up questionnaire, the safety leaders were asked to select their top 
five 5 barriers from a list derived from the interviews. Given the number of barriers 
identified in the interviews, and the various levels at which they operate, the 
selection of five barriers was considered most appropriate to capture potential 
variation amongst participants. Table 4.6 represents the number of people who rated 
each barrier as one of that top five, and the corresponding percentage.  
Subcontractor management and operations was seen as a significant barrier by 
63% of respondents. Similarly, the transience of the workforce rated as a top five 
barrier by 45% of the sample. This is reflected more strongly here than in the 
interview data. In addition, too much paperwork was also rated as a significant 
barrier by 60% of respondents, relating to the identified interview theme of industry 
barriers to safety culture, and in particular legislative requirements. However, 
comments around this theme also referred to internal processes complicating these 
issues, so the rating could also be reflective of a lack of alignment and support for 
safety culture. Interestingly, other industry issues discussed in the interview themes 
did not rate as highly here, with only 14% and 8% rating the competitive nature and 
poor regulatory systems respectively as one of the their top five barriers. 
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Table 4.6 
Frequencies and percentages for the most significant barriers to creating and 
maintaining safety culture (N=35) 
Most significant barriers  Freq % 
Difficulties with subcontractor management and operations  22 62.9 
Too much paperwork  21 60.0 
The challenge of “Keeping it fresh”  16 45.7 
Low levels of competency in safety leadership roles   17 48.6 
Transiency of the workforce  16 45.7 
Too much change too quickly  15 42.9 
Competing business priorities e.g., production versus safety  13 37.1 
Maintaining a high level of safety awareness even when incidents  
aren’t occurring 
12 34.3 
Excessive workload  11 31.4 
Complexity of safety legislation 7 20.0 
Not enough safety resources   7 20.0 
Financial costs associated with safety   6 17.1 
Competitive nature of the industry  5 14.3 
“Bad attitudes” about safety  4 11.4 
Poor regulatory system for industry 3 8.6 
 
Other barriers rated as significant by a high proportion of respondents related 
to ‘keeping it fresh’, competency in leadership roles, and the pace of change.  
Interestingly, competing business priorities was only rated as a top five barrier by 
37% of respondents, despite this being a key theme identified in the interviews, and 
supported by statements around concern for the ‘cost’ of prioritising safety. It is 
possible that the ‘competing business priorities’ item was presented too broadly to 
rate highly in the questionnaire responses. Another possibility is that the safety 
leaders were affected by social desirability biases, as their positions would require 
them to communicate the message of ‘safety first’, and this may have affected their 
rankings.  
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4.3.4 Enhancing and improving safety culture 
This category of interest was investigated in both the interview round and 
follow-up questionnaire round of the Delphi method. Results are presented from each 
round respectively.  
Interview themes 
After discussing safety culture factors and barriers, interviewees were asked 
about how they thought the organisation could enhance or improve its safety culture 
over the next few years. This question was included to identify how these experts 
thought the factors could be operationalised in the business, and how barriers may be 
overcome.   
The view on the organisation’s safety culture in the future was very positive, 
despite the considerable barriers described in section 3.3. Many interviewees 
expressed a view that continuous effort would lead to an improved culture. One 
interviewee said “You just have to stay at it ... take stock regularly— sit back, check 
if the conditions have changed and if we need to do something differently”. 
Similarly, other interviewees commented that “Safety is like riding a bike up a hill—
as soon as you stop pedalling you go backwards” and “Success will come through 
persistence—it’s a fragile space, safety”. The fragility of the organisation’s safety 
culture was also reflected in an interviewees comment that “It’s much harder to 
build a culture than break a culture”. Another recognised that the cultural journey 
was not a fast one and that the organisation was “still working on ownership and 
understanding—it takes time.”  
Simplicity and consistency of cultural messages, material, processes and 
frameworks were also considered critical to the improvement of safety culture in the 
organisation. One interviewee emphasised that “not all things are important, [we 
need to] identify the critical few things that are important”. Another interviewee 
extended this, “I think safety culture is significantly enhanced when there is 
simplicity in terms of process and framework for the safety system”. This was 
something that should be led by the organisation’s leaders, through improved 
visibility: “I would like to see more from corporate and branch leadership in being 
visible, particularly to projects. It’s not just about what they say it’s what they do.” It 
was also suggested that systems and cultural objectives should be better aligned and 
integrated into an overarching safety management system.  
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Other comments related to improved change management of the cultural 
change process, including establishing a core group of change agents to assist the 
organisation in moving towards its cultural targets. The roles of corporate areas were 
also discussed, in particular around the improved coordination of safety efforts, 
including more guidance and support from corporate areas to reduce inconsistency 
and inefficiency across projects. Finally, it was recognised that the organisation’s 
growth and pace of change was critical to consider in any cultural approach to safety, 
including considering sustainability and flexibility to adapt to changing markets, 
“Whatever we put in place now needs to be sustainable and grow with the 
organisation.” 
Questionnaire ratings 
In the follow-up questionnaire, panel members were asked to rank their top 
three facilitators of safety culture in the organisation from a list derived from the 
interviews, in order to determine a level of consensus from the group. Table 4.7 
shows the number of people who rated each strategy as one of that top three, and the 
corresponding percentage.  
Table 4.7  
Frequencies and percentages for the most important facilitators of safety culture in 
the organisation (N = 35)   
Facilitators of safety culture  Freq % 
Ensuring the systems support the desired safety culture 23 65.7 
Having clear and simple safety messages  19 54.3 
Defining safety leadership roles and accountabilities  16 45.7 
Managing safety culture as a change process  15 42.9 
Having a framework for enforcing safety accountabilities  13 37.1 
Making sure the business is ready for relevant safety culture initiatives 7 20.0 
Identifying and supporting change agents/ champions across the 
organisation 
7 20.0 
Communicating organisational safety priorities 5 14.3 
 
The results support the key interview themes identified, with systems 
supporting safety culture and clear and simple safety messages being most 
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commonly rated as important facilitators of safety culture.  Defining safety roles and 
accountabilities and having a framework for enforcing these were also considered 
important strategies by a number of respondents. Interestingly, communicating 
organisational safety priorities was only rated in the top three most important by 14% 
of the panel.  
However, it is important to recognise that some facilitators may have been 
rated as more important because they are perceived as currently lacking in the 
organisation, and are therefore ‘top of the list’ for improvement. Other facilitators 
may not have been chosen as the top three because they were not seen as urgent, or 
they were seen as already operating within areas of the organisation.  
4.4 DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to explore how safety culture is understood and described by 
safety leaders in the organisation, and to determine the key factors and barriers to 
safety culture development and maintenance in the industry context.  
4.4.1 Theoretical implications 
The key themes identified in the safety leaders’ definitions and descriptions of 
safety culture highlight that their understanding of safety culture related to the 
actions and behaviours of the workforce, and in particular how people behaved in 
their normal mode of operation. Thus, the focus was more on the outcomes of 
culture, such as behavioural expressions, rather than the content. The descriptions 
also recognised the link between safety culture and the organisation’s broader 
culture, highlighting the desire to integrate safety values with the broader business 
approach in the organisation. Relating this to the layered view of culture 
(Guldenmund, 2000; Schein, 1992), the outer layer of artefacts was reflected in 
descriptions much more than the middle or core layers. Given the nature of the 
construction industry, and the dominant disciplines within it – engineers, project 
managers, and trade-skilled construction workers – it is not surprising that the 
tangible components of complex concepts such as culture are given emphasis (e.g., 
leaders’ talking about safety with the frontline workforce). The implication of this is 
that many theory-based definitions of safety culture may not be easily understood 
and accepted in practice, and having simple and practical messages about safety was 
important to the safety leaders in this sample.  
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The key themes identified in the safety leaders’ understanding of the safety 
culture factors revealed that, consistent with the literature (e.g., Banks & Davey, 
2010, Clarke & Ward, 2006; Hofmann & Morgeson, 2004; Zohar & Luria, 2005), 
leadership was identified as a key factor for positive safety culture in the 
organisation, and there was an emphasis on leaders demonstrating commitment to 
safety, and being visible to the project-based workforce. These findings align with 
the functionalist perspective, which views culture as something that can be 
deliberately influenced to support management strategies and systems (Glendon et 
al., 2006). Perhaps this is not surprising, given that the sample were all leaders 
themselves, and likely have experience in attempting to influence culture in their 
workplace. However, the emphasis on visibility and closely collaborative 
relationships between frontline workers and senior management is critical in the 
context of construction project work, and suggests the need for values to be 
translated into model leadership behaviours for a positive safety culture (Biggs et al., 
2005).   
Also consistent with the literature was an emphasis on effective 
communication and worker’s involvement in safety. A number of studies across 
various samples and industries have established the importance of these factors in 
fostering and maintaining a positive safety culture (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; 
Dingsdag et al., 2008; Zohar, 2010). This study has confirmed the relevance and 
importance of these factors in a construction context. Worker’s involvement in safety 
can also be understood as an outcome of high safety motivation—another concept 
that has considerable support in the literature (e.g., Neal et al., 2000). This concept is 
reflected in the theme around worker’s involvement (participation is an outcome of 
safety motivation), and the theme around defined safety accountabilities—about 
organisational reward and recognition systems, and appropriate behaviour being 
rewarded and inappropriate behaviour having clear and consistently applied 
consequences.  
Perhaps less obvious in the literature but clear and consistent in the responses 
of this sample, was the theme around simple and streamlined safety systems being 
critical to supporting cultural goals. Comments related to simplifying safety reporting 
and minimising paperwork so that other aspects of safety could be prioritised. This 
could reflect current organisational maturity around safety, insofar as a focus on 
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systems is considered to be reflective of a reasonably immature culture (Hudson, 
2007). The emergence of this theme could also be unique to the sample in this 
instance. Managers are more likely to be exposed to the frustrations of complex 
systems, particularly if they are not aligned to the values espoused at the senior 
management level.  
4.4.2 Practical implications 
The results from this study have a number of practical implications for the 
organisation studied, and industry more generally. The key themes identified in the 
safety leaders’ perceptions of barriers to safety culture identified a number of issues 
that were viewed as significant to the development and maintenance of safety 
culture, and that are likely to impact upon safety culture initiatives within the 
organisation. The company has built its reputation on its ‘can-do attitude’ to projects, 
and this has commonly been interpreted as a high production focus. Managers are 
now trying to reinterpret this as a ‘can-do safely’ approach to construction works, but 
there are clearly some perceived contradictions with this. The safety leaders raised 
diverse issues such as the transient subcontractor workforce, legislative and 
regulatory difficulties, and the challenge of maintaining safety awareness under high 
production pressures. The challenges presented by the subcontractor workforce may 
be highly relevant to the construction industry, but the other key barriers are likely to 
be experienced by many organisations across various industries. Whilst these barriers 
may not be possible to overcome in the short term, their impact can be lessened if 
they are identified early in the change process. The consideration of barriers is not 
common in the current research literature (see Banks & Davey, 2010, for an 
exception), but is critical to the ultimate success of any cultural initiatives.   
More broadly, the safety leaders’ perceptions of culture reflect their 
understanding that culture change is complex, difficult, and time-consuming, and that 
values and ideals are difficult to translate into practice. However, this is balanced by 
a mostly functional view of culture, whereby culture is viewed as something that can 
be proactively influenced, and leaders are believed to be the drivers of cultural 
change. Interviewee comments about enhancing safety culture indicate that 
consistent effort is required to achieve better safety outcomes over time. Any change 
must be cognisant of current organisational maturity and change readiness, as well as 
the influence of barriers to that change.  
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4.4.3 Strengths, limitations and future research 
This study provides an important insight into how safety culture is understood 
by the safety leaders in the organisation, offering a critical perspective to bridge the 
gap between safety culture theory and practice. An important gap in the current 
research literature was addressed, by exploring the key factors and barriers to safety 
culture from the perspective of the leaders who drive culture in the organisation. The 
most important factors and barriers have been identified through the modified Delphi 
method of iterative rounds with a panel of experts and discussed in detail. Further, 
this study offers a leadership perspective on safety culture, which will later be 
compared to a broader workforce sample in the second study. Finally, the themes 
from the interviews highlight the overriding importance of management commitment 
to safety, which is commonly reported as the higher order factor in safety climate 
measures. It appears that a management commitment measure of climate may be 
appropriate for further research in the organisation.  
This study has contributed to the body of safety culture knowledge in that it 
derived safety culture descriptions from key stakeholders within the organisation for 
future investigations, as opposed to using traditional conceptualisations of safety 
culture that have not been customised for the organisation or the construction 
industry more broadly. A substantive body of research has investigated safety culture 
definitions and content (e.g., Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000) but few research 
studies begin with clarifying the understanding for that population prior to embarking 
on measurement, analysis and interpretation. One important strength of the study was 
that the interviewees were recognised safety leaders within the organisation, and 
were in a position to provide expert opinion on their understanding of safety culture. 
Insights gained from this research are critical to both researchers and practitioners 
attempting to integrate safety culture theory and practice to improve safety outcomes.   
Given that this research has important applications within the safety culture 
field, further research would be beneficial to continue to explore the role of leaders’ 
perceptions in developing and maintaining positive safety culture in organisations. 
This will be a focus of investigation in Studies Two and Three. Furthermore, it is 
recognised that frontline workers may interpret leaders’ cultural messages 
differently, and it is important to explore perceptions of management commitment to 
safety with the broader workforce. Particularly relevant in this study is the possible 
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influence of social desirability biases within the management group. That is, it is 
likely that some interviewees felt the need to project positive perceptions of safety in 
their workplace, as safety is clearly an espoused priority within the organisation. The 
next phase of this research program, described in Chapter 5, surveyed a broader 
cross-section of the workforce to determine whether there are similar perceptions of 
the facilitators and barriers to safety culture at different levels of the organisation.  
As previously described, safety culture is understood as a top-down driven 
process, in that organisational leaders influence the culture, and interventions can be 
targeted to improve safety culture elements and therefore related outcomes. Implicit 
in this approach is a critical need to understand the perspective of the organisational 
safety leaders to further understand how safety culture is articulated and led in the 
organisation. Figure 3.1 outlines the theoretical framework underpinning Study One, 
and this chapter has described the synthesis and contrast of the facilitators and 
barriers to safety culture development in this organisation. In particular the elicited 
themes of continuous effort leading to an improved culture, simplicity and 
consistency of cultural messages, material, processes, and frameworks as effective 
catalysts, improved change management of the cultural change process, and the 
organisation’s growth, pace of change, flexibility and sustainability were considered 
critical by the respondents to a cultural approach to safety.  
4.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the first study of the research program. The findings 
from the organisational safety leaders’ interviews provided an insight into how safety 
culture is understood and applied in practice within the organisation. The key 
facilitators and barriers to safety culture development and maintenance were 
identified and must now be confirmed with the broader workforce. Additionally, 
leadership and management commitment to safety culture was confirmed as the most 
important factor for a positive safety culture, which is aligned to current literature 
around safety culture and climate conceptualisations.  
The following chapter presents the second study of the research program. The 
study involved the development and distribution of a quantitative workforce survey, 
designed to investigate the intra-organisational differences in perceptions of safety 
climate, the relationship between safety climate, safety behaviour, and other 
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mediating factors, and further explore facilitators and barriers to safety culture 
development and maintenance. The second study specifically builds on Study One by 
exploring perceptions of facilitators and barriers with the broader workforce, as well 
as examining how perceptions of management commitment to safety (a key factor 
identified in the current sample) are related to safety performance at an individual 
level.   
  
 Chapter 5: Investigation of safety climate perceptions in the workforce 95 
Chapter 5:  Investigation of safety climate 
perceptions in the workforce 
This chapter describes the research undertaken for the second study in the PhD 
research program. Study One investigated safety culture barriers from an 
organisational/managerial perspective and explored how safety culture was defined 
and described; the factors comprising safety culture; facilitators of safety culture; and 
barriers to safety culture development and maintenance. Study Two investigated 
safety climate perceptions with a cross-sectional sample of the organisation, gaining 
a large sample of self-report data on safety climate, motivation, performance and 
non-compliance, as well as perceptions of leadership and stage of change and 
allowing investigation of the relationship between safety climate and safety 
behaviour. A background to the research is provided, including how this study fits in 
the overall research design, and the specific research questions addressed in the 
study. Hypotheses are presented as they relate to each research question. The method 
is then described in detail, including the development of the survey, the sample, 
survey distribution and data analysis. Results relating to each hypothesis are 
presented and discussed in terms of implications for both theory and practice.   
5.1 STUDY AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The second study of the research program aimed to empirically investigate the 
safety climate of the organisation, and the factors influencing the relationship 
between safety climate, safety behaviour, and related safety outcomes. Figure 3.1 
outlines the theoretical framework underpinning this investigation. This study 
contributes to the overall program of research by addressing the second and third 
research objectives and more specifically, research questions 2, 3 and 4.  
 RQ2: What are the key facilitators and barriers to safety culture? Study 
One (Chapter 4) explored the most important facilitators and barriers to 
safety culture from the perspective of safety leaders in the organisation. 
This study examines these with a broader workforce sample and attempts 
to distil higher order factors or categories to inform safety culture research. 
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 RQ3: Are there intra-organisational differences in safety culture 
perceptions and safety behaviour? This study measures the safety climate 
of a large cross-section of the workforce in order to determine overall 
climate and any intra-organisational differences. Similarly, the study 
explores potential intra-organisational variations in self-reported safety 
behaviour.  
 RQ4: What additional factors influence safety behaviour and related 
outcomes? The final research question addressed by this study analyses the 
factors that influence safety behaviour and related outcomes in a cross-
sectional workforce sample. Potential predictive variables are considered 
as they relate to self-reported measures of safety participation, safety 
compliance, procedural compliance and non-compliance, and incident 
involvement.  
The research questions were investigated in this study through the use of 
testable hypotheses. Table 5.1 presents a summary of hypotheses as they relate to the 
research questions.  
 The safety leaders sample in Study One rated the themes from interviews in 
order to determine or ‘rate’ the most important safety culture facilitators and barriers. 
These were included as items in the current study, in order to determine if they were 
perceived similarly in the broader workforce. The most important facilitators rated 
by the leaders were ensuring the systems were aligned with the safety culture, and 
having clear and simple messages about safety. The most important barriers were 
managing subcontractor operations and quantity of safety paperwork. These themes 
were similar to those identified in previous literature.  
Due to the safety leadership roles of the participants in Study One, it was 
expected that the identified facilitators and barriers to safety culture would be 
reflective of the broader organisational perceptions. Therefore, it was hypothesised 
that the highly ranked facilitators and barriers from leaders in Study One would be 
consistently perceived in this broader workforce sample (H1). Furthermore, in 
relation to the facilitators, it was hypothesised based on previous research that the 
items would load onto higher order factors around safety communication and worker 
involvement (H2). Similarly, it was hypothesised that the barrier items would load 
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onto higher order factors, reflecting more general themes around difficulties with 
developing and maintaining safety culture (H3).  
Table 5.1  
Hypotheses and Study Two research questions  
Hypotheses Research Questions 
 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4 
H1.  The highly ranked facilitators and barriers from leaders in 
Study One will be consistently perceived in this broader 
workforce sample 
   
H2.  The facilitator items will load onto higher order factors 
around safety communication and worker involvement  
   
H3.  The barrier items will load onto higher order factors, 
reflecting more general themes around difficulties with 
developing and maintaining safety culture 
   
H4.  Safety climate, motivation, compliance and participation 
will differ across organisational divisions 
  
H5.  Safety climate, motivation, compliance and participation 
will differ amongst workforce levels 
  
H6.  Safety climate, safety motivation, leadership and stage of 
change will explain a significant proportion of variance in safety 
compliance and safety participation 
  
H7.  Safety climate, safety motivation, leadership and stage of 
change will explain a significant proportion of variance in 
incident involvement and non-compliance (receiving warnings) 
  
H8.  Safety motivation, leadership and stage of change will 
mediate the relationship between safety climate and safety 
compliance and participation 
  
 
Given the size and diversity of the current construction and mining 
organisation, it is possible that a number of safety climates exist. Previous research 
suggests that work groups or workforce levels differ in their perceptions of how 
safety is valued and prioritised due to differing working environments and 
management approaches (Morris et al., 1999; Prussia et al., 2003). 
Divisional/functional areas were of specific interest in the current study given the 
breadth of operations conducted by the organisation. The organisation is structured 
around these divisional areas, and it is important to know if the divisions have their 
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own climate (that is, shared perceptions of how safety is valued by management) or 
whether these perceptions are shared at the organisational level. Therefore, based on 
previous literature, it was hypothesised that safety climate, motivation, compliance 
and participation would differ across organisational divisions (H4). Additionally, it 
was hypothesised that safety climate, motivation, compliance and participation 
would differ amongst workforce levels (H5).  
As discussed in Chapter 3, safety culture is very difficult to measure. It 
encompasses many intangible layers of individuals’ values, opinions and 
assumptions about the world that are often not explicitly known to the individual 
(Guldenmund, 2000). Safety climate is often used as a measure of culture because it 
can be determined easily and efficiently through survey questions. Safety climate 
refers to the individual perceptions of the value of safety in the work environment 
(Neal et al., 2000). More specifically, safety climate is measured as the aggregate 
perceptions of management commitment to safety, as reflected in organisational 
values and processes. Previous research suggests that what employees believe 
managers think about safety is important (Johnson, 2007). As the term suggests, 
climate reveals the safety temperature at a point in time, and is most valuable when 
measured at regular intervals to compare changes and track progress over time.  
Safety climate has been shown to be strongly linked to safety performance 
(Johnson, 2007; Mohamed, 2002; Seo, 2005). In a recent meta-analysis Christian et 
al. (2009) identified a number of studies showing a link between climate and various 
measures of safety performance, including self-reported safety behaviour and 
incident involvement. As shown in Figure 3.1, this research is guided by a model of 
safety performance that defines two behavioural components of safety: safety 
compliance and safety participation. In addition to safety climate predicting safety 
behaviour, a number of mediating factors have been associated with the climate-
behaviour relationship. The theoretical framework underpinning the research 
includes three influential factors with considerable support in the research literature: 
safety motivation, leadership and stage of change. Therefore, it was hypothesised 
that safety climate, safety motivation, leadership and stage of change would explain a 
significant proportion of variance in safety compliance and safety participation (H6).  
In addition to the components of safety behaviour described above, further 
measures of safety performance were included to provide a comprehensive view of 
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the climate–behaviour relationship. Self-report measures of incident involvement and 
non-compliance (receiving warnings for not following safety rules) were also 
included as dependent variables. Given the conceptual similarity between these 
measures and safety behaviour components, it was expected the predictive factors 
would exhibit a similar relationship. Therefore, it was hypothesised that safety 
climate, safety motivation, leadership and stage of change would explain a 
significant proportion of variance in incident involvement and non-compliance 
(receiving warnings) (H7).  
Further to the expected predictive value of the above variables, previous work 
suggests that the relationship between safety climate and behaviour may be mediated 
by the additional predictive factors discussed above. That is, safety climate may 
influence safety behaviour through more proximal variables such as safety 
motivation, leadership and stage of change. As presented in Figure 3.1, these 
variables potentially provide a more sophisticated explanation of the classic safety 
climate–behaviour relationship, whereby climate affects behaviour because of these 
proximal variables. Therefore, it was hypothesised that safety motivation, leadership 
and stage of change would mediate the relationship between safety climate and 
safety compliance and participation (H8).  
5.2 METHOD 
The development of the survey was cognisant of industry considerations, in 
particular the research team was aware that the survey needed to be suitable for the 
workforce, in relation to length and question language. Several drafts were reviewed 
by appropriate organisational contacts (primarily divisional safety managers) for 
appropriate format, length and language, and the resulting survey was a result of 
review and amendment. The survey also underwent a pilot with blue-collar workers 
(N = 8) on a Brisbane project site to ensure relevance and comprehension. Some 
questions were re-worded to be relevant to the workforce, while not compromising 
their empirical validity. For example, “senior executive team” was changed to 
“senior management” to reflect organisational terminology. Additionally, two barrier 
items were reworded to aid understanding. The item “the challenge of keeping it 
fresh” was reworded to “people losing enthusiasm for safety initiatives quickly”. 
Also, the item “transiency of the workforce” was reworded to “workers coming and 
going regularly (especially subcontractors)”. Demographic measures were also 
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reviewed to ensure comparison would be possible with other organisational surveys. 
Details of work locations and business units were also obtained from existing 
organisational data.  
5.2.1 Participants 
All employees of the organisation were invited to participate. At the time of the 
survey the direct workforce included approximately 10,000 employees. A total of 
3,209 surveys were received representing a response rate of approximately 32%. Of 
those surveys received, 2,957 were usable (that is, had at least one section of the key 
measures completed, representing 92% of returned surveys). 
The majority of respondents were male (86%) and aged between 30 and 50 
years of age, with an average age of 39 years. The majority of survey respondents 
were waged employees (40%) and ‘other’ managers (15%). Subcontractors 
accounted for 7% of the sample (Appendix E has further details of position types and 
other demographic characteristics of the sample). In this case-study organisation, 
subcontractors are closely aligned in policy and practice with the principal 
contractor, which is atypical of the industry generally. Thus in this organisation, 
there would be a high likelihood that their responses would reflect mainstream 
beliefs and attitudes of the workforce, and hence no controls were applied in the 
analyses. Thirty-four senior managers completed the survey—representing just over 
1% of the sample. The great majority of survey respondents worked full-time, with 
47% working shifts, and 44% working standard hours. Part-timers and casuals 
accounted for 1% and 4% of the sample respectively. Average role tenure was just 
over three years, with 67% of respondents having been in their current role between 
one to five years. Average organisational tenure was just under four years, with 37% 
of respondents having been in the organisation between two to five years. Average 
industry tenure was almost eight years, with half of the respondents having been in 
the industry between two to ten years. Table 5.2 outlines respondents for each 
division, whether they completed online or hardcopy surveys, and the total headcount 
data for the divisions at the time of the survey. 
The Resources Division had the highest number of respondents at 1584 and the 
highest response rate based on headcount data (49%). This was followed by 
Telecommunications at 27% and Industrial and Energy division at 26% response 
rate. The lowest response rate was in the Group Services Division, with a 14% rate.  
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Table 5.2  
Divisional respondents by survey type 
Division Online Hard-
copy 
Total 
number 
% of 
sample 
Headcount 
(Dec 2011) 
Construction 440 249 689 23.30 4,258 
Industrial and Energy 1 70 71 2.40 278 
Resources 311 1,273 1,584 53.57 3,264 
Infrastructure 111 7 18 3.99 865 
Corporate 38 1 39 1.32 288 
Telecommunications 362 0 362 12.24 1,330 
Other/ Not specified 58 36 94 3.18 - 
    TOTALS   1,303 1,654 2,957 100% 10,283 
 
The representativeness of the sample was an important consideration for this 
study, as the survey distribution was managed through organisational contacts on 
site. It was important to determine if the people that responded to this survey were 
similar to people in the organisation generally. Comparison analyses with 
organisational data suggest that the people that responded to this survey were 
representative of the organisation more broadly. Data from a 2010 organisational 
survey were used as a comparison point for this purpose. There were over 7000 
respondents to that corporate-driven survey, representing a 70% response rate 
compared to payroll headcount data at that time. The demographic profile of the 
current survey respondents was compared to the 2010 organisational survey 
respondents in terms of category percentages (see Appendix E for descriptive data 
for these comparisons). Overall, this sample was very similar in terms of gender, age, 
position type, employment status and organisational tenure, and based on this 
comparison we had some confidence that the respondents to this survey were 
representative of the organisation’s workforce.  
5.2.2 Procedure 
The study was cross-sectional and survey based. The survey was conducted 
over an eight-week period between November 2011 and January 2012. Distribution 
to all company employees was through organisational safety managers and on-site 
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visits, where respondents were invited to complete either a hardcopy or online 
version of the survey. Direct distribution by the researcher was only possible for a 
limited number of sites due to the geographical dispersion of the organisation. An 
information sheet was provided to the organisational contacts, stating all relevant 
information in relation to completion of the survey (see Appendices F and G). Email 
scripts were also provided for distribution of online links (see Appendices H and I).  
Demand characteristics, including the ‘good-participant role’ of the workplace 
were minimised by ensuring anonymous and confidential online completion of the 
survey. This was seen as important as demand characteristics refer to the effects of 
experimental participation, increasing participants’ awareness of being ‘evaluated’ in 
some way and wanting to produce data that is consistent with what they believe to be 
the hypotheses of the experiment (Nichols & Maner, 2008). In addition, those 
employees that completed hardcopy surveys were ensured confidentiality by 
distribution through safety managers directly to the research team, rather than 
through line management channels. 
The online survey tool was created in Key Survey Enterprise Online Survey 
Software. Hardcopy survey versions were also created for those participants unable 
to access a computer. All survey responses were sent to the QUT research team via 
post or downloaded via the online survey site, Key Survey. Hardcopy surveys were 
manually entered into spread sheets by the research team and then stored in a locked 
room with restricted access. All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 20. 
5.2.3 Measures 
The study survey was four pages including the participant information section 
(see Appendix J). The first page included demographic questions, the second page 
included safety climate, safety motivation, safety compliance, safety participation, 
procedural compliance, non-compliance (receiving warnings) and incident 
involvement. The third page included leadership and stage of change questions. The 
final page included questions about safety culture barriers and facilitators.  
Demographics 
A number of demographic variables were included in the survey to provide a 
comprehensive description of the sample and for some specific hypotheses. 
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Gender. Gender of respondents was measured by a two-option response type 
where respondents indicated male or female as their gender.   
Age. Age of respondents was measured by an open response question requiring 
participants to indicate their age in years. 
Employment status. Employment status was measured by a four-option 
response type where respondents selected from Full-time – Shift worker, Full-time – 
Non-shift worker, Part Time and Casual. These categories were based on previous 
employee surveys administered within the case study organisation (primarily focused 
on measuring constructs such as employee engagement and job satisfaction, and used 
to drive human resource strategy).  
Tenure. Three types of tenure were measured: role tenure, being how long 
respondents had been in their current role; organisational tenure, being how long 
respondents had worked for the organisation; and industry tenure, being how long 
respondents had worked in the industry. Previous research has found that 
organisational tenure is positively correlated with safety climate perceptions (Beus, 
Bergman & Payne, 2010). Due to the nature of the industry—including a dynamic 
and moving workforce—role tenure and industry tenure were also included as they 
reflect experience and immersion in the construction culture more generally.  
Position type. Position type was measured using a categorical response option. 
Position types included 10 options: Graduate Engineer, Engineer/Senior Engineer, 
Team Leader /Supervisor/Foreperson, Senior Manager, Functional/Divisional 
Manager, Other Manager, All Other Salaried Employees, All Other Waged 
Employees, Subcontractor and Other. For the purposes of analysis, position types 
were further categorised into four groups: workers, frontline management, middle 
management and senior management. These categories were validated by the 
organisational contact as appropriate for this workforce population.  
Organisational division. Organisational division was also of interest, given the 
size and diversity of the organisation. Divisional area was measured as self-reported 
allocations to one of seven divisional categories:  Construction, Resources, 
Industrial/Energy, Infrastructure, Corporate, Telecommunications, or ‘other’. These 
categories were also validated by the organisational contact as appropriate for this 
workforce population. 
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Project type. In addition to selecting the organisational division they were 
employed in, respondents were asked to indicate the project on which they were 
employed. This was an open-response question, as the organisation had over 100 
projects active at the time.  
Safety culture facilitators and barriers 
The results of Study One indicated a number of significant facilitators and 
barriers of safety culture as identified by the management sample interviewed. One 
of the aims of Study Two was to obtain a view from the broader workforce on these 
same facilitators and barriers. Therefore the main themes from the leader interviews 
were presented as items in this workforce sample. Some items from Study One were 
adapted to suit the broader sample. For example, the item “bad attitudes about 
safety” was extended to two items in the current survey, specifically: “bad attitudes 
about safety amongst managers” and “bad attitudes about safety amongst 
employees”. Additionally, two barrier items were re-worded to aid understanding (as 
described in section 5.2).   
The survey measured respondents’ views on the facilitators of safety culture 
(ways to improve safety culture). Eight strategies were presented (consistent with 
Study One), and respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or 
disagreed with the significance of the facilitators, on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = strongly 
disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Also consistent with Study One, 16 safety culture 
barriers were presented, and respondents were asked to indicate agreement with the 
item being a significant barrier to safety culture within the organisation. All items 
were measured on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. The mid-point was defined as ‘neutral’.   
Safety climate 
Safety climate was measured using a three-item scale from Neal and Griffin 
(2006) that was designed to measure perceptions of management commitment to 
safety and is operationalized by the value and priority given to safety (i.e., safety 
values). This three-item measure was chosen for a number of reasons. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, an individual perception measure of climate was considered most 
appropriate for the organisational context, as opposed to a group-level measure. 
Additionally, a higher order measure relating to management values was deemed 
appropriate given the trend in current literature (see section 2.3.5) and clear theme 
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from safety leader interviews in Study One. An example item was “Senior 
management places a strong emphasis on workplace health and safety”. Items were 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. The mid-point was defined as ‘neutral’. The authors reported an 
internal reliability alpha (the ability for the items to yield consistent scores) of .95.  
Safety motivation 
A three-item scale from Neal and Griffin (2006) was used to measure safety 
motivation as a potential contributing and mediating factor. The items reflect an 
intrinsic view of motivation, and assess the motivation of an individual to perform 
safety-related activities. Previous studies have also used this measure of motivation 
in safety research (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010). An example item was “I feel that it 
is worthwhile to put in effort to maintain or improve my personal safety”. Items were 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. The mid-point was defined as ‘neutral’. The authors reported an 
internal reliability alpha of .92.  
Safety compliance 
As discussed in section 2.6.1, it is important to clearly define and measure 
safety performance, and current literature (e.g., Neal & Griffin, 2006) considers there 
to be two components of performance: safety compliance and safety motivation. A 
number of items measured safety compliance. These measures were chosen to 
provide a comprehensive view of self-reported safety compliance behaviours, 
including both positive behaviours and ‘negative’ behaviours such as being involved 
in an incident and receiving warnings. The primary measure was a three-item scale 
from Neal and Griffin (2006) and was used to assess behaviours involving following 
safety procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner. An example item was “I 
use the correct safety procedures for carrying out my job”. Items were measured on a 
5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The 
mid-point was defined as ‘neutral’. The authors reported an internal reliability alpha 
of .93.  
Additionally, two items measuring safe work behaviour were adopted from 
Mohamed (2002). The items asked respondents to indicate on a scale of 0-100% the 
average percentage of time that a) they follow all of the safety procedures for the 
jobs they perform, and b) their co-workers follow all of the safety procedures for the 
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jobs that they perform. Lastly, one item assessed non-compliance with safety 
procedures by asking respondents to indicate the number of times in the last 12 
months that they had received a warning for not following safety procedures. 
Previous research has used a similar measure of incident involvement (e.g., Gyekye, 
2006). These items were included with a view to matching responses with 
organisational data; however, this was not possible due to the method of data capture 
in the organisation.  
Safety participation 
In addition to safety compliance behaviours that directly contribute to an 
individual’s personal safety, behaviours relating to safety participation were also of 
interest as an outcome variable. A three-item scale from Neal and Griffin (2006) was 
used to assess safety participation. An example item was: “I put in extra effort to 
improve the safety of the workplace”. Items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The mid-point was defined 
as ‘neutral’. The authors reported an internal reliability alpha of .89. 
Incident involvement 
A further outcome variable included in this study included incident 
involvement. One item assessed self-reported incident involvement. Respondents 
were asked to indicate the number of times in the last 12 months that they had been 
directly involved in a workplace injury or near-miss event (i.e., an incident that could 
have resulted in an injury but did not in this instance) in the workplace. As Probst 
and Brubaker (2001) contend, self-report measures of incident involvement and 
unsafe behaviour had been previously found to be related to independent 
observations of the same variables.  
Leadership 
As discussed in 2.6.4, leadership is an important construct to consider in the 
safety climate–behaviour relationship. Two measures of transformational leadership 
were investigated as potential mediating factors in this study: supportive leadership 
and personal recognition. The measures were sub-scales from a validated 
transformational leadership scale (Rafferty & Griffin, 2004). Both measures were 
considered especially relevant to current research, given the importance of immediate 
supervisors in encouraging safe behaviour of employees. Supportive leadership was 
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measured by three items assessing perceptions of support from an immediate 
supervisor. An example item was “My immediate supervisor considers my personal 
feelings before acting”. Items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 = 
strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree. The mid-point was defined as ‘neutral’.  
Personal recognition was measured by three items assessing perceptions of personal 
recognition from an immediate supervisor. An example item was “My immediate 
supervisor commends me when I do a better than average job”. The authors reported 
internal reliability alphas of .95 and .96 respectively.  
Stages of change 
Finally, another potential mediating factor in the climate-behaviour 
relationship was considered in this study. As discussed in section 2.6.5, stage of 
change is a measure of individuals’ preparedness for taking action to change their 
behaviour. Stages of change were measured using Barrett et al.’s (2005) adapted 
scale. Previous safety research has used this scale to identify stage of change in a 
survey-like format (Banks et al., 2008). The item asked respondents to indicate their 
approach to workplace safety risks, with higher scores indicating a more mature 
approach. The scale used was a forced-choice response type ranging from 1 to 5, 
with each number representing an approach to workplace safety risks, specifically: 
1. I’m not exposed to risk and I’m not considering changing my work behaviour 
2. I’m planning to take action to reduce my risk in the next six (6) months 
3. I have definite plans to reduce my risk in the next month  
4. I have already taken actions to reduce my risk  
5. I’m continuing to take actions to reduce my risk  
5.2.4 Statistical analyses 
A number of statistical analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses, 
including factor analysis, bivariate correlations, regressions, mediation and analyses 
of variance (ANOVAs).   
Data cleaning and assumption checking 
Missing data. There was a considerable amount of missing data across key 
variables. The greatest amount missing occurred for organisation tenure (57% 
missing), industry tenure (70%) and role tenure (60%). Several other variables were 
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missing between one and five per cent. Therefore, pairwise deletions were used in 
subsequent analyses to maximise sample size.  
 Outliers. There were a number of univariate and multivariate outliers in the 
data. Examination of a boxplot for the non-compliance variable revealed four 
univariate outliers. The decision was made to delete these as they were considered 
outside of the normal population. Multivariate outliers were examined in relevant 
analyses using Mahalanobis distance and Cook’s distance for residuals. None of 
these outliers had a Cook’s distance greater than 1, so were not considered to 
influence the regression coefficients.  
Normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity. Assumptions of 
normality were violated for a number of variables. In particular, most variables were 
negatively skewed (described in section 5.3.1.). To account for this, a more stringent 
alpha level was adopted for relevant analyses (p < .01). Transformation was not 
considered necessary as regressions and ANOVAs are robust to violations of 
normality (Cone & Foster, 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). In addition, the 
variables were similarly skewed so it was considered that transformation may only 
offer marginal improvements in analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). To be certain, 
however, analyses were conducted on both transformed and untransformed data to 
assess the impact of transformations. As transformations had no significant impact 
on overall results, untransformed data were used for the reported analyses 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Normality of residuals was also tested where relevant 
and is reported as appropriate in the following analyses. The data met linearity, 
multicollinearity and homoscedasticity assumptions for regression analyses; 
however, homogeneity of variance requirements were violated for the ANOVAs, and 
appropriate F-tests and post-hoc tests were used to counter this.  
Finally, the ample sample size for this study (N = 2957) and the comparison 
groups (minimum n = 35) meant that there were no concerns regarding sufficient 
power to detect differences. In contrast, as described above, a more stringent alpha 
level was set to reduce the likelihood of Type 1 errors. Commentary is provided 
throughout the results regarding statistical significance and practical significance 
(meaningfulness) using additional indicators such as effect size.  
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Factor analysis 
The items relating to safety culture facilitators and barriers were developed 
based on qualitative data from Study One. The items were tested with the sample 
from Study One (N=41), and were again used in the survey for the current study. In 
addition to the importance ratings as measured by the Likert scale response type, the 
underlying factor structure of the items was also of interest for this study. The eight 
facilitator items and 16 barrier items were each subjected to principal components 
analysis (PCA) using SPPS version 20. PCA was chosen over factor analysis as it 
provides an empirical summary of the dataset, rather than a theoretical solution that 
ignores unique and error variability (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Prior to performing 
PCA, the suitability of data for factor analysis was assessed. Inspection of the 
correlation matrix revealed the presence of many coefficients of .3 and above. One 
barrier item was poorly correlated (range from r = .07 to r = .28) with other items, so 
was removed for the final factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .92, 
exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1970, 1974). In addition, Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance (p <. 001), 
supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. 
ANOVAs 
One-way analysis of variance was performed to test hypotheses relating to 
group differences on continuous dependent variables. Specifically, scores on safety 
climate, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation, were 
compared across organisational divisions (functional areas in the organisation) and 
workforce levels (worker, frontline management, middle management and senior 
management). Post-hoc analyses were performed using Tukey’s HSD or Games-
Howell tests as relevant for each specific analysis. 
Bivariate correlations 
Bivariate correlations were performed to describe the relationship between 
continuous variables (and gender as a dichotomous variable). Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficients I were calculated. Strength of relationships were 
determined using Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, where r = .10 to .29 are considered 
small or weak relationship, r = -.30 to .49 are considered medium strength, and r = 
.50 to 1 is considered a strong relationship.  Negative r values indicate an inverse 
relationship but do not affect strength.  
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Regressions 
Regression analyses were performed to test the hypotheses. Generally, 
regression is employed to predict a score on one variable from a score on the other 
variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2004). For this study, two hierarchical multiple 
regressions were used to test the hypotheses predicting safety compliance and safety 
participation. These hypotheses were informed by the theoretical framework 
described in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1). Hierarchical multiple regression analysis allows 
the examination of the individual contribution of independent variables on the 
dependent variable, over and above the effect of other independent variables. 
Similarly, logistic regressions were performed to test the hypotheses predicting 
incident involvement and non-compliance (receiving warnings), as these dependent 
variables were dichotomous.  
Mediation 
Mediation describes an indirect relationship between an independent variable 
and dependent variable, whereby a third variable mediates the relationship. That is, 
the link between the independent and dependent variables are because of the 
influence of the mediator.  Simple mediation and multiple mediation analyses were 
performed to test potential relationships between antecedents, determinants and 
components of safety performance.  
In the current study, bias-corrected bootstrapping was used to test the 
significance of the indirect effects and to obtain confidence intervals using an SPSS 
macro provided by Preacher and Hayes (2008). Whilst Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
causal steps approach is still common in mediation testing, a focus on the magnitude 
of the indirect effect is now widely accepted as the preferred approach to mediation 
testing (Hayes, 2013; Mackinnon, Fairchild & Fritz, 2007; Rucker, Preacher, 
Tormala & Petty, 2011; VanderWeele & Vansteelandt, 2009). The bootstrap 
estimates were based on 5,000 bootstrap samples, as recommended by Preacher and 
Hayes (2008) and Hayes (2013).  
5.3 RESULTS 
The results from the workforce safety climate survey are presented as they 
relate to each research question. First, the importance ratings of safety culture 
facilitators and barriers are presented, followed by factor analyses of both sets of 
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items. Next, the descriptive statistics and ANOVAs relating to group differences are 
presented, including organisational division and workforce level comparisons. 
Finally, results relating to the factors predicting safety performance are presented 
including bivariate correlations, hierarchical regressions and mediation analyses.  
5.3.1 Key facilitators and barriers to safety culture 
This section presents on the perceptions of importance given to each facilitator 
and barrier of safety culture. Descriptive statistics are presented for the sample, 
followed by results from the factor analyses.  
Importance of facilitators and barriers 
Table 5.3 and 5.4 present the means, standard deviations and breakdown of 
frequencies for the Likert-scale points for the facilitator items and barrier items. 
Higher scores indicate that on average, employees agreed with that item being a 
significant facilitator or barrier of a positive safety culture respectively. 
Table 5.3 
Importance of facilitators  
    % 
 
Facilitator M SD 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
1 Making sure everybody knows 
the most important safety issues 
4.27 .68 0.3 0.7 9.1 51.9 38.0 
2 Leaders knowing their 
responsibilities for safety 
4.25 .67 0.3 0.9 8.0 54.7 36.1 
3 Having clear and simple safety 
messages 
4.21 .64 0.3 0.8 8.3 59.3 31.3 
4 Everybody understanding what 
safety issues they are responsible 
for 
4.14 .69 0.4 1.5 11.1 57.4 29.7 
5 Getting passionate people to 
speak up about safety issues 
4.04 .81 0.7 3.4 16.9 49.7 29.3 
6 Matching safety programs to 
business needs in different areas 
4.02 .71 0.4 1.4 17.9 56.7 23.6 
7 Making the work systems support 
safety goals 
3.99 .66 0.4 1.0 16.6 63.0 18.9 
8 Understanding culture change is 
difficult and takes time 
3.85 .84 0.8 6.4 20.0 53.0 19.8 
 
Facilitators of safety culture were all rated positively, with means ranging from 
3.85 (slightly agree) to 4.27 (mostly agree). Standard deviations (SDs) ranged from 
0.64 to 0.84 indicating reasonably small variability in responses (people felt similarly 
about the items). The facilitators with the highest importance rating were ‘making 
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sure everybody knows the most important safety issues’, ‘leaders knowing their 
responsibilities for safety’ and ‘having clear and simple safety messages’.  
Table 5.4 
Importance of barriers  
 Barriers to safety culture were rated more neutrally, with means ranging from 
2.72 (mildly disagree) to 3.57 (slightly agree). Standard deviations ranged from 0.91 
to 1.09 indicating a larger variability in responses (people felt differently about the 
items). The barriers with the highest importance rating were ‘workers coming and 
going regularly (especially subcontractors), ‘too much paperwork’, and ‘maintaining 
a high level of safety awareness even when accidents aren’t occurring’.  
Interestingly, the barrier item with the lowest importance rating was ‘bad attitudes 
about safety amongst managers’.  
    % 
 
Barrier M SD 
Strongly 
disagre
e 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
Workers coming and going 
regularly (especially 
subcontractors) 
3.57 0.97 2.0 12.7 27.7 41.5 16.1 
2 Too much paperwork 3.53 1.05 2.3 15.9 28.0 34.3 19.4 
3 
Maintaining a high level of safety 
awareness even when incidents 
aren’t occurring 
3.37 1.01 3.9 17.4 27.8 40.3 10.7 
4 
People losing enthusiasm for 
safety initiatives quickly 
3.36 0.97 2.4 19.0 28.5 40.7 9.4 
5 
Competing business priorities (eg. 
production versus safety  
3.31 1.09 4.6 19.6 30.9 29.8 15.1 
6 
Difficulties with subcontractor 
management and operations 
3.24 0.94 3.2 17.2 40.7 30.5 8.5 
7 Complexity of safety legislation 3.22 0.95 3.0 19.2 39.0 30.3 8.5 
8 Excessive workload  3.21 0.98 2.8 21.8 36.3 29.5 9.6 
9 Too much change too quickly 3.14 0.98 3.1 23.6 37.9 26.0 9.1 
10 
Low levels of competency 
(knowledge, skills & abilities) in 
safety leadership roles. 
3.13 1.08 4.6 27.7 29.4 27.3 11.0 
11 Competitive nature of the industry 3.08 0.94 4.1 21.7 42.1 26.2 5.9 
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12.   Financial costs associated with 
safety 
2.96 1.01 6.2 27.4 38.3 20.6 7.5 
13 
 “Bad attitudes” about safety 
amongst workers 
2.93 1.06 7.4 30.9 31.1 23.3 7.4 
14  Not enough safety resources 2.89 1.02 5.9 32.3 34.2 20.6 6.6 
15 
Poor regulatory system for the 
industry 
2.80 0.91 6.5 30.3 44.3 14.9 4.0 
16 
 “Bad attitudes” about safety 
amongst managers 
2.72 1.01 11.4 34.7 30.6 16.6 6.7 
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Factor analysis 
In addition to perceptions of most significant facilitators and barriers to safety 
culture, the factor structure of the items was of interest. To determine the factor 
structure of the items, exploratory factor analyses were conducted.  
For the facilitator items, a one-factor solution provided the best fit. Principal 
components analysis (see Table 5.5) revealed the presence of one component with 
eigenvalues exceeding 1, explaining 54.90%, of the variance. An inspection of the 
scree plot revealed a clear break after the first component. Using Catell’s (1966) 
scree test, it was decided to retain one component. This was further supported by the 
results of the Parallel Analysis, which showed only one component with eigenvalues 
exceeding the corresponding criterion values for a randomly generated data matrix of 
the same size (8 variables x 2557 respondents). Closer inspection of the facilitator 
items reveals that the component could reflect a higher-order factor around safety 
communication.  
Table 5.5 
Principal components analysis of safety culture facilitator items 
 
Facilitator item                                                                             Component 1 
Making sure everybody knows the most important safety issues .81 
Leaders knowing their responsibilities for safety .79 
Having clear and simple safety messages .79 
Everybody understanding what safety issues they are responsible for .79 
Getting passionate people to speak up about safety issues .74 
Matching safety programs to business needs in different areas .74 
Making the work systems support safety goals .69 
Understanding culture change is difficult and takes time .56 
Note. The solution could not be rotated as it has only one component. 
For the barrier items, a three-component solution provided the best fit. 
Principal components analysis revealed the presence of three components with 
eigenvalues exceeding 1, explaining 38.56%, 8.30% and 7.26% of the variance 
respectively. An inspection of the scree plot revealed a clear break after the first 
component, however, there was a second break after three components. Using 
Catell’s (1966) scree test, it was decided to retain three components for further 
investigation. This was further supported by the results of the Parallel Analysis, 
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which showed three components with eigenvalues exceeding the corresponding 
criterion values for a randomly generated data matrix of the same size (15 variables x 
2557 respondents). To aid in the interpretation of these three components, oblimin 
rotation was performed. The rotated solution (see Table 5.6) revealed the presence of 
a relatively simple structure, with all components showing a number of strong 
loadings and all variables loading mostly on only one component. Three exceptions 
were ‘poor regulatory system for the industry’, ‘low levels of competency in safety 
leadership roles’ and ‘too much paperwork’ which all had cross-loadings on more 
than one factor. There were moderate positive correlations between the three factors 
(r = .57, .63, .63).  
Table 5.6  
Principal components analysis with oblimin rotation of safety culture barrier items 
 
 Component 
Barrier item 1 2 3 
Financial costs associated with safety .82   
Competitive nature of the industry .79   
Not enough safety resources .65   
Complexity of safety legislation .64   
Excessive workload .48   
Competing business priorities .44   
“Bad attitudes” about safety amongst workers  -.81  
“Bad attitudes” about safety amongst managers  -.78  
Poor regulatory system for the industry  -.49  
Low levels of competency in safety leadership roles  -.49  
Workers coming and going regularly (especially subcontractors)   .73 
Difficulties with subcontractor management and operations   .73 
Too much change too quickly   .59 
Too much paperwork   .58 
People losing enthusiasm for safety initiatives quickly   .57 
Note. Rotation method Oblimin with Kaiser normalisation. Rotation converged in 49 
iterations. Only fifteen items were included as one item was removed from the analysis due 
to poor correlations with other items (range from r = .07 to r = .28). Cross loadings removed 
for final PCA.  
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Inspection of the component items reveals themes for each. The first 
component includes items relating to safety resourcing. ‘Too much paperwork’ had a 
split loading on this component and the third component, however, conceptually it 
fits with the first as it is related to complexity of the safety legislation and excessive 
workload. The second component includes items relating to safety attitudes and 
competency in safety leadership roles. Finally, the third component includes items 
relating to a dynamic workforce, such as difficulties with subcontractors coming and 
going and too much change too quickly. 
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
This section presents descriptive statistics for the variables relating to Research 
Question 3, exploring intra-organisational differences in safety culture perceptions 
and behaviour. Table 5.7 (on the following page) presents the means, standard 
deviations and scale type of the demographic variables, climate and behaviour 
variables, and stage of change and leadership variables. 
The mean safety climate score across the organisation was positive at 4.26 out 
of 5 (SD = 0.75). This means that on average, respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statements around senior management valuing safety. Similarly positive 
scores were obtained for safety motivation (M = 4.65, SD = 0.50), safety compliance 
(M = 4.47, SD = 0.59) and safety participation (M = 4.25, SD = 0.67).  
The procedural compliance items were also rated very highly, with respondents 
indicating that they follow the safety procedures required for their work on average 
93% of the time, and that their co-workers follow safety procedures 88% of the time.  
The self-reported incident involvement measure was very low, with the average 
number of times respondents reported being involved in an incident less than one 
(that is, less than once in the last 12 months). Similarly, reports of non-compliance 
(receiving a safety warning) in the last 12 months averaged less than once.  
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Table 5.7  
Means, standard deviations and scale type of survey measures 
Variable n M SD Skew Kurtosi
s 
Scale and range 
1. Gender 2937 - - - - - 
2. Age 2786 39.21 11.25 .26 -.71 In years (17–83) 
3. Role tenure 1175 3.36 3.85 3.60 19.75 In years (0–40) 
4. Organisation tenure 1274 3.85 4.12 3.10 .14 In years (0–34) 
5. Industry tenure 905 7.80 8.84 1.99 3.69 In years (0–51) 
6. Safety climate 2859 4.26 0.75 -1.27 2.50 Likert scale (1–5) 
7. Safety motivation 2882 4.65 0.50 -2.19 9.24 
8. Safety compliance 2880 4.47 0.59 -1.22 3.26 
9. Safety participation 2879 4.25 0.67 -.74 .88 
10. Proc. comp (self) 2855 93.08 12.76 -4.01 21.61 Percentage (0–
100%) 
11. Proc comp (others) 2811 87.55 15.78 -2.51 8.81  
12.Incident 
involvement 
2843 0.56 4.09 18.76 400.12 Number of times 
(last 12 months) 
13. Non-compliance 2828 0.11 0.49 8.21 108.12 
14. Stage of change 2805 4.33 1.33 -1.86 1.82 Interval scale (1–5) 
14.Supportive 
leadership 
2827 3.80 0.85 -.70 .63 Likert scale (1–5) 
15. Personal recognition 2826 3.79 0.91 -.80 .05 
Note. Proc. comp = procedural compliance 
The mean stage of change score was 4.33, indicating that on average 
respondents were at an advanced stage of change (already or continuing to take 
actions to reduce their risk). Perceptions of supportive leadership were more 
moderately rated, with the mean of 3.80 indicating respondents on average slightly 
agreed that their immediate supervisor was supportive. There was a very similar 
result for average perceptions of personal recognition received from immediate 
supervisors.  
Due to the very positively skewed distributions for incident involvement and 
non-compliance (receiving warnings), dichotomous categories were created for use 
in analyses. Table 5.8 shows the descriptive statistics for these categories.  
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Table 5.8 
Descriptive statistics for dichotomised incident involvement and non-compliance 
(receiving warnings) 
Involvement in incident n % Received warning n % 
None 2,330 79 None 2,613 88 
Once or more 513 18 Once or more 219 7 
Missing 114 4 Missing 125 4 
Total 2,843 100 Total 2,832 100 
 
The vast majority of respondents did not report being involved in an incident or 
receiving a safety warning in the last 12 months (79% and 88% respectively). For 
those that reported being involved in an incident, 314 respondents (61%) indicated 
involvement in a single incident. For those that reported receiving a warning, 158 
respondents (72%) indicated receiving a single warning in the last 12 months.  
Table 5.9 (on the following page) presents the frequency statistics for position 
type and workforce level category. Position type was re-coded into four ‘workforce 
levels’ for the purposes of analysis. The worker level included engineers, 
subcontractors and all other salaried and wages employees who did not indicate 
management responsibilities. Frontline management included team leaders, 
supervisors and forepersons. Middle management included functional and divisional 
managers. And finally, senior management included senior managers which were 
defined as the managing director, and all divisional general managers.   
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Table 5.9  
Descriptive statistics for position type and workforce level 
Position type n % Workforce level n % 
Graduate Engineer  57 1.9 Worker 2,004 67.8 
Engineer/ Senior Engineer 173 5.9 
Subcontractor  205 6.9 
All other salaried employees 399 13.5 
All other wages employees 1,146 38.8 
Team leader /Supervisor/ 
Foreperson 
299 10.1 Frontline management 314 10.9 
Functional/Divisional 
manager 
107 3.6 Middle management 528 17.9 
Other manager 407 13.8 
Senior manager 34 1.1 Senior management 35 1.2 
Total 2,957 100  2,957 100 
 
5.3.3 Intra-organisational differences in safety culture perceptions and safety 
behaviour 
Intra-organisational differences were investigated to compare variance between 
groups on key measures. Relevant descriptive statistics and analyses are presented 
below, followed by ANOVA results for each group comparison. Post-hoc 
comparisons were performed using Tukey’s HSD test or the Game-Howell test as 
appropriate to account for unequal variances.  The Games-Howell test was 
considered the most appropriate post-hoc test due to unequal group sample sizes and 
the large total sample. 
Divisional differences 
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to determine significant 
differences between intra-organisational groups on key measures. The following 
analyses were designed to test for any significant differences between divisional 
areas on safety climate, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation. 
Divisional area was measured as self-reported allocations to one of seven divisional 
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categories: Construction, Resources, Industrial/Energy, Infrastructure, Corporate, 
Telecommunications or ‘other’.  
Table 5.10 provides a summary of the analyses. Statistically significant 
differences were found across organisational divisions on all key measures. Despite 
reaching statistical significance, the actual difference in mean scores between the 
groups was reasonably small. The effect sizes were quite small, with safety climate’s 
medium effect size an exception (η2 = .05; Cohen, 1988).  
Divisional differences on safety climate scores. There were statistically 
significant differences found between divisions on safety climate scores: F (6, 2806) 
= 26.05, p < .001, η2 = .05. Post-hoc comparisons for safety climate scores using the 
Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean safety climate score for Resources Division 
(M=4.12, SD=0.75) was significantly lower than Construction Division (M=4.49, 
SD=0.69) and Infrastructure Division (M=4.53, SD=0.71).    
Divisional differences on safety motivation scores. There were statistically 
significant differences found between divisions on safety motivation scores: F (6, 
2829) = 5.16
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .01. Post-hoc comparisons using the Games-Howell test 
indicated that the mean safety motivation score for Construction Division (M = 4.73, 
SD = 0.44) was significantly higher than Resources Division (M = 4.63, SD = 0.45) 
and Telecommunications Division (M = 4.57, SD = 0.55).  
Divisional differences on safety compliance scores. There were statistically 
significant differences found between divisions on safety compliance scores: F (6, 
2827) = 4.66
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .01. Post-hoc comparisons using the Games-Howell test 
indicated that the mean safety compliance score for Construction Division (M = 4.54, 
SD=0.56) was significantly higher than Telecommunications Division (M = 4.36, 
SD=0.63).  
Divisional differences on safety participation scores. There were statistically 
significant differences found between divisions on safety participation scores: F (6, 
2826) = 7.81, p < .001, η2 = .02. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the mean safety participation score for Telecommunications Division 
(M = 4.08, SD = 0.74) was significantly lower than Construction Division (M = 4.35, 
SD = 0.66), Resources Division (M = 4.23, SD=0.65), and Infrastructure Division (M 
= 4.36, SD = 0.65). 
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Table 5.10 
Summary of ANOVA results for divisional differences on outcome variables 
    95% CI 
 n M  SD LL UL 
Safety climate              
Construction 673 4.49 .69 4.44 4.55 
Industrial/Energy 71 4.34 .74 4.16 4.51 
Resources 1555 4.12 .75 4.08 4.15 
Infrastructure 115 4.53 .71 4.40 4.66 
Corporate 39 4.56 .80 4.31 4.82 
Telecommunications 322 4.34 .77 4.26 4.43 
Other/ Not specified 38 4.38 .69 4.15 4.60 
F (6, 2806) = 26.05, p < .001, η2 = .05 
Safety motivation       
Construction 682 4.73 .44 4.70 4.76 
Industrial/Energy 71 4.64 .45 4.54 4.75 
Resources 1568 4.63 .51 4.61 4.66 
Infrastructure 116 4.67 .46 4.59 4.76 
Corporate 39 4.63 .70 4.40 4.86 
Telecommunications 322 4.58 .55 4.52 4.64 
Other/ Not specified 38 4.74 .34 4.63 4.85 
F (6, 2829) = 5.16
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .01 
Safety compliance       
Construction 681 4.54 .56 4.50 4.58 
Industrial/Energy 71 4.44 .60 4.30 4.58 
Resources 1567 4.45 .59 4.43 4.48 
Infrastructure 116 4.52 .50 4.43 4.61 
Corporate 39 4.29 .83 4.02 4.56 
Telecommunications 322 4.36 .63 4.29 4.43 
Other/ Not specified 38 4.60 .53 4.42 4.77 
F (6, 2827) = 4.66
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .01 
Safety participation     
Construction 682 4.35 .66 4.30 4.40 
Industrial/Energy 71 4.25 .68 4.09 4.41 
Resources 1566 4.23 .65 4.20 4.26 
Infrastructure 116 4.36 .65 4.24 4.48 
Corporate 39 4.08 .90 3.79 4.37 
Telecommunications 321 4.08 .74 3.99 4.16 
Other/ Not specified 38 4.36 .58 4.17 4.55 
F (6, 2826) = 7.81, p < .001, η2 = .02 
Note. 
a Welsh’s F reported due to unequal variances 
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Workforce level comparisons 
The following analyses were designed to test for any significant differences 
between workforce levels on safety climate, safety motivation, safety compliance 
and safety participation. The workforce level categories were: worker, frontline 
management, middle management and senior management. Table 5.11 shows a 
summary of the analyses. Statistically significant differences were found across 
workforce levels on all key measures; however, the actual difference in mean scores 
between the groups was reasonably small. The effect sizes were also quite small (η2 = 
.01 to .03; Cohen, 1988).  
Workforce level differences on safety climate scores. There were statistically 
significant differences found between workforce levels on safety climate scores: F 
(3, 2786) = 41.80
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .03. Post-hoc comparisons using the Games-
Howell test indicated that the mean safety climate scores for Workers (M=4.20, 
SD=0.76) and Frontline Managers (M = 4.31, SD = 0.73) were significantly lower 
than Middle Management (M = 4.49, SD = 0.69) and Senior Management (M = 4.78, 
SD = 0.39). Workers and Frontline management did not differ significantly on safety 
climate scores. Similarly, Middle Management and Senior Management did not 
differ significantly on safety climate scores.  
Workforce level differences on safety motivation scores. There were 
statistically significant differences found between workforce levels on safety 
motivation scores: F (3, 2805) = 15.38
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .01. Post-hoc comparisons 
using the Games-Howell test indicated that the mean safety motivation score for 
Workers (M = 4.63, SD = 0.52) was significantly lower than Middle Management (M 
= 4.75, SD = 0.40) and Senior Management (M = 4.84, SD = 0.28). Frontline 
management (M = 4.67, SD = 0.47) also had a significantly lower average score than 
Senior Management.  
Workforce level differences on safety compliance scores. There was not a 
statistically significant difference at the p < .001 level in safety compliance scores for 
the different organisational levels: F (3, 2804) = 5.12, p = .002.  
Workforce level differences on safety participation scores. There were 
statistically significant differences found between workforce levels on safety 
participation scores: F (3, 2803) = 27.09
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .03. Post-hoc comparisons 
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using the Games-Howell test indicated that the mean safety participation score for 
Workers (M = 4.18, SD = 0.68) was significantly lower than Frontline Management 
(M = 4.42, SD = 0.61), Middle Management (M = 4.39, SD = 0.63) and Senior 
Management (M = 4.57, SD = 0.51).  
Table 5.11 
Summary of ANOVA results for workforce level differences on outcome variables 
    95% CI 
 n M  SD LL UL 
Safety climate              
Worker 1948 4.20 .76 4.17 4.23 
Frontline management 307 4.31 .73 4.22 4.39 
Middle management 500 4.49 .70 4.43 4.55 
Senior management 35 4.78 .39 4.65 4.91 
F (3, 2786) = 41.80
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .03 
Safety motivation       
Worker 1964 4.63 .517 4.60 4.65 
Frontline management 308 4.67 .473 4.61 4.72 
Middle management 502 4.75 .40 4.72 4.79 
Senior management 35 4.85 .28 4.75 4.95 
F (3, 2805) = 15.38
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .01 
Safety compliance       
Worker 1964 4.44 .60 4.42 4.47 
Frontline management 308 4.50 .56 4.44 4.57 
Middle management 501 4.54 .54 4.49 4.59 
Senior management 35 4.65 .45 4.49 4.80 
F (3, 2803) = 5.12, p = .002, η2 = .01 
Safety participation     
Worker 1962 4.19 .68 4.16 4.22 
Frontline management 308 4.43 .61 4.36 4.50 
Middle management 502 4.39 .63 4.34 4.45 
Senior management 35 4.57 .51 4.39 4.75 
F (3, 2803) = 27.09
 a
, p < .001, η2 = .03 
Note. 
a Welsh’s F reported due to unequal variances 
5.3.4 Factors influencing safety behaviour and related outcomes 
This section presents analyses for the variables relating to Research Question 
4a, which involves exploring the factors influencing safety behaviour and related 
outcomes. Bivariate correlations are presented first, followed by hierarchical multiple 
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regressions (testing H6, that safety climate, safety motivation, leadership and stage of 
change will explain a significant proportion of variance in safety compliance and 
safety participation). Mediation relationships are then analysed and presented (testing 
H8, that safety motivation, leadership and stage of change will mediate the 
relationship between safety climate and safety compliance and participation). Finally, 
logistic regressions predicting the likelihood of incident involvement and non-
compliance are presented (testing H7, that safety climate, safety motivation, 
leadership and stage of change will explain a significant proportion of variance in 
incident involvement and non-compliance [receiving warnings]).  
As presented in section 5.2.3, a number of measures were used to assess factors 
influencing safety behaviour and related outcomes. Safety climate, safety motivation, 
safety compliance and safety participation were all assessed using three-item Likert 
scales from Neal et al. (2000). Safety compliance was also measured using additional 
percentage scales from Mohamed (2002) that assessed procedural compliance of self 
and others. Non-compliance was also measured as warnings received for not 
following safety procedures, and self-reported incident involvement was measured as 
a related safety behaviour outcome.  
Leadership was also investigated as a potential factor influencing safety 
behaviour, and was measured using two three-item subscales from a transformational 
leadership scale (Rafferty & Griffin, 2004): supportive leadership and personal 
recognition.  
Bivariate correlations 
Inspection of the inter-correlations between variables (see Table 5.10) reveals a 
number of statistically significant relationships.  
Safety climate had a significant positive relationship with safety motivation (r 
= .37, n = 2855, p < .01), safety compliance (r = .33, n = 2854, p < .01), safety 
participation (r = .29, n = 2853, p < .01), procedural compliance (self: r = .12, n = 
2828, p < .01 and others: r = .20, n=2785, p < .01), supportive leadership (r = .38, n 
= 2796, p < .01) and personal recognition (r = .32, n = 2795, p < .01). However, 
much stronger relationships were observed between safety motivation and safety 
compliance (r = .69, n = 2880, p < .01), and safety motivation and safety 
participation (r = .59, n = 2879, p < .01). 
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In terms of outcome measures, the two components of safety behaviour (safety 
compliance and safety participation) were strongly related as expected (r = .67, n = 
2878, p < .01). In addition, safety compliance and procedural compliance (self and 
others) were significantly positively related (self: r = .35, n = 2852, p < .01 and 
others: r = .22, n = 2808, p < .01). Non-compliance (receiving warnings) was 
significantly positively correlated with self-reported incident involvement (r = .30, n 
= 2821, p < .01). Safety compliance and safety participation were also significantly 
negatively correlated with non-compliance (receiving warnings: r = -.06, n = 2823, p 
< .01 and r = -.06, n = 2822, p < .01). 
Bivariate correlations were also performed to examine relationships between 
demographic variables of age and tenure (role, organisational and industry), and the 
four key constructs of safety climate, safety motivation, safety compliance, and 
safety participation. Whilst some correlations reached statistical significance (e.g., r 
= .12, n = 1236, p < .01, for safety climate and organisational tenure), none 
suggested a medium or strong relationship. Therefore, these demographic variables 
were not included as control variables in the following regression analyses.  
Contrary to expectations, stage of change was not significantly correlated with 
safety climate (r = -.03, n = 2773, p = .14). However, weak relationships were 
observed with other variables: safety motivation (r = .09, n = 2796, p < .01), safety 
compliance (r = .07, n = 2794, p < .01), safety participation (r = .13, n = 2794, p < 
.01), and procedural compliance (self: r = .09, n = 2779, p < .01 and others: r = .22, n 
= 2760, p < .01). Due to the lack of relationship with safety climate, this variable was 
not included in further analyses.  
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Table 5.12  
Inter-correlations for variables 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Gender (female)
a
 -                
2 Age -.11
*
 -               
3 Role tenure
b
 -.08
*
 .23
*
 -              
4 Organisation tenure
b
 -.02 .34
*
 .54
*
 -             
5 Industry tenure
b
 -.14
*
 .51
*
 .47
*
 .46
*
 -            
6 Safety climate .03 .07
*
 -.05 .12
*
 .08 (.94)           
7 Safety motivation .03 .08
*
 -.04 .04 .03 .37
*
 (.88)          
8 Safety compliance .04 .10
*
 -.04 .03 .01 .33
*
 .69
*
 (.92)         
9 Safety participation -.01 .18
*
 .01 .10
*
 .09 .29
*
 .56
*
 .67
*
 (.89)        
10 Proc. comp (self) .05 .02 -.05 .01 -.02 .12
*
 .17
*
 .35
*
 .28
*
 -       
11 Proc. comp (others) .03 -.01 -.08
*
 -.04 -.11
*
 .20
*
 .10
*
 .22
*
 .16
*
 .69
*
 -      
12 Incident involvement -.03 -.01 .01 -.01 .05 -.03 -.00 .01 .02 .01 -.02 -     
13 Non-compliance -.06
*
 -.03 .02 -.04 -.05 -.03 -.06
*
 -.06
*
 -.06
*
 -.09
*
 -.07
*
 .30
*
 -    
14 Stage of change -.17
*
 .07
*
 .02 .04 .08 -.03 .09
*
 .07
*
 .13
*
 .09
*
 .04 -.02 .01 -   
15 Supportive leadership .04 .01 -.02 .01 -.01 .38
*
 .26
*
 .27
*
 .30
*
 .15
*
 .22
*
 -.01 -.04 -.02 (.93)  
16 Personal recognition .03 -.02 .01 .02 -.01 .32
*
 .22
*
 .23
*
 .25
*
 .12
*
 .19
*
 -.01 -.03 -.01 .75
*
 (.95) 
Note. 
*
Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level (2-tailed). 
a 
Refers to point biserial correlation.
 
 
b 
Tenure items had fewer responses (ranging from n = 905 to n = 1274). 
Bolded values are greater than r = .50, Proc. Comp = procedural compliance. Reliability alphas are reported on the diagonal where relevant.   
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Regressions 
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of safety 
motivation, supportive leadership and personal recognition to predict safety 
compliance after controlling for the influence of safety climate (Table 5.13).  
Table 5.13 
Hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting safety compliance 
Variables B 95% CI β sr2 R² ΔR² 
  LL UL     
Step 1 
  Safety climate 
 
.256  
 
.229 
 
.284 
 
.329
**
 
 
.108 
 
.108 
 
 
Step 2 
  Safety motivation 
  Supportive leadership 
  Personal recognition 
 
.761  
.057 
.000 
 
.021 
.028 
-.026 
 
.795 
.085 
.026 
 
.649
** 
.082
**
 
.001 
 
.356 
.003 
.000 
 
 
 
.490 
 
 
 
.382 
Note. Dependent variable = Safety compliance 
**
p < .001 
 
Safety climate was entered at Step 1, explaining 11% of the variance in safety 
compliance. At Step 2, the inclusion of safety motivation, supportive leadership and 
personal recognition explained 49% of the variance in safety compliance. The 
semipartial correlation coefficients indicate that safety motivation was the most 
important contributor, with a unique contribution of 36% of total variance in safety 
compliance. Supportive leadership contributed a small but significant amount of 
unique variance (0.3%) and personal recognition did not explain any unique variance 
in safety compliance.  
Hierarchical multiple regression was also used to assess the ability of safety 
motivation, supportive leadership and personal recognition to predict safety 
participation after controlling for the influence of safety climate (Table 5.14).  
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Table 5.14 
Hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting safety participation 
Variables B 95% CI β sr2 R² ΔR² 
  LL UL     
Step 1 
  Safety climate 
 
.260  
 
.228 
 
.291 
 
.292
**
 
 
.085 
 
.085 
 
 
Step 2 
  Safety motivation 
  Supportive leadership 
  Personal recognition 
 
.712  
.091 
.026 
 
.669 
.055 
-.007 
 
.755 
.128 
.059 
 
.532
** 
.115
**
 
.035 
 
.240 
.006 
.001 
 
 
 
.366 
 
 
 
.281 
Note. Dependent variable = Safety participation 
**
p < .001 
 
Safety climate was entered at Step 1, explaining 9% of the variance in safety 
participation. At Step 2, the inclusion of safety motivation, supportive leadership and 
personal recognition explained 37% of the variance in safety participation. The 
semipartial correlation coefficients indicate that safety motivation was the most 
important contributor, with a unique contribution of 24% of total variance in safety 
participation. Again, supportive leadership contributed a small but significant amount 
of unique variance (0.6%) and personal recognition contributed less than 0.1% of 
unique variance explained in safety participation.  
Testing mediation 
The hierarchical regressions revealed that safety motivation was the most 
significant predictor of variance in both safety compliance and safety participation. 
Based on previous literature (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010), it 
was hypothesised that the relationship between these variables may be a mediated 
one. Therefore, further analyses were undertaken to explore whether safety 
motivation and leadership dimensions mediated the relationship between safety 
climate and safety outcomes.   
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Table 5.15 reports the results of simple mediation analyses to explore indirect 
effects of each potential mediator on each safety outcome. The ‘c path’ refers to the 
relationship between the independent variable (IV: safety climate) and the dependent 
variable (DV: safety compliance or safety participation) with all mediators included. 
The ‘a path’ refers to the relationship between the IV and the relevant mediator, 
whereas the ‘b path’ is the relationship between the relevant mediator and the DV. 
The final path (c’ path) refers to the direct relationship between the IV and the DV 
when the mediators have been accounted for. In traditional mediation models, the c’ 
path should be reduced to zero if full mediation has occurred (that is, the relationship 
between the IV and the DV only exists because of the influence of the mediator 
variable).  
In the simple mediations presented below, safety motivation, supportive 
leadership and personal recognition all predicted the outcome variables in this series 
of simple mediations; with all providing evidence of partial mediation (the direct c’ 
path is smaller but still significant).  
Table 5.15 
Simple mediation analyses of effect of safety climate on safety compliance and safety 
participation 
Mediator  N Regression coefficient (B) Mediation effect 
  c path a path b path c path LL 
95% 
CI 
UL 
95% 
CI 
DV: Safety compliance        
Safety motivation 2854 .26
**
 .25
**
 .78
**
 .07
**
 .1587 .2294 
Supportive leadership 2792 .26
**
 .43
**
 .12
**
 .21
**
 .0372 .0643 
Personal recognition 2792 .26
**
 .39
**
 .09
**
 .23
**
 .0225 .0458 
        
DV: Safety participation        
Safety motivation 2853 .26
**
 .25
**
 .74
**
 .08
**
 .1503 .2169 
Supportive leadership 2792 .27
**
 .43
**
 .17
**
 .19
**
 .0557 .0882 
Personal recognition 2791 .27
**
 .39
**
 .13
**
 .22
**
 .0386 .0644 
        
Note.
 *
p < .01, 
**
p < .001     
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To further examine the potential role of these variables, multiple mediation 
analyses were conducted to determine the relative role of each mediator when 
considered together. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 reveal significant indirect effects between 
safety climate and both safety compliance and safety participation for the mediators, 
safety motivation and supportive leadership. Personal recognition did not have a 
significant indirect influence for either safety compliance or safety participation 
when other mediators were taken into account. Therefore, supportive leadership and 
safety motivation are both significant partial mediators of the climate–behaviour 
relationship. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Multiple mediation model for variables predicting safety compliance 
a paths b paths 
c’ path (c path) 
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Figure 5.2. Multiple mediation model for variables predicting safety participation 
 
Predicting the likelihood of incident involvement  
Logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of a number of factors 
on the likelihood that respondents had reported that they were involved in an incident 
in the past 12 months. The model contained four independent variables (safety 
climate, safety motivation, supportive leadership and personal recognition). The full 
model containing all predictors was statistically significant, 2 (4, N = 2755) = 32.45, 
p < .001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who 
reported being involved in an incident and those who reported not being involved in 
an incident. The model as a whole explained a relatively low [between 1.2% (Cox 
and Snell R square) and 1.9% (Nagelkerke R squared)] amount of the variance in 
incident involvement, but correctly classified 82% of cases. As shown in Table 5.16, 
only safety climate made a uniquely statistically significant contribution to the 
model. The odds ratio of .78 indicates that there is a 22% decrease in the odds of 
reporting being involved in an incident for a 1-unit change in safety climate scores 
(i.e., in terms of a more positive safety climate).  
 
a paths b paths 
c’ path (c path) 
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Table 5.16 
Logistic regression predicting likelihood of incident involvement 
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
95% CI for 
Odds ratio 
       LL UL 
Safety climate -.245 .070 12.216 1 .001 .783 .683 .898 
Safety motivation .253 .107 5.603 1 .018 1.044 1.044 1.589 
Supportive leadership -.128 .089 2.077 1 .150 .880 .740 1.047 
Personal recognition -.072 .080 .805 1 .370 .930 .795 1.089 
Constant -.905 .489 3.416 1 .065 .405   
Note. N = 2755; Dependent variable = Incident involvement (no/yes) 
 
Predicting the likelihood of non-compliance (receiving warnings) 
Logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of a number of factors 
on the likelihood that respondents would report that they had received a warning in 
the past 12 months. The model contained four independent variables (safety climate, 
safety motivation, supportive leadership and personal recognition). The full model 
containing all predictors was statistically significant, 2 (4, N = 2746) = 15.40, p = 
.004, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who 
reported receiving a warning and those who reported not receiving a warning. The 
model as a whole explained a relatively low [between 0.6% (Cox and Snell R square) 
and 1.3% (Nagelkerke R squared)] amount of the variance in non-compliance, but 
correctly classified 92.3% of cases. As shown in Table 5.17, only safety motivation 
made a uniquely statistically significant contribution to the model. The odds ratio of 
.67 indicates that there is a 33% decrease in the odds of reporting receiving a 
warning for non-compliance, for a 1-unit change in safety motivation scores (i.e., in 
terms of a more positive safety motivation score).  
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Table 5.17 
Logistic regression predicting likelihood of receiving a safety warning 
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
95% CI for 
Odds ratio 
       LL UL 
Safety climate -.049 .106 .216 1 .642 .952 .774 1.171 
Safety motivation -.394 .132 8.900 1 .003 .674 .520 .874 
Supportive leadership -.150 .129 1.354 1 .245 .861 .669 1.108 
Personal recognition .073 .119 .377 1 .539 1.076 .852 1.358 
Constant -.177 .574 .095 1 .758 .838   
Note. N = 2802; Dependent variable = Receiving a warning (no/yes) 
 
5.4 DISCUSSION  
This study aimed to empirically investigate the safety climate of the 
organisation, and the factors influencing the relationship between safety climate, 
safety behaviour, and related safety outcomes. An overview of the results relating to 
each research question and hypothesis is given below, followed by a discussion of 
the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, as well as the strengths and 
limitations of the study.  
5.4.1 Overview of results 
Results are summarised here as they relate to each research question and the 
corresponding hypotheses.  
Key facilitators and barriers to safety culture 
The hypothesis that the highly ranked facilitators and barriers from Study One 
would obtain high levels of agreement (H1) was partially supported by the results. 
Facilitators of safety culture previously identified by safety leaders in Study One 
were all rated positively by workers in Study Two. The facilitators with the highest 
importance rating were ‘making sure everybody knows the most important safety 
issues’, ‘leaders knowing their responsibilities for safety’ and ‘having clear and 
simple safety messages’. This is consistent with previous research on safety barriers 
(Banks & Davey, 2010). The safety leaders in Study One also ranked having clear 
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and simple messages about safety in the top three, as well as leaders knowing their 
responsibilities for safety (originally worded as ‘defining safety leadership roles and 
accountabilities). However, they also ranked ‘ensuring systems were aligned with the 
safety culture’ as important, which differed from the current workforce sample. Also 
in contrast was that safety leaders ranked the item about making sure everybody 
knows the most important safety issues (originally worded as “communicating 
organisational safety priorities”) as the lowest importance whereas the workforce 
sample perceived this facilitator to be the most important. This finding is important 
as it hints at a disconnect between workers and managers on a factor we now know 
to be critical to safety culture: safety communication.  
Barriers to safety culture were rated more neutrally than facilitators, with some 
mean item scores indicating mild disagreement with the item. The barriers with the 
highest importance rating were ‘workers coming and going regularly (especially 
subcontractors), ‘too much paperwork’, and ‘maintaining a high level of safety 
awareness even when accidents aren’t occurring’.  Interestingly, the barrier item with 
the lowest importance rating was ‘bad attitudes about safety amongst managers’. 
This could reflect a different interpretation of the item ranking process. It is possible 
that respondents confused ‘importance’ with ‘evidence’ in that they did not think that 
this barrier was a problem so did not rate it as important. The safety leaders in Study 
One also ranked too much paperwork in their top three significant barriers. However, 
other highly ranked items related to ‘difficulties with managing subcontractor 
operations’ and ‘the challenge of keeping it fresh’. These items are quite similar to 
the items perceived as important to the workforce sample; but reflect more of a 
management perspective on the issues of a subcontractor workforce and maintaining 
a focus on safety. Therefore, whilst some similarities were found between the safety 
leader’s perceptions and the broader workforce’s perceptions of facilitators and 
barriers, there were also some points of difference, so the hypothesis is only partially 
supported.  
The hypothesis that the facilitator items would load onto higher order factors 
around safety communication and worker involvement was not supported. Only one 
component was found in the factor analysis, with all items loading onto the same 
component. In reviewing the facilitator items, it is possible to interpret this finding as 
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a higher order factor around safety communication, as many items reflect this theme. 
However, this result is not conclusive.   
The hypotheses that the barrier items would load onto higher order factors, 
reflecting more general themes around difficulties with developing and maintaining 
safety culture (H3) was supported. A three-factor solution was derived, indicating 
three higher order components to the barrier items. These components related to: 
safety resourcing; safety attitudes and competency; and the dynamic workforce. 
Relating these factors back to the importance ratings in both studies, it seems that the 
challenges of a dynamic workforce are seen as a consistent barrier to safety culture 
development and maintenance.  
Intra-organisational differences in safety culture perceptions and behaviour 
The hypothesis that safety climate, motivation, compliance and participation 
would differ across organisational divisions (H4) was partially supported. The 
descriptive statistics and F statistics revealed a number of significant divisional 
differences in mean scores on all outcome measures. Further post-hoc analyses 
revealed that construction division had a significantly higher average score than 
resources division on safety climate and safety motivation. Construction division also 
had significantly higher average scores than some other divisions on safety 
compliance and safety participation, although not significantly different from 
resources division on these behaviour measures. This result could reflect a greater 
risk exposure in construction compared to other divisions, coupled with a more 
focused education on safety concerns as a result of these risks. However, although 
differences were statistically significant, the mean differences and effect sizes were 
quite small, indicating a possible inflation of differences due to the large sample size. 
Thus, the hypothesis is cautiously supported.  
The hypothesis that safety climate, motivation, compliance and participation 
would differ amongst workforce levels (H5) was partially supported by the results. 
ANOVAs revealed significant differences on three outcomes measures – safety 
climate, safety motivation and safety participation. No group differences were found 
on safety compliance scores. Post-hoc analyses revealed that workers had 
significantly lower scores than middle and senior management on the three outcome 
measures, and workers and frontline management were not significantly different on 
safety climate or safety motivation. In addition, frontline management had 
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significantly lower scores than middle and senior management on safety climate, and 
lower than senior management on safety motivation. The results indicate that there is 
a stark contrast between individuals at the frontline (both workers and frontline 
management) and office-based middle and senior management in terms of safety 
perceptions and behaviours, with those further removed from the core business of 
construction and mining having more positive perceptions. This is consistent with 
Morris et al.’s (1999) findings that blue-collar workers had less favourable 
perceptions of the climate than their white-collar counterparts. However, similar to 
the divisional group differences, the actual difference in mean scores was small 
across all analyses, and the effect sizes were even more modest. Given this, and the 
lack of significant differences on safety compliance, the hypothesis was only 
partially supported.  
Factors influencing safety behaviour and related outcomes 
The hypothesis that safety climate, safety motivation, leadership (personal 
recognition and supportive leadership) and stage of change would explain a 
significant proportion of variance in safety compliance and safety participation (H6) 
was partially supported. Bivariate correlations indicated very small correlations 
between stage of change and any key outcome variables, so this measure was not 
included in subsequent analyses. Hierarchical multiple regressions included safety 
climate in step one, and safety motivation, supportive leadership and personal 
recognition in step two. The total variance explained in safety compliance was 49%, 
with safety climate contributing 11%, safety motivation uniquely contributing 36% 
and supportive leadership contributing less than one percent. A similar result was 
found for the hierarchical regression predicting safety participation, with 37% total 
variance explained, safety climate contributing 9%, safety motivation contributing 
24% and supportive leadership less than one percent. The results indicate that safety 
climate, safety motivation and supportive leadership were all significant predictors of 
safety compliance and safety participation, and safety motivation was the most 
important contributor in both cases. This is consistent with previous research on the 
climate-behaviour relationship (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal et al., 2000; Neal & 
Griffin, 2002).  However as personal recognition was not a significant contributor to 
either outcome, the hypothesis is only partially supported.  
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The hypothesis that safety climate, safety motivation, leadership and stage of 
change would explain a significant proportion of variance in incident involvement 
and non-compliance (receiving warnings) (H7) was partially supported. Using 
dichotomous outcome variables, the relative contribution of each IV in predicting 
incident involvement and non-compliance (receiving warnings) was tested. 
Consistent with previous research, safety climate was a significant predictor of 
incident involvement, and safety motivation was a significant predictor of receiving a 
warning. Inconsistent with previous research was that safety climate did not predict 
receiving warnings (Zohar, 2010) and safety motivation did not predict incident 
involvement (Griffin & Neal, 2000). With regard to receiving warnings, this result 
could reflect an enforcement paradox whereby receiving warnings is a healthy sign 
of a safety climate, in that those unsafe behaviours are monitored and acted upon. 
This may have muted the impact of safety climate in the prediction model. With 
regard to safety motivation not predicting incident involvement, this could reflect a 
measurement issue whereby incident involvement does not indicate responsibility. 
That is, despite being highly motivated to perform safety behaviours, respondents 
may have been involved in an incident that was not a result of their direct actions 
(and also not reflective of their safety motivation). In addition, the two leadership 
measures of supportive leadership and personal recognition were not significant 
predictors of either outcome variable. Previous research investigating leadership 
suggests that it may be a more distal factor in predicting safety outcomes (leadership 
as an antecedent; Griffin & Neal, 2000), which could explain the poor predictive 
influence in this case. Furthermore, for those variables that were predictive, the 
amount of total variance explained for each outcome was very small in this study 
(around one to two percent).  
Finally, the hypothesis that safety motivation, leadership and stage of change 
would mediate the relationship between safety climate, and safety compliance and 
participation (H8) was partially supported. Simple mediation analyses were 
conducted with safety climate as the independent variable, and safety compliance 
and safety participation as dependent variables respectively. Safety motivation, 
supportive leadership and personal recognition were identified as mediators of these 
two pathways. As with the regression analyses, stage of change was not included in 
the mediation tests due to poor bivariate correlations. The results revealed that all 
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potential mediators did in fact partially mediate the climate–behaviour relationship 
when considered on their own. The greatest decrease in the direct path due to the 
mediator was observed with safety motivation. Multiple mediation analyses were 
then performed to assess the effect of all mediators when considered together. As 
predicted based on similar previous research (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010), the 
results revealed that both safety motivation and supportive leadership were 
significant partial mediators of the climate–behaviour relationship. However, the 
second leadership measure around personal recognition became non-significant when 
considered with others. Thus, the climate–behaviour relationship is a mediated one, 
and safety motivation and supportive leadership are significant partial mediators, so 
the hypothesis is partially supported.  
5.4.2 Theoretical implications 
A number of important theoretical implications stem from the results of this 
study. The first relates to the investigation of safety culture barriers. The items 
developed in this program of research were subjected to principal components 
analysis. The analysis suggested that barriers to safety culture appear to be multi-
factorial, and future studies could extend this research by developing reliable metrics 
to measure the impact of these in workforce safety climate surveys. Of particular 
value would be a measure of barrier impact or evidence in the workplace, so that 
perceptions of barriers could be included in the safety climate–behaviour relationship 
in future studies. That is, the current study aimed to determine the most important 
barriers to safety culture development and maintenance in a general sense, but did 
not measure perceptions of whether that particular item was a barrier for an 
individual at that point in time. This meant that we were not able to compare 
perceptions of barriers with safety climate perceptions, which may elucidate the 
impact of perceived barriers on climate and related outcomes.  
Second, the results offer support for the use of Neal et al.’s (2000) safety 
performance framework in safety climate research. All measures were positively and 
significantly correlated, and as expected safety climate and motivation predicted the 
safety performance components. In addition, safety motivation was found to mediate 
the climate–behaviour relationship. This result supports the idea that safety climate is 
an antecedent, and safety motivation is a determinant of self-reported safety 
behaviour. Further, safety compliance and safety participation were negatively 
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correlated with additional measures of non-compliance and incident involvement, 
suggesting evidence of convergent validity for the measures. Further, the inclusion of 
leadership measures as predictors and potential mediators in this framework did not 
reveal a substantial amount of predictive variance, suggesting safety motivation is 
the most important contributor to the relationship. However, the total variance 
explained in both hierarchical regressions was less than half, indicating that other 
variables not considered in this study may also be exerting an influence on the 
climate–behaviour relationship. The multiple mediation results indicate a similar 
story, with the direct path reducing when the mediators were included, but not 
completely disappearing. The results extend Griffin and Neal’s (2000) model by 
finding support in a new industrial context, in a large and influential organisation. 
The results of the current study illustrate that management commitment to safety, and 
personally valuing safety remains critical to achieving individual safety performance.  
Third, the multiple mediation effect on the climate–behaviour relationship is an 
important contribution to the literature. Previous studies have used structural 
equation modelling and multi-level modelling to map various independent and 
dependent variables (e.g., Zohar, 2005). This study is the first, to the author’s 
knowledge, to use multiple mediation analyses to test this relationship. Future studies 
could consider the use of multiple mediation analyses as a useful method to assess 
the nature of the relationship between variables. Further, the results here indicate that 
it is important to consider potential mediators together in a multiple mediation 
model, as some results indicated by the simple mediations were not confirmed in the 
multiple mediation analysis.  
Finally, the lack of significant results for the stage of change measure is an 
interesting finding. In this case, the individual’s preparedness to take action to 
manage their safety risks was not related to their views of management commitment 
to safety, and only weakly related to their personal safety motivation and self-
reported safety compliance and participation. The mean was high for this measure, 
with most indicating the most mature stage of change. Organisational safety training 
and induction emphases on personal responsibility and management of safety risks 
may have influenced the skewed results in this sample. It is also possible that the 
measure was not suited for adaption to the current context, as it may have lost some 
nuances in the translation to a five-item forced-choice scale (as opposed to a 
 140  
qualitative, interview style format which determines stage of change through a series 
of questions and examples).   
5.4.3 Practical implications 
The findings from this study have a number of practical implications for the 
organisation, industry and workplaces more generally. First, the dynamic workforce 
was consistently viewed as a barrier to safety culture development and maintenance. 
Unfortunately, a transient workforce and use of subcontractors on big projects is a 
common characteristic of the construction and mining industry in Australia. This 
barrier may be difficult to overcome for the organisation in the short term due to 
wider industry influences. However, some of the specific items are around managing 
subcontractor operations, which does have scope for improvement across the 
organisation and within specific project sites. Organisations could usefully develop 
and foster durable subcontractor partnerships where possible, for example through 
preferred tender processes, to encourage shared development of safety culture. 
Second, the differences between workforce levels on safety climate, motivation 
and behaviour indicate a need to ensure senior management commitment is translated 
through the workforce levels, particularly at frontline management levels. This may 
not need to be a straight replication of organisational level value statements, but the 
message should be consistent. Workers have little exposure to senior and middle 
management compared to their line supervisors, so it is important for safety 
messages to be communicated through the most relevant and present leader. The 
importance of supervisory safety practices is highlighted in previous research 
investigating safety climate and leadership (Zohar, 2002).  
Finally, the finding that safety motivation mediated the climate–behaviour 
relationship suggests that safety motivation is the key to safety climate influencing 
safety behaviour outcomes. Potentially, safety initiatives that ignore safety 
motivation (that is, the motivation of individuals to perform safety-related activities) 
may not have the intended improvement outcomes, despite efforts around creating a 
positive safety climate. Supportive leadership was also a partial mediator of the 
relationship, so it is important to consider how supportive leadership and safety 
motivation may be linked for workers making safety decisions. Clearly, highlighting 
senior management commitment to safety is only one approach in encouraging safe 
behaviours. Other interventions leveraging supervisor support to motivate employees 
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in personally valuing safety could have greater impact on safety outcomes for the 
organisation.   
5.4.4 Strengths, limitations and future research 
The study had a number of strengths; including the replication of findings from 
study one using another methodology and broader sample, the use of a solid 
theoretical framework and reliable measures for safety climate and behaviour, and 
the application of this framework to the Australasian construction and mining 
industry.  
This study built on findings from study one in order to further explore these 
within a broader workforce sample. In this case, the workforce sample was large and 
reasonably representative so we can be confident that the findings reflect perceptions 
within the organisation. The finding that facilitators and barriers to safety culture 
were perceived reasonably similarly across the organisation is important to informing 
future safety interventions within the current organisation and potentially other 
organisations in the construction and mining industry.  
The theoretical framework underpinning the research program and this study 
specifically has good support in the literature, and aspects of it have been empirically 
tested in both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. The inclusion of additional 
mediating variables was also a strength of this study, as it is important to know the 
relative contribution of variables to the prediction of safety behaviour. This is the 
first study to simultaneously consider mediators in a unique sample with influence 
across the Australasian construction sector.  
Further, the predictive ability of a concise three-item safety climate measure in 
this study was comparable to other studies using up to 16-item measures (Johnson, 
2007). The short measure had excellent internal reliability and bivariate correlations 
indicated concurrent validity in that all measures were correlated in a significant, 
positive direction. The validation of this concise measurement tool in a large 
workforce sample has practical applications for industry, and researchers working 
with industry. Perception surveys are often lengthy and cumbersome to conduct with 
large numbers of workers, and reducing time away from critical organisational tasks 
is an important benefit to industry. In industries such as construction and mining, 
with inherent pressures of production in the time available, the availability of a 
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reliable, valid, and concise short-item safety climate measure for future research is 
additionally likely to assist in a higher respondent rate and greater representativeness.  
However, a number of limitations need to be mentioned. The main 
methodological limitation of this study relates to the use of self-report perception 
surveys. There is an inherent social desirability bias around safety (safety is ‘good’) 
that could have affected the trend in responses on safety questions. However, the 
research design ensured that confidentiality and anonymity were preserved so social 
desirability should have been reduced. Future studies could consider including 
measures of social desirability and demand characteristics to determine if these 
affected the results of the survey (see Crowne & Marlow, 1960 for an example). 
However, it has also been suggested that the magnitude of this distortion is 
commonly overestimated in perception research (Crampton & Wagner, 1994). 
Further, Mohamed (2002) argues that self-report measures can be more accurate than 
other sources of ‘objective’ incident data as under-reporting of incidents in 
organisational records is a widespread issue in construction organisations. 
Additionally, Work Safe Australia only records data from workers compensation 
claims which can only generally be lodged after a seven-day absence. A possible 
solution to self-report behaviour biases is to consider including a measure of 
supervisor-rated safety behaviour alongside self-reported safety behaviours 
(Christian et al., 2009), however, this naturally increases the survey size, which may 
meet resistance from organisational management in an applied research context.  
Another limitation concerns the sample’s representativeness and 
generalisability. Despite the representativeness of the sample being quite good in this 
study, it is still possible that the survey did not reach less engaged staff. The previous 
organisational survey we compared our results to had a 70 per cent response rate. 
This is an excellent rate; however, we do not know whether the remaining 30 per 
cent have similar views to the survey sample. Thus, it is possible that the survey 
responses do not include the full range of potential opinions and perceptions of 
employees in the organisation. Further, as previously discussed, the sample was all 
drawn from one organisation. The organisation is considered reasonably 
representative of and influential within the Australasian construction and mining 
industry, however, caution should be taken in generalising the results to other 
organisations.  
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A further consideration in the interpretation of results from this survey relates 
to the level of measurement. All measures in the study were of individual perceptions 
that have been averaged to the organisational or group level for the purpose of group 
comparisons. Any difference in perception of climate at the group or organisational 
level is only a reflection of the mean differences. Other research has employed multi-
level modelling techniques (Newnam et al., 2008; Zohar & Luria, 2005) as an 
alternative approach to climate measurement, however, the transient nature of the 
workgroups within the organisation precluded this approach.  
Another methodological and theoretical consideration is the cross-sectional 
nature of the study. As explained in section 5.2, conducting the survey at more than 
one time point was considered unrealistic and burdensome for the participating 
organisation. The consequence of this decision is that causal inferences can only be 
made based on theoretical pathways rather than actual empirical data for this study. 
For example, the analyses relating to safety climate and incident involvement could 
also be muddled by the enforcement paradox, whereby receiving warnings may 
indicate a stronger safety culture, rather than a weaker one (a reversal of the 
proposed theoretical pathway). Despite this limitation, the results found are 
consistent with causal studies using the same measures. For example, Griffin and 
Neal (2006) found a significant lagged effect of climate and motivation on behaviour 
after a six-month period.  
The results of this study suggest that a direction for future research should be to 
further investigate the factors predicting safety behaviour, particularly a 
consideration of the mechanisms for how employees are motivated to perform safety 
behaviours. The significant mediation role of safety motivation suggests that the 
safety climate is not the only consideration in improving safety outcomes, and 
understanding how employees are motivated and the role of supervisors in this is 
critical.   
5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the background, method, results and implications from 
the second study in the research program. The workforce safety climate survey was 
conducted with a large cross-section of the organisation, and used an extended model 
of safety performance to investigate the safety climate–behaviour relationship. 
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Differences on key measures were also explored between organisational divisions 
and workforce levels, with statistically significant results but limited applied 
significance. Finally, the barriers and facilitators identified by the safety leaders in 
Study One were rated on importance with the broader workforce sample.  
Study Two results indicate that safety climate, safety motivation and 
supportive leadership were all significant predictors of safety compliance and safety 
participation, and safety motivation was the most important contributor in both cases. 
Study Three further investigates how and why workers are encouraged to perform 
safety behaviours, and the influencing role of supervisors from the perspective of 
frontline workers. This investigation is critical both for informing practical safety 
culture interventions for the organisation, and also assisting in the translation of 
research findings to the organisational environment.  
The next chapter describes the final study in the research program. It details the 
background and method to the study, including a rationale for the chosen theoretical 
approach within the research program’s overall framework. The results of the study 
are presented as they relate to this framework, and implications are discussed in 
terms of research questions and broader theoretical and practical applications.  
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Chapter 6: Safety motivation and 
performance 
This chapter describes the research undertaken for the final study in this PhD 
research program. A background to the research is provided, including the 
positioning of this study in the overall research methodology, a review of the key 
theories on motivation and an analysis of the chosen motivational theory as it was 
utilised in this study. Next, a rationale is given for why group interviews were the 
chosen method for this study, and a brief description of the application of the method 
in the context is provided. Details of the participants, materials, procedure, and data 
analysis are then described. Results from the thematic analysis are presented as key 
findings and are then discussed in relation to the implications for safety culture 
theory and practice.  
6.1 STUDY AIMS AND APPROACH 
As noted in section 2.6, the nature of the relationship between safety climate 
and safety behaviour is still being explored and refined by researchers (Christian et 
al., 2009). The survey results from Study Two offered evidence that safety 
motivation explained a significant proportion of variance in safety behaviour, and 
partially mediated the relationship between safety climate and safety behaviour. This 
relationship supports previous findings in the area (e.g., Neal & Griffin, 2006; 
Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010), and further highlights the need to consider how climate 
perceptions influence individual motivations to perform safely at work. Safety 
motivation was measured as a value perception, with items relating to personal 
beliefs about the importance of putting in effort to be safe and reduce incidents. 
Interestingly, safety motivation was also highlighted in the interview results from 
Study One, with safety leaders emphasising the importance of worker’s involvement 
and personal commitment to safety (see section 4.4).  
Given that Study Two highlighted the significance of safety motivation, the 
aim of this final study was to understand how and why workers are motivated to be 
safe, and what factors might help or hinder this. In particular, the role of the frontline 
supervisor was of interest in this regard, as this had not been specifically explored in 
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Studies One and Two, but is well supported in the literature (e.g., Dingsdag et al., 
2007; Zohar & Luria, 2005). The survey results do not explain what causes an 
individual to be motivated, and how this motivation translates to performance in a 
practical sense. Study Three aimed to address this gap by conducting group 
interviews with frontline workers and supervisors to determine what influences their 
motivation to engage in safe behaviours at work.  
This study contributes to the overall program of research by addressing the 
third and fourth research objective and more specifically, research question 5: 
 RQ5: How can workers be encouraged to perform desired safety 
behaviours? The final study in the research program delves deeper into 
understanding how and why workers are motivated to perform safety 
behaviours, and the influencing role of supervisors. The research 
employs a qualitative method to understand the process by which 
frontline workers and supervisors are motivated to be safe at work, and 
how this compares to other motivated work behaviours. This frontline 
perspective is critical to informing practical safety culture interventions 
for the organisation, as these workers have the most risk exposure.  
As previously noted, in the context of organisational behaviour, motivation is 
often cited as a critical influencing factor for performance and the positive 
relationship between safety motivation and safety performance has been established 
in a number of studies (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 2002; Newnam et al., 
2008). Additionally, the role of leaders in workplace safety is well established in the 
research literature (Clarke & Ward, 2006; Griffin & Hu, 2013; Hoffman, Kines, & 
Anderson, 2010; Zohar, 2000).  
An overview of employee motivation theories was provided in section 2.6.3, 
and Vroom’s (1964) Valence–Instrumentality–Expectancy theory was highlighted as 
a well-accepted modern theory of work motivation. Previous safety research has also 
adopted this understanding of motivation in a safety context (Griffin & Neal, 2006; 
Zohar, 2003); however, not specifically in a construction and mining context. Given 
its relevance in explaining why workers may be motivated to perform safety 
behaviours, the theory was used as a theoretical framework for guiding the group 
discussion and interpreting the results.  
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Figure 6.1 displays the VIE model that outlines how effort is linked to 
performance which leads to the desired outcome (Expectancy–Performance–
Outcome). The theory suggests that people are in a motivated state when they believe 
the effort expended will lead to performance at the desired level, and that this 
performance is associated with valued outcomes or rewards. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Relationship between constructs in VIE theory 
 
The key elements of the model relate to expectancy, instrumentality and 
valence. Expectancy refers to the individual believing that a certain level of effort 
will lead to desired performance. Instrumentality refers to the individual assessing 
that performance at the desired level will be linked to rewards or outcomes. Valence 
refers to the value placed on those rewards. If any part of this chain is broken then 
the effort may not be undertaken by the individual because motivation is 
compromised. The theory has practical utility; if the organisation can identify a weak 
link in this chain, then that link can be targeted for improvement (Levy, 2003).     
 VIE theory has considerable support within the research literature. Miner’s 
(2003) quantitative review of organisational behaviour theories ranks VIE theory 
highly on importance, scientific validity and practical usefulness. Included in the 
comparison were alternative motivation theories and other theories relating to 
leadership and decision-making. Additionally, the theory has validity in cross-
cultural studies (e.g., Matsui & Terai, 1979, compared American and Japanese 
samples). Kalliath et al. (2010) also consider VIE one of the most valuable theories 
of work motivation. They explain how VIE can be applied to enhance worker 
motivation. First, managers need to ensure that valued rewards are available to 
workers. Second, workers need to be reassured that they have the skills and resources 
available to do the tasks required of them. Last, the organisation needs to ensure that 
individual performance is clearly linked to valued rewards. Managers can play a role 
Expectancy 
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Performance Outcome 
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Valence 
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in clarifying expectations about effort leading to desired performance, as well as in 
ensuring that performance is consistently rewarded in a way that is valued.  
However, others criticise the theory for being too complex to apply to normal 
everyday decisions, and for excluding non-cognitive elements such as emotions and 
personality traits (Landy & Conte, 2010).  Another important note about VIE theory 
is that it is a within-individuals theory in that individuals are thought to weigh up 
different alternatives to determine what they will be motivated to do, rather than a 
theory that identifies which individuals are more motivated (Landy & Conte). 
Therefore, any between-individuals analysis is not appropriate, which unfortunately 
applies to a considerable portion of the early research on the theory (van Eerde & 
Thierry, 1996). Despite these complexities, VIE theory remains one of the most 
popular motivational theories in organisational performance research (Miner, 2003). 
In addition, the majority of studies on VIE theory are quantitative in nature, and no 
known studies have attempted to apply the theory specifically to safety performance 
using a qualitative method.  
For the current research context, VIE theory was used as a framework for 
identifying the drivers of safety performance. Operationalising the theory is best 
introduced with an example. A safety-specific instrumentality cognition could be: “If 
I follow safety rules, it will lead to other valued outcomes”. These valued outcomes 
may include: a good performance review; promotion for safety record; not being 
injured in an incident; or, not being responsible for an incident. Alternatively, 
following safety rules at work could lead to less valued outcomes such as: running 
behind on a project; finishing a shift late; or, looking silly in front of workmates. In 
addition, perhaps the rewards valued by employees are more likely to be an outcome 
of other performance factors such as high productivity and cost-savings.   
Table 6.1 describes the operationalisation of VIE theory for this research. Each 
VIE theory construct is detailed and defined. Organisational, Supervisor and Worker 
perspectives are then clarified across all VIE constructs. This comprehensive matrix 
which engages all elements of the theory then led to the development of the 
Interview Schedules which interrogate all theory elements (Appendices L and M).  
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Table 6.1 
Operationalisation of VIE theory for this study 
Construct Definition Organisational 
perspective  
Supervisors 
perspective 
Workers 
perspective 
Performance 
(P) 
 
This research 
defines “safe 
behaviour” as 
safety compliance 
and safety 
participation.  
Full safety 
compliance and 
participation with a 
view to preventing 
workplace 
incidents (is this 
clearly 
communicated?) 
What level of 
performance do 
supervisors expect 
of their direct 
employees?  
What do workers 
think is expected 
of them around 
safety?  
Effort (E)  
 
The action 
required to 
perform at the 
desired level 
What type of effort 
does the 
organisation ask 
employees to make 
to be safe?  
What do 
supervisors expect 
employees to do to 
meet safety 
performance 
standards? 
What do workers 
think they need to 
do to meet safety 
performance 
standards? 
 
Expectancy 
 
Belief that a 
specific level of 
effort will lead to 
a desired level of 
performance 
What does the 
organisation expect 
employees to do to 
meet safety 
performance 
standards? 
Do supervisors 
specify the effort 
required to 
successfully 
comply with safety 
rules?  
 
Do workers think 
that their effort 
will result in them 
fulfilling safety 
performance 
expectations? 
Outcome (O) 
 
The outcomes 
associated with 
performance at 
the desired level, 
particularly 
rewards. This may 
be positive or 
negative. 
Are incidents 
avoided if everyone 
performs as 
expected? 
 
Do supervisors 
communicate the 
outcomes 
associated with 
safety performance?  
 
What outcomes 
do workers link to 
meeting safety 
performance 
standards?  
Valence (V) 
 
The desirability of 
outcomes/rewards 
associated with 
performance at a 
given level 
 
Are rewards 
communicated in a 
way that makes 
them desirable to 
employees?   
Do supervisors 
have an insight into 
what workers 
value? 
What outcomes 
do workers value? 
Are these the 
rewards that are 
associated with 
safety 
performance?  
Instrument-
ality (I)  
 
Belief that 
performance at 
the desired level 
will actually 
result in the 
valued outcomes 
 
What outcomes are 
currently linked to 
performance? 
Do supervisors 
have discretion in 
the rewards that 
they provide for 
workers safe 
behaviour?  
How do supervisors 
clarify this link?  
Are workers 
confident that a 
valued outcome 
will result they if 
they have the 
necessary safety 
performance?  
 
 150  
6.2 METHOD 
A semi-structured group interview methodology was used to determine the 
underlying factors for workers’ motivation to engage in safety behaviour. Interviews 
are commonly used in mixed method studies as a complement to quantitative 
methods (Kruger & Casey, 2000). Consistent with other qualitative techniques, the 
data derived offers more depth and meaning around concepts than scaled survey 
responses can, as well as an insight into the practical application and understanding 
of the same concepts. Interviews are suited to research that aims to reveal the factors 
that influence participants’ behaviours and motivations in the language of the 
participants (Krueger & Casey). The chief strength of the group interview technique 
is that participants are not just interacting with the researcher; they are engaging in 
discussion with other participants, which can lead to insights that may not arise 
through individual interviews. This is particularly relevant in the context of safety, as 
corporate messages are often so entrenched that responses can be automatic if not 
checked and questioned by peers.  
As already mentioned, the underlying mechanisms for motivated behaviours 
are difficult to explore in a survey. It was considered important to gain a perspective 
from frontline workers in a way that elicits depth of understanding, including 
examples of scenarios in which decisions about safety are made. The basic premise 
of VIE theory is that individuals choose between various behaviours based on the 
likelihood of a positive outcome. In a dynamic working environment such as 
construction and mining, there may be situations where workers could comply with a 
safety rule, or could choose an alternative behaviour that will result in a more valued 
reward (for example, taking a shortcut in order to finish the job more quickly). A 
qualitative method of enquiry allows participants to explain the reasons behind their 
decisions, and to compare contextual factors in making these decisions. This 
approach was designed to complement the other studies in the research program, 
providing the necessary depth of data to explore the constructs within the guiding 
theoretical framework.  
6.2.1 Participants 
Participants were a convenience sample recruited from three project sites 
within the organisation. In an attempt to obtain a sample that was representative of 
the researched organisation (and representative of the workforce climate survey 
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respondents), a mix of construction and mining sites was included, from various 
geographical locations (see Table 6.2). Frontline workers and supervisors were 
invited to participate in separate groups, with group sizes varying from 3 to 8 
employees depending on the size of the site and availability of workers. Supervisors 
were particularly difficult to recruit in large numbers because of their role 
responsibilities. In fact two supervisors were interviewed individually as this was the 
only feasible option. Whilst group interview research often seeks to have 
heterogeneous group members to capitalise on different perspectives, homogenous 
groups have two important advantages in this context. First, discussing safety matters 
with peers in similar roles allows shared experiences to be captured with great depth. 
Second, given the potentially sensitive nature of the discussion topic, it was 
important to ensure that participants felt that they could share information and 
experiences freely, without being inhibited by those above or under them in the 
organisational hierarchy.  
Table 6.2 
Group interview demographics 
Site Project type Location Worker n Supervisor n 
1 Road construction Victoria 5 3 
2 Rail construction New South Wales 3 5 
3 Coal mine Queensland 8 5 
  Total 16 13 
 
The total number of participants in this study was 29, with just over half (55%) 
being frontline workers and the remainder comprising frontline supervisors. One 
participant was female and 28 were male, consistent with the gender balance in 
previous studies, and across the sample population. This sample was considered 
sufficient for the purpose of the current study, as other research has noted that 
saturation is often reached early within the group interview methodology (Conchie et 
al, 2013).  That is, new ideas and themes become less likely as the number of groups 
increases.  
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6.2.2 Materials 
An interview schedule was used to guide the discussions for frontline 
supervisor groups and frontline worker groups (see Appendices L and M). As 
discussed in section 6.1, questions were designed around the theme of safety 
motivation, using VIE theory as a framework. An audio recorder was used for the 
purposes of transcribing the discussions. Participant Information Sheets were 
distributed to all participants prior to interviews commencing (see Appendix K).  
6.2.3 Procedure 
The interviews were conducted in private conference/training rooms at the 
relevant sites. Participants were provided with information sheets outlining the 
purpose of the research and the nature of their participation. As the interviews took 
place at the workplace, it was particularly important for participants to be assured of 
the confidentiality of their responses and their right to withdraw at any stage. Once 
participants had given their verbal consent the facilitator provided a brief 
introduction to the focus of the discussion and the importance of valuing everyone’s 
contribution to the discussion.  
The interview schedule included a mix of open-ended questions and follow-up 
prompts as recommended by Krueger and Casey (2000). All participants were asked 
to respond to the first question about the level of safety performance expected at their 
workplace. This promoted equal contribution and openness amongst interviewees. 
Demand characteristics such as social desirability were managed by ensuring that 
questions included self-perceptions and general perceptions of safety behaviour. 
Discussions were facilitated by encouraging contributions from all participants and 
managing dominant participants (for example, at appropriate times the facilitator 
would prompt for similar or different experiences from other group members if one 
person had been the main contributor to discussions). 
The group interviews varied in length between 20 to 50 minutes duration, with 
an average duration of 32 minutes. Duration was also necessarily restricted due to 
operational site requirements. Variances in length were mostly due to the size of the 
group, with larger groups taking longer. The two individual interviews with 
supervisors were the shortest duration. Interview transcripts were produced for 
analysis from the audio files, omitting any information that would allow the 
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individual or the organisation to be identified. The audio files were then destroyed in 
accordance with ethics committee requirements. 
6.2.4 Data analysis 
Data were analysed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A detailed 
discussion of thematic analysis as a qualitative technique is provided in Chapter 4. 
To protect participant anonymity, individuals were not identified in the interviews or 
in the resulting transcripts. Therefore analysis was restricted to group level themes 
rather than individual trends in responses. Responses were quite similar across the 
construction and mining sites, with group data indicating comparable themes. 
Therefore, the results across all three sites are presented, and the relevant site is 
indicated after quotes. In contrast to the interviews conducted in Study One, this 
study had a defined framework for discussion and analysis. Therefore, the framework 
guided the thematic analysis and results are presented in the same approach.  
6.3 RESULTS 
Frontline workers and supervisors’ motivation to perform safety behaviours 
was explored by adopting a well-established employee motivation theory to the 
safety context. The results from the group interviews are presented as they relate to 
each component of the theory. Thus, the results following relate to safety 
performance, effort and expectancy, instrumentality, outcomes and valence.  
6.3.1 Safety performance 
From the workers’ perspective, discussions primarily related to procedural 
compliance. Following safety rules and procedures was the most common perception 
of what workers thought was expected of them in the company and on the project 
site. One worker summarised the requirements: “Being responsible for one’s self and 
people around you” (Worker, Site 1). Other performance requirements described 
related to proactive hazard identification, and participation in group safety activities 
such as pre-starts, toolbox talks and the development of Job Safety Analyses (JSAs), 
Safe Operating Procedures (SOPs), or Safety Health and Environment Work Method 
Statements (SHEWMS) where relevant. An example of the importance of proactive 
safety behaviour illustrates: “If I see something that’s a problem I see anything that I 
should pick up on site, I am there to report [it]” (Worker, Site 2).  
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The supervisors’ view of employee safety performance was well aligned to the 
workers’ perspective. Discussions confirmed the importance of following safety 
procedures and raising safety issues or concerns. Procedural compliance also 
extended to the completion of relevant safety paperwork, a requirement for the 
organisation and for the individuals in order to have evidence of compliance. 
Supervisors also reported an additional performance requirement around ‘safety 
leadership’ or leading by example. The following example reflects the perceived 
importance of modelling safety behaviours to team members:  
“I think it’s just leading by example, you know. If people below you see that 
you care about their safety then they’ll think the same way about safety. You 
know what I mean. So that’s all I do—lead by example and look after your 
mates.” (Supervisor, Site 3) 
6.3.2 Effort and expectancy 
Workers’ discussions around the effort required to meet safety performance 
expectations included both compliance and participation components. There was 
some variation in the specific actions or behaviours required in following safety rules 
in different work areas, however, these had a consistent theme around prioritising 
safety considerations in decision-making. All job tasks were described as having a 
safety element, and the workers’ job was to implement the appropriate risk controls 
as specified by the relevant policy or procedure. In many instances, workers also had 
involvement in the development of these safe work procedures (for example, job 
safety analyses, standard operating procedures, and safety and health work method 
statements), and participation in this process was also seen as necessary for safety 
performance. Proactive hazard identification was also cited, for example: “if there’s 
anything unsafe you can’t just leave it, you got to fix it. As soon as you find 
something—anything—that’s unsafe, you have to report it and sort it out” (Worker, 
Site 3).  
Generally, effort-to-performance expectancy was reasonably strong amongst 
workers, in that they believed if they followed the safety rules for their work area and 
participated in relevant safety activities, they would be successfully meeting the 
required performance standards. In response to a question targeting expectancy, one 
interviewee confirmed: “You would be happy with how safe you are 95 per cent of 
the time” (Worker, Site 1). This is likely due to the clear articulation of performance 
 Chapter 6: Safety motivation and performance 155 
standards at the organisational and work team levels. To provide some organisational 
context, a recent rollout had occurred of simple, branded safety rules articulating 
minimum safety requirements for different work environments within the 
organisation. The rules were known as “Above the line” and had a focus on risk 
minimisation through applying a hierarchy of controls. The organisation had put 
some effort into communicating these through various media (intranet, handouts, 
face-to-face leadership visits). However, despite this effort there were some 
exceptions relating to this, particularly in the construction areas, where some workers 
felt like expectations could vary according to idealised and realistic expectations, for 
example: 
“With the pre-start, you are encouraged to—you are responsible for your own 
 safety and to work safely. And then when you get out onto the work site, as 
 with every job  with safety, there are a lot of grey areas.” (Worker, Site 1) 
From the supervisors’ perspective, there was consistency in how expectations 
were communicated across work teams and project sites. This was assisted by clear 
organisational policies on what effort was required of workers to successfully 
comply with safety rules. Supervisors generally used the language of the 
organisational policies, and did this through various mechanisms such as pre-starts, 
toolbox talks and behavioural observations. As employees themselves, some 
supervisors also discussed how their efforts around safety related to performance 
standards in their role. As part of the safety leadership modelling that was expected, 
supervisors perceived that their behaviour needed to be consistent with 
organisational policies. This included supporting and advocating for employees’ 
safety concerns and working with management at the project level to address hazards 
within their work group. For example, one interviewee described his accountability 
to raise hazards with higher management in the following phrase: “You gotta make 
noise, make the call” (Supervisor, Site 3).  
6.3.3 Outcomes, valence and instrumentality 
Workers’ discussions around the outcomes or rewards for safety compliance 
and participation had several common themes. Rewards such as retail vouchers, 
eskies, backpacks and branded shirts were often mentioned as tangible outcomes for 
safe performance. Project and organisational level awards were also discussed, with 
most examples being for group performance rather than individual effort (for 
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example, loss time injury (LTI) free periods were reportedly rewarded at the project 
level). Other forms of recognition cited included team barbecues and breakfasts, 
although there was some confusion about what performance was being rewarded at 
these events, as described in the following conversation extract:  
W1: And we’ve had BBQs. Was that for safety? 
W2: No, that was for getting the contract renewed.  
W3: Yeah. 
W1: Ok, production [laughter]. (Workers, Site 3) 
 
Discussions also occurred around consequences in the work environment when 
performance expectations are met. At a basic level, workers understood that safety 
was so entrenched in organisational policies and procedures that meeting safety 
performance expectations was necessary to maintain employment with the 
organisation. For example, “keeping your job” and “going to the next job” were often 
brought up in discussion. However, there were some examples of safety performance 
having negative outcomes. The following examples highlight tension between 
competing performance priorities and outcomes:   
Worker 1: If you bring up some safety issues you’ll be called a trouble-
 maker. Stirring shit for nothing because they don’t deem it unsafe. They 
 won’t say it to you; it’ll be like ‘thanks for that’. But then the next day you’ll 
 be off that machine and you’re on a shit one for a couple of weeks. 
Worker 2: Yeah.  (Site 3) 
“Sometimes you’ll have a really good safety issue but it’s going to affect 
 production so when that happens they’ll talk to you outside alone. Basically 
 you’ll have three people from management standing there and everything you 
 say they’ll have a come-back for and they’ll just fire at you until you go ‘ok, 
 forget about it’.” (Worker, Site 3) 
Worker 1:  [You] come across a lot of things that work out very well in the 
office, but when  you are out there, they don’t work at all. And the same way 
you can  find yourself in a grey area because you get out and it says, ‘well do 
this’. But if we do this, we are going to cause another issue, and then you can 
set off a chain reaction. Or you can go back, start at the baseline and work it 
out.  
Worker 2:  Which could impede production 
Worker 3:  And time is money 
Worker 4: At times there is encouragement to, well, “let’s get working’ 
 (Site 1) 
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For some interviewees, the relative valence for production and safety outcomes 
was clear. For example,  
“There’s a fine line between being efficient at your job and being safe at your 
 job. You’ve just got to blend them together as best you can. But I’m going
 home in one piece, before I’m getting a truck out an hour earlier. That’s the 
 way I look at it.” (Worker, Site 3).   
Another outcome of safety performance discussed related to personal safety 
and well-being. Several workers reasoned that being compliant with safety rules led 
to intrinsic outcomes for themselves and their workmates, often expressed in the 
phrase “go[ing] home safe”. This expression acknowledges the potential for serious 
physical harm on site, and captures the motivation to avoid incident involvement, as 
well as motioning towards general well-being and impacts on family or home life.  
For example, “You go home unhurt, to enjoy whatever you do out of work” (Worker, 
Site 1).  
In regards to the valence of the outcomes, maintaining employment was highly 
valued. Sometimes this was linked to safety performance (instrumentality), and other 
times it was more strongly linked to production performance. Job enrichment was 
also spoken about (for example, being given a more comfortable or newer truck to 
operate), however this was often linked as a positive outcome for production 
performance rather than safety performance.  
 Particularly in the mining context where financial remuneration is generous, 
retail vouchers did not hold much reverence. However, workers still reported 
appreciating receiving them, but not because of the financial reward, but for the 
recognition and acknowledgement that it represented. For many interviewees, a “pat 
on the back” from supervisors or project management was a valued outcome for their 
efforts. This could reflect an internalisation of organisational safety climate, in that 
workers strive to individually perform behaviours that they perceive are valued by 
the organisation, and through a process of reducing cognitive dissonance, these 
organisational values also become personal values for the individual.  
Supervisors generally believed that their workers valued rewards such as retail 
vouchers and other small gifts. Supervisors reported some opportunities to exercise 
discretion with informal rewards such as ‘early marks’ and providing cool 
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refreshments on a hot day. Overall however, rewards were perceived to be controlled 
at the project level. There were also perceived discrepancies between how the 
frontline workers were rewarded and rewards available for project ‘staff’. This 
finding could be more aligned to equity theory in terms of fairness comparisons 
between self and others.  
6.4 DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to understand how and why workers are motivated to be safe, 
and what factors might help or hinder this, including the role of the supervisor.  
6.4.1 Theoretical implications 
This study utilised VIE theory to provide a framework for understanding 
workers’ motivations to behave safely. Whilst there are a number of theories 
explaining work motivation, VIE theory is argued to be the best fit for the safety 
context in this population (Levy, 2003; Miner, 2003). The theory demonstrated 
utility in uncovering the process for how employees are motivated to be safe at work. 
The results of this study highlight the breadth of application for VIE theory, 
particularly in a qualitative research context. This adds another dimension to the 
mediated climate-behaviour relationship described in Study Two, and is aligned with 
the overall theoretical framework underpinning the research program.  
As previously outlined, VIE theory is a “within subjects” theory which argues 
that individuals make conscious choices among alternative courses of action based 
on perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes about those alternatives and their associated 
outcomes (Pinder, 1998; Vroom, 1964). Behaviour commences and receives 
direction as individuals consider valence, instrumentality, and expectancy to produce 
outcomes. Valence refers to the affective orientation that an individual has with 
respect to a given outcome. It is a preference that is derived from the anticipated 
level of satisfaction associated with an outcome. Outcomes exist at two levels with 
task performance generally representing the first level, and intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards occupying the second level inasmuch as these outcomes result from task 
performance. Instrumentality refers to the extent to which an individual believes that 
task performance will lead to second-level outcomes. High instrumentality motivates 
behaviour that facilitates performance as performance becomes valued by its 
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association with a second-level outcome. Expectancy refers to the extent to which an 
individual believes they can accomplish a first-level outcome performance outcome. 
Applying these concepts to safety behaviour, the first-level outcome would 
refer to successful task performance, including meeting safety compliance 
requirements and participating in safety initiatives. The second-level outcome(s) 
would refer to desired ‘rewards’, including maintaining employment, job enrichment, 
supervisor and leader recognition and ultimately securing personal safety. Thus, 
individuals should be motivated to engage in safety behaviour when they believe 
they can meet task performance requirements (expectancy) and that meeting these 
first-level outcomes would lead to other valued outcomes (instrumentality) as 
described above.   
VIE theory also demonstrated utility for understanding the role of leadership in 
motivating workers. The safety field is awash with proponents of ‘safety leadership’ 
(e.g., Conchie et al., 2013) and this is described as being a critical skill for leaders at 
all organisational levels. This study has shown that frontline supervisors continue to 
be central in communicating safety expectations, standards and decision-making 
processes on the job. In addition, they appear to be an overlooked resource in terms 
of employee motivation. This is a positive extension to previous industry research. 
Newman et al. (2008), in a study on safety in work vehicles, found that drivers’ 
perception of fleet managers’ safety values were related to their motivation to drive 
safely. Although the study included drivers’ perception of supervisors’ safety values, 
this relationship was non-significant, whereas the present study offered contrasting 
evidence of employee motivation being influenced by frontline supervisor values. 
Frontline supervisors are potentially in the best position to provide immediate 
recognition for safety performance, in a way that is meaningful and valued.  
6.4.2 Practical implications 
The construction industry is a team-based, diverse and dynamic environment 
(Hoffmeister et al., 2014), which requires personal motivation and supportive 
leadership to negotiate the variety of physical and mental demands of the workplace. 
Previous studies have defined safety behaviour as motivated work behaviour 
(Newnam et al., 2008), and it is important to understand how that motivation occurs 
in the industry context. The results from this study indicate that decisions about 
complying with safety rules or participating in safety initiatives are not made in 
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isolation, but with a sense of other competing priorities and values. Several examples 
of this are provided 6.3.3 in the context of the highly valued outcome of maintaining 
employment, which was sometimes linked to safety performance (instrumentality) 
and at other times was more strongly linked to production performance. Further, as 
also evidenced this means that an intrinsically motivated employee may still need 
other extrinsic rewards to emphasise the importance of the desired behaviour.  
Geller (1994, p.19) illustrates the difficulty of motivating safe work 
behaviours: “Unsafe work practices are often followed by motivating consequences 
(i.e., comfort, convenience and faster job completion). Conversely, safe work 
practices often require personal sacrifice (i.e., discomfort, inconvenience, delayed 
work break).” Geller argues that reward and recognition policies need to be based on 
criteria employees feel they can personally control (instrumentality). These 
comments complement the conceptual consideration in VIE theory from Effort to 
Performance to Outcome discussed earlier (see Figure 6.1). That is, it relates to 
behaviour of themselves and workgroup peers, rather than injury or incident rates 
(outcomes). In this sample, memorable rewards such as barbecues and gifts were 
often linked to group level injury-free days. Potentially this is not an effective link 
for individuals when making decisions to follow safety procedures and participate in 
safety activities. In addition, it also focuses on the negative aspect of safety—an 
absence of negative events—rather than positive practices such as the presence of 
observable safety behaviours.   
One positive driver of safety performance from this study is the leadership 
perspective. Supervisor goals were to ensure consistency in how expectations were 
communicated across work teams and project sites. This was further assisted by clear 
organisational policies on what effort was required of workers to successfully 
comply with safety rules. To further this, supervisors generally used the language of 
the organisational policies and, as leadership models, perceived that their behaviour 
needed to be consistent with organisational policies. Supervisors generally believed 
that their workers valued extrinsic rewards and, whilst acknowledging that rewards 
were generally controlled at project level, reported some opportunities to exercise 
discretion with informal rewards.  
In regards to encouraging positive safety behaviour in their employees, 
supervisors in this sample seemed to understand their roles and responsibilities 
 Chapter 6: Safety motivation and performance 161 
around safety, which is critical to any safety intervention. Understanding safety 
accountabilities is the first step (Biggs et al., 2005), and building further safety 
leadership skills in communicating a shared vision, modelling behaviours and 
applying motivational strategies is a further investment the organisation can make in 
improving safety outcomes. In particular, acknowledging the importance of workers’ 
health and wellbeing, rather than just a compliance focus, should be a focus of 
supervisors in motivating safety behaviours of their employees.       
Based on the results, there are two major areas for the organisation to focus on. 
First, the results indicate that workers do not always receive rewards that are valued 
when they meet safety performance expectations. Second, a consistent link between 
valued rewards and safety performance needs to be clearly articulated both at the 
organisational level and, critically, through the frontline supervisors. The results of 
this study indicate that the workers in this organisation understand the level of safety 
performance required of them, and they know what they are expected to do in order 
to meet those requirements. However, as long as the outcomes for safety 
performance are not valued, or are inconsistently provided, or if outcomes for other 
performance metrics are more valued, or more consistently provided, the worker may 
experience conflicting motivations to perform safely. The instrumentality for this 
sample of employees (that is, the belief that performance at the desired level will 
actually result in the valued outcomes) was not always strong. These results have 
implications across the industry as well, given the similar work environment and 
workgroup structures. The industry’s focus on production output trickles down to 
employees on the frontline, and safety performance cannot compete with production 
drivers without clear organisational policies and strong leadership at all levels.   
6.4.3 Strengths and limitations 
There were a number of strengths to this study. First, the use of a qualitative 
technique allowed for depth of understanding that could not be obtained throughout 
the quantitative survey. This was important given the highly contextual nature of 
motivated behaviours and decision-making. Second, the study focused on the 
perspective of frontline workers and supervisors who are most exposed to risk in the 
workplace, and whose attitudes and behaviours are ultimately targeted through 
workplace culture initiatives. This group had lower safety climate scores in the 
workforce safety climate survey (see Chapter 5), so were important to target in this 
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follow up study. Third, the application of VIE theory in this context is unique, and 
addresses a gap in the current literature. VIE theory is well supported in the 
motivation literature, but has not been utilised to explore motivations and constraints 
for safety behaviour generally, nor specifically in a construction context.  
However, the study also contained some limitations. First, the use of a group 
interview setting might have inhibited responses by some employees, and may have 
elicited socially desirable responses due to the content of the interview. This is a 
common limitation in safety research (e.g., Conchie et al., 2013) and is very difficult 
to overcome when accessing employees at their place of work. Additionally, some 
participants specifically expressed concerns about confidentiality and anonymity 
prior to the interviews commencing. Whilst stating the terms of ethical clearance for 
the study hopefully alleviated these concerns, some participants may have been 
cautious in offering opinions in front of peers in the workplace.  
Another limitation concerns the theoretical framework for the structure of the 
interview content. As mentioned above, the application of VIE theory in this setting 
has resulted in many interesting insights into influencing safe behaviours of 
employees. However, the design of the interview schedule around this framework 
may have limited elicitation of other potential thoughts and views. To counter this, 
participants were offered an opportunity to provide any additional comments during 
the interviews; however, such commentary was limited and in all cases related to 
existing themes.  
6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter described the final study in the research program. The study used 
a qualitative approach to explore the mechanisms underlying a major finding in 
Study Two, namely the significance of safety motivation. VIE theory was used as a 
framework to identify what motivates frontline workers and supervisors to perform 
safety behaviours. The theory assisted in identifying a potential opportunity to 
further motivate workers in regards to safety. This study addressed Research 
Objectives 3 and 4 and Research Question 5. More specifically, it examined the 
relationship between safety culture and safety behaviour from the perspective of 
frontline workers, investigated additional factors that influence this relationship and 
translated these findings through identified opportunities for improving safety culture 
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and safety behaviour within the industry. In addition to identifying the critical impact 
of safety leaders on frontline workers, this study identifies two additional factors for 
positive organisational attention. First, there needs to be congruence and consistency 
that workers always receive rewards that are valued when they meet safety 
performance expectations. Second, a consistent link between valued rewards and 
safety performance needs to be clearly articulated both at the organisational level 
and, critically, through the frontline supervisors. 
The next chapter synthesises the overall findings from the research. Findings 
are reported as they relate to each research question and the objectives of the 
research program. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed, with an 
emphasis on translating research findings into applied solutions for the organisation 
and industry more broadly.  
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Chapter 7: General discussion  
This chapter provides a general discussion of the findings from the research 
program. First, a summary of key findings is provided as they relate to each research 
question and the objectives of the research program. Next, the theoretical 
implications of these findings are discussed, followed by a consideration of the 
practical implications for the findings. The overall strengths and limitations of the 
research program are then presented. The chapter concludes with some 
recommendations for translating research findings into applied solutions for the 
organisation and the construction and mining industry more broadly, as well as 
highlighting future safety culture and climate research priorities.  
7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The aim of the thesis was to explore safety culture in a large Australasian 
construction and mining contracting company, with a view to understanding how 
safety culture theory and practice can be integrated to improve safety culture and 
related outcomes within the industry. This aim included several objectives. The first 
objective was to gain insight into how safety culture is understood in theory versus 
how it is applied in practice. The second objective was to explore workforce 
differences in perceptions of safety culture across the organisation. The third 
objective was to examine the relationship between safety culture and safety 
behaviour, and investigate additional factors that influence this relationship. Finally, 
the thesis aimed to translate research findings to applied recommendations for 
improving safety culture and safety behaviour within the industry.  
The literature review identified that further research was needed on a number 
of unresolved issues in the safety culture field. Specifically, the literature remains 
confused on a number of key theoretical points regarding safety culture and climate. 
Empirical safety culture research and empirical safety climate research is not well 
integrated, and this has led to divergent bodies of research. In addition, industry 
practice has adopted safety culture change programs without always knowing the 
theoretical and empirical foundation for such initiatives. This research has attempted 
to introduce some clarity and reduce confusion in an important industry setting by 
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undertaking a series of investigations to allow safety leaders and followers to 
articulate their attitudes, beliefs, and values about safety in the workforce in language 
and concepts commonly understood in industrial communication, and to formulate 
suggestions for positive change.  
The research program addressed a number of significant deficits in safety 
culture research to date. An understanding of safety culture was gained from the 
perspective of those who implement and manage safety culture initiatives within the 
organisation. Further investigation of the relationship between safety climate and 
behaviour was undertaken, taking potential mediating variables into account. And 
finally, how these influencing factors operate in an industry context was explored 
from the perspectives of frontline workers and supervisors.  
Research Question 1: How is safety culture understood and described by the 
safety leaders in the organisation?   
This research program has taken an integrative view of safety culture; but a 
functionalist view of how management influences culture. That is, culture is a top-
down driven process, and the views of management are critical to the resulting safety 
culture. As discussed in Chapter 2, the current academic literature has a fragmented 
view of safety culture stemming from diverse theoretical positions and unresolved 
conceptual debates. It was important to understand how the experts in the 
organisation understood safety culture, as this influences how cultural values and 
beliefs are translated through workforce levels. This research question contributed to 
the first objective of the research program by providing an insight into the shared 
vision of safety culture, how safety culture is understood, and what language is used 
to describe safety culture within the organisation. This offers a critical industry 
perspective to balance the theoretical understanding of safety culture as presented in 
the academic literature. 
The key themes identified in the safety leaders’ definitions and descriptions of 
safety culture highlight a more pragmatic view of culture than that in the literature. 
The themes indicated that their understanding of safety culture related to the actions 
and behaviours of the workforce, and in particular how people acted in their normal 
mode of operation. Examples include statements such as “the way we do things 
around here” and “what people do when no one’s looking”. This can be related to 
the layered view of culture (Guldenmund, 2010; Schein, 1992), where the outer layer 
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of artefacts was reflected in descriptions much more than the middle or core layers. It 
seems logical that the tangible aspects of culture were given emphasis in this sample, 
given the nature of the construction industry and the disciplines within it (e.g., 
engineers, project managers, trade-skilled workers).   
In addition to safety culture descriptions and definitions, the themes from the 
interviews highlight the overriding importance of management commitment to 
safety, which is commonly reported as the higher order factor in safety climate 
measures. This finding corroborates previous research on safety culture (Dingsdag et 
al., 2008) and safety climate (Guldenmund, 2007), and informed the 
conceptualisation and 167perationalized167167n of safety climate in the workforce 
survey. That is, safety climate was measured as perceptions of management 
commitment to safety and was operationalized by the value and priority given to 
safety (i.e., safety values). Worker involvement in safety was another theme that 
emerged from the interviews, which also aligned with the choice of framework for 
study two, in that both safety motivation and safety participation were included as 
part of an investigation of the climate-behaviour relationship.  
Research Question 2: What are the key facilitators and barriers to safety 
culture?  
Also contributing to Objectives 1 and 2, this research question addressed a gap 
in the research literature to date by investigating the most important facilitators and 
barriers to safety culture, from the perspectives of the organisational safety leaders 
and the broader workforce. The elements that help or hinder the development and 
maintenance of positive safety culture were considered important to identify 
alongside descriptions and definitions. Whilst the factors that comprise safety culture 
are frequently discussed in the literature, there is a comparative lack of exploration 
into the practical facilitators and barriers that can influence safety culture 
improvement in organisations. Organisations are complex, and have a number of 
business priorities such as quality, time and cost performance, so a consideration of 
the contextual impacts on safety culture is important from an industry perspective. In 
addition, the unique nature of the construction and mining industries presents further 
contextual barriers to the development and maintenance of safety culture amongst a 
transient, diverse and dispersed workforce.   
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The research question was addressed by adopting a number of methodological 
approaches. First, safety leaders were interviewed, and resulting themes were 
identified. These themes were then confirmed through a quantitative ranking process 
with the same sample of safety leaders, as part of a two-round modified Delphi 
method. The results from these methods indicated a number of facilitators and 
barriers to safety culture. Specifically, the most commonly highly ranked facilitators 
were around systems being aligned, clear and simple safety messages and leaders 
knowing their responsibilities for safety. The most commonly highly ranked barriers 
were difficulties with subcontractor management and operations, too much 
paperwork and the challenge of keeping it fresh (relating to safety fatigue and 
complacency from message saturation).   
The second study investigated perceptions of the importance of facilitators and 
barriers with a broader workforce sample and attempted to distil higher order factors 
or categories to inform safety culture research. The facilitators and barriers from 
Study One were included as items in Study Two, and converted to Likert-scale 
response questions in order to achieve a measure of perceived importance of each 
item. As expected, there was some similarity between safety leaders’ rankings of 
important facilitators and barriers, and average agreement scores on the Likert-scale 
questions within the broader workforce. The importance of clear and simple safety 
messages was perceived similarly, as was the significance of leaders knowing their 
responsibilities for safety. However, a difference was that the workforce sample 
indicated that making sure everybody knows the most important safety issues was 
important to facilitating a positive safety culture. A commonly perceived barrier was 
too much paperwork; however, the workforce sample also emphasised workforce 
transiency (workers coming and going regularly) and complacency (maintaining a 
high level of safety awareness even when accidents aren’t occurring) as important 
barriers.  
These differences may be explained by the level of insight into organisational 
safety which is consistently understood and interpreted by safety leaders who 
typically are predominantly site based for the duration of the project and well aware 
of hazard history and site peculiarities. This is not the case with the transient 
workforce who are either subcontractors or employees subject to roster and site 
changes that disrupt continuity. The transient workforce and management of 
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subcontractor operations were identified as a significant barrier by respondents in 
this study and were seen by safety leaders as increasing risks on projects and 
significant barriers to contemporary and future safety culture development.  
When considering the results from the principal components analysis, the 
barrier items loaded on components relating to safety resourcing, safety attitudes and 
competency, and the dynamic workforce. In the relative ranking and importance 
perceptions from safety leaders and the broader workforce, it appears, as noted 
previously, that the negative impact of the dynamic workforce is a consistent 
perception. Safety culture definitions refer to the shared attitudes, values and beliefs 
of organisational members, and having a transient workforce makes the building of a 
shared view difficult to achieve.  
Research Question 3: Are there intra-organisational differences in safety 
culture perceptions and safety behaviour?  
Also addressing Objective 2, this research question explored intra-
organisational differences in perceptions of safety climate and safety behaviour. 
Previous research (see section 2.3.6) suggested that perceptions may vary within a 
large and diverse organisation. In particular, differences between functional areas 
(divisions) and workforce levels (workers vs. management) were of interest in this 
thesis. As part of the workforce safety climate survey (Chapter 5), demographic 
information about respondents was obtained in order to perform group comparisons. 
The current construction and mining organisation had six divisions at the time of the 
survey, each with arguably different functional operations and potential climates: 
Construction, Resources, Industrial/Energy, Infrastructure, Corporate, and 
Telecommunications.  Analyses revealed statistically significant differences on all 
outcome measures (safety climate, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety 
participation). Specifically, individuals in the construction division had higher scores 
on average than a number of other divisions. In particular, construction division 
respondents reported significantly higher perceptions of safety climate and safety 
motivation than resources division however, did not differ on the safety behaviour 
measures.  
Differences in perceptions across workforce levels were also investigated in the 
workforce safety climate survey. Position types were collected as part of the survey, 
and were later categorised into one of four workforce level categories: worker, 
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frontline management, middle management and senior management. Analyses 
revealed statistically significant differences on three outcomes measures, but not on 
safety compliance. Specifically, workers’ average perceptions of safety climate, 
safety motivation and safety participation were lower than middle and senior 
management. In addition, frontline managers had similar perceptions to workers, and 
differed significantly to senior management on all measures. These results resonate 
with findings by Dingsdag et al. (2008) who, in a study of worker perceptions on 
which positions in the construction industry have the most influence in driving and 
maintaining a site safety culture, found that such positions of influence were all site 
based (Site OH&S advisor, Foreman/Supervisor, Union representatives, the workers 
themselves). Middle management and senior management were seen as distal 
influences with poor communication channels. Given this, the results in this present 
study present a disconnect in perceptions, inasmuch as middle and senior 
management generally rated most measures higher than the workers and frontline 
managers, where it could be argued reality resides. This argues for better vertical 
communications and strategies to engage middle to senior management leaders as 
communication is frequently identified as the most or second most necessary element 
after leadership of a safety culture (e.g., Flin et al., 2000; Thompson et al. 1998).       
Research Question 4: What additional factors influence safety behaviour and 
related outcomes?  
In addition to understanding organisational variations in safety climate and 
behaviour, this research question contributed to Objective 3 by investigating the 
relationship between safety climate and safety performance, as well as any additional 
factors that influence this relationship. The research question was addressed by 
identifying possible influencing factors from the literature (Chapter 2) determining a 
guiding theoretical framework for the research program (Chapter 3), and measuring 
these constructs in the workforce safety climate survey (Chapter 5). The review of 
the literature identified a number of factors predictive of safety performance, 
including safety climate and other factors. The framework developed for the research 
program adopted a well-supported safety performance model and integrated 
additional factors from the literature review. The resulting framework could then be 
used to guide the measures for the climate survey.  
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The nature of the influence these factors have on safety behaviour and related 
outcomes was investigated by conducting a number of regression and mediation 
analyses. The relative predictive value of each independent variable on safety 
compliance and participation was assessed using hierarchical regression analyses. 
These analyses revealed that safety climate, safety motivation, and supportive 
leadership all significantly contributed to the variance explained in both behavioural 
measures, and safety motivation had the greatest unique contribution. Mediation 
analyses revealed that the climate–behaviour relationship was partially explained by 
safety motivation and supportive leadership. This finding supports the safety 
performance framework in that the more proximal determinants of safety behaviour 
(in this case, safety motivation and supportive leadership) mediate the impact of 
antecedents (in this case, safety climate) on safety behaviour.  
The relative predictive value of each independent variable on non-compliance 
and incident involvement was assessed using logistic regression. Safety climate was 
a significant predictor of variance in incident involvement and safety motivation was 
a significant predictor of non-compliance. Other independent variables did not 
explain any significant variance in either outcome measure. Further, the overall 
percentage of variance explained in these analyses was very small, indicating that 
none of the variables were particularly important in explaining non-compliance and 
incident involvement, and that potentially other variables not considered in this study 
may have an influence.  
Research Question 5: How can workers be encouraged to perform desired 
safety behaviours? 
Also contributing to the third objective, this research question further examines 
the impact of these additional factors on safety behaviour amongst frontline workers 
and supervisors. The results from the workforce safety climate survey indicated that 
safety motivation and supportive leadership partially mediated the climate-behaviour 
relationship, and that safety motivation was the most important predictor of variance 
in self-reported safety behaviour. This research question considered the important 
detail of how these factors influence safety behaviour in the workplace.  
Other analyses in Study Two also indicated that frontline workers and frontline 
management had lower scores on all key measures in the workforce safety climate 
survey. That is, on average they had lower scores than middle and senior 
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management on safety climate perceptions and safety motivation, as well as on self-
reported safety compliance and safety participation. Furthermore, these levels of the 
workforce are exposed to the most safety risks in the workplace due to their job tasks 
and position types. Thus, this group was the target population for the final study of 
the research program. As previously argued, understanding how workers are 
motivated to perform safety behaviours, and the influencing role of supervisors, is 
critical to informing practical safety culture interventions for the organisation.  
To understand how frontline workers are motivated and supported to be safe at 
work, VIE theory, an employee motivation theory of sound scientific validity and 
practical utility was adopted as a guiding structure for Study three, within the broader 
theoretical framework underpinning the research program. Previous studies on 
motivation in safety have referenced VIE theory, but this is the first investigation to 
adopt the theoretical components as a structure for a qualitative investigation of 
safety behaviour. Group interviews were conducted with workers and frontline 
supervisors across three project sites within the organisation. These sites were a mix 
of construction and mining projects across three Australian states. 
Findings indicated that safety performance standards were well understood and 
consistently perceived by workers and supervisors. Additionally, the effort required 
to meet these safety performance requirements was generally understood and agreed 
upon in both types of group. However, when considering whether meeting 
performance standards led to positive outcomes for individuals, the link was less 
straightforward. This could relate to the perceived valence of the outcomes whereby 
maintaining employment was highly valued and this was on occasions linked 
(instrumentality) to safety performance, and at other times was more strongly linked 
to production performance. Many workers reported inconsistent outcomes for safety 
performance, and/or more valued outcomes for productivity performance. Themes 
from the group interview conversations indicated that despite the clear priority given 
to safety by senior management in their organisational communications, workers 
experienced conflicting priorities when choosing between safe behaviours and time-
saving behaviours. Production was perceived as a competing value, and production 
performance was more obviously linked to valued rewards such as preferential job 
tasks and job promotions.    
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7.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The findings from the research described in this thesis have a number of 
theoretical implications. The guiding theoretical framework for this thesis integrated 
several theories in order to explore safety culture rigorously within the organisation. 
Each aspect of the framework has been supported by the findings of the research 
program (see Figure 3.1, reproduced below for convenience).  
 
Figure 3.1. Theoretical framework and research program design 
(reproduced here for convenience) 
 
Safety culture remains a difficult concept to define and describe, even for those 
operating within it. The layered model of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2010) is a 
useful way to conceptualise the construct. Descriptions seem to reflect the outer layer 
of culture, according to the model, with espoused values also included in some 
descriptions. It is important for researchers to approach safety culture research with 
an understanding of this layered model, so that interpretations from collected data 
can be appropriately made. Further, the understanding of safety culture reported by 
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were considered an important reflection of a positive safety culture and climate. This 
aligned to modern safety climate studies in the literature, and led to the 
operationalisation of safety climate as a unidimensional construct in the workforce 
survey. That is, climate was operationalised as worker perceptions of the value and 
priority given to safety, especially by managers.  
The factors that are perceived to help and hinder safety culture development 
and maintenance were also identified by safety leaders in the organisation, and 
validated by a large workforce sample. Barriers to safety culture were categorised 
into three overarching themes around inadequate safety resourcing, poor safety 
attitudes and competency and difficulties with a dynamic workforce. Safety leader 
and workforce perceptions of these indicated that the dynamic workforce is the 
greatest barrier to safety culture within the organisation. The key facilitators of safety 
culture appear to all relate to one higher-level idea around effective safety 
communication, including clear and simple messages and clearly defined safety 
accountabilities. Future research should consider adopting measures of safety culture 
facilitators and barriers within workforce surveys, in order to determine the impact of 
these for individuals and work groups, and whether there is a relationship between 
these and other predictive factors in the climate-behaviour relationship.  
Another theoretical implication relates to the use a safety performance 
framework in safety climate research. This thesis adopted Neal et al.’s (2000) model, 
and incorporated additional influencing variables identified in the literature. The 
results further suggest that safety climate is an antecedent of safety behaviour, and 
that safety motivation is the most important determinant of safety behaviour. Safety 
motivation and supportive leadership are significant partial mediators of the 
relationship between safety climate and safety behaviours. However, safety 
motivation appears to be the most important contributor, as it explains more variance 
than perceptions of supportive leadership and personal recognition from supervisors. 
Conceptualising the climate–behaviour relationship in this way allows researchers to 
investigate the relative impact of influencing variables, as well as consider the nature 
of the relationship between perceptions of management commitment, internalised 
safety values, and self-reported compliance and participation within the workplace. 
Indeed, this thesis has made an important contribution to the literature in identifying 
a multiple mediation effect on the climate–behaviour relationship, in a unique 
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organisational context. Given the transiency and dynamic nature of the workforce in 
this sample, including changing workgroups and employee–supervisor dyads, there is 
limited opportunity for relationship development with frontline managers. The 
results of this thesis highlight that employee safety motivation and supportive 
leadership continue to be critical to the climate–behaviour relationship in this work 
environment.  
Finally, VIE theory demonstrated utility in uncovering the process for how 
employees are motivated to be safe at work. The results of this study highlight the 
breadth of application for VIE theory, particularly in a qualitative research context 
and in the construction industry sampled here. The results of Study Three add a rich 
dimension to the mediated climate–behaviour relationship described in Study Two, 
and are aligned with the overall theoretical framework underpinning the research 
program. This thesis has also shown that frontline supervisors continue to be central 
in communicating safety expectations, standards and decision-making processes on 
the job. The results of Study Three highlight that clear performance standards are the 
first step in motivating safety behaviours, and frontline supervisors are in the best 
position to provide immediate recognition for safety performance, in a way that is 
meaningful and valued.  
7.3 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
There are a number of practical implications for organisations wanting to 
improve their safety performance. The findings from this program of research 
suggest that workers and managers perceive the dynamic workforce to be a barrier to 
safety culture development and improvement. This barrier may be difficult to 
overcome for the organisation in the short term due to wider industry influences. 
However, some of the specific items are around managing subcontractor operations, 
which may have scope for improvement across the organisation and within specific 
project sites. Organisations could usefully develop and foster durable subcontractor 
partnerships where possible, for example through preferred tender processes, to 
encourage shared development of safety culture. Further, simple and clear safety 
communication was perceived to be a facilitator of safety culture, so safety priorities 
and accountabilities should continue to be reinforced by senior management, project 
site management and frontline supervisors.  
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The findings also suggest that safety climate (perceptions of management 
commitment to safety) is important in influencing individuals’ safety behaviours, but 
more important is how these safety values are internalised for employees, resulting in 
motivation to perform safety behaviours. Whilst leadership was not as predictive in 
our workforce survey, Study Three results suggested that frontline supervisors have 
an important role in confirming the safety climate, communicating clear safety 
messages and in motivating employees by providing and/or communicating the 
positive outcomes related to safety performance. Therefore, frontline supervisors 
need to be supported in their safety leadership, including effective safety 
communication, and provided with tools and resources to help them balance this 
responsibility with other job functions and coached how to effectively communicate 
safety.   
Competing values such as production versus safety confuse safety messages 
and dilute incentives to engage in safety behaviours. These competing values are not 
evident at senior management level but are communicated from middle management 
down. Frontline supervisors have an important role to play in motivating employees 
to engage in safe behaviour, and greater scope could be given to them in determining 
appropriate rewards for individual and team safety performance. They also need 
support in emphasising the link between performing safe behaviours and positive 
outcomes for employees, in order to buffer against perceptions of competing values. 
It would be additionally useful for all levels of management to engage more closely 
in communicating consistent safety messages as the current burden largely falls to 
frontline supervisors.  
7.4 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS  
This thesis has contributed to the body of safety culture, climate and behaviour 
knowledge by addressing a number of gaps in the literature, and adopting an applied 
research approach in order to inform future safety culture interventions in the 
Australasian construction and mining industry. The research design was guided by a 
theoretical framework that was a fusion of well-supported theories and models. By 
drawing on these established models, the research design had a strong foundation for 
application in a new context. The theoretical framework incorporated models of 
safety culture and climate, safety climate and behaviour models as well as a theory of 
employee motivation and performance. The program of research is one of the few to 
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empirically investigate safety culture and climate and behaviour in one sample and 
due to the size and influence of the organisation within the industry, some 
extrapolation is possible to other similar organisations in the sector. Whilst a number 
of potential contributing factors are presented in the literature, this thesis focused on 
the variables with the strongest relationship to safety performance, and investigated 
the climate–behaviour relationship with a large cross-sectional workforce sample.   
The research also adopted a participatory approach to investigating safety 
culture, using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. By using multiple 
methods and gaining multiple workforce perspectives, a more comprehensive view 
of culture could be obtained. This methodological and sampling triangulation is rare 
but recommended within the research literature. Perspectives on safety culture and 
workplace safety were obtained from individual interviews with 41 safety leaders in 
the organisation, survey data from 2,957 employees across all levels of the 
organisation, and group interviews with 29 frontline workers and supervisors. Taken 
together, these perspectives offer a comprehensive understanding that can be 
balanced with the theoretical understanding from the safety culture literature.   
All three studies attempted to measure safety culture through tapping into the 
middle and outer layers of safety culture – respectively known as ‘artefacts’ and 
‘espoused values’ as articulated by Guldenmund (2010), and represented in Figure 
3.1. Although safety culture was the outcome variable under investigation in Study 
One, the measurement method involved seeking opinions and perceptions about 
culture, rather than conducting direct observations or examining organisational 
artefacts. However, as the core is so difficult to directly measure, inferences were 
made from data obtained from the middle or outer layers as is common in culture 
research. Additionally, it could be argued that direct observations of organisational 
traditions or rituals is still only a reflection of ‘espoused values’ in that the presence 
of the researcher affects the conduct of organisational members. Thus, an 
organisation’s safety culture is perhaps only known to the organisational members 
themselves, and a researcher can only extract articulations of the perceptions of this 
culture from those members and attempt interpretation from there.  
Whilst the goal of this thesis is to ultimately contribute to reducing workplace 
safety incidents, it could be criticised for not directly measuring incident rates or 
severity as part of the investigation. As stated in Chapter 5, organisational incident 
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data was collected with a view to matching responses with self-report data; however, 
this was not possible due to the method of data capture in the organisation. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of limitations with using incident report data 
collected by organisations. First, organisational incident reporting is not truly 
objective, and can vary considerably depending on the organisation’s safety culture 
maturity. Underreporting is common so actual incident rates are difficult to obtain. 
Second, incidents are rare events that occur due to the culmination of a number of 
cultural, contextual, and individual factors. Therefore, incident data is difficult to 
work with, as there is rarely enough range to be able to apply predictive models. 
Finally, incident data is a reactive measure of safety performance, and it is argued 
that measuring individual’s compliance with safety rules and procedures, and 
participation in initiatives is a better method of proactively measuring safety 
performance.  
Finally, the applied investigation of one organisation has both strengths and 
limitations. The limitations regarding generalisability and external validity have been 
previously discussed. In regards to advantages, first, it was a unique sampling 
population for data collection. The organisation is considered one of the largest 
construction and mining contractors in Australasia with over 10,000 employees. 
Furthermore, the organisation belongs to a parent holdings company with global 
influence. In particular, the organisational structure is replicated across the industry, 
as it operates as both a principal contractor and a subcontractor across a large variety 
of projects. Therefore whilst the findings of the research program reflect data from 
this specific organisational population, thus limiting external validity, the 
implications of the findings are likely to be relevant across the Australasian sector 
and potentially globally. 
7.5 FUTURE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 
The research was conducted with the scope and limitations of a doctoral 
program, as well as the operational requirements and business expectations of the 
participating organisation. Notwithstanding the limitations discussed above, a 
number of important findings were presented that address gaps in current research 
literature. These findings also suggest areas for safety culture researchers to extend 
upon in future research.  
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In terms of future research, a safety performance framework, operationalised 
with antecedents and determinants, seems to be a sound approach to investigating the 
climate–behaviour relationship. The findings also suggest that a participatory 
approach offers a comprehensive understanding of safety culture within an 
organisation, and conducting purely quantitative investigations may not be sufficient 
to properly understand the operation of influencing factors in practice, and amongst 
different employee groups.   
Further studies can extend upon this approach when considering the way in 
which safety climate affects individuals’ behaviour at work. The nature of the 
organisational structure and work environment meant that individual perceptions 
were measured in the Study Two survey, and it may be beneficial for smaller studies 
to be undertaken with selected work groups to investigate group-level climates and 
the relative influence of different levels of management (e.g., senior management, 
project managers and line supervisors) on these. Future research should also consider 
adopting measures of safety culture facilitators and barriers within workforce 
surveys, in order to determine the impact of these for individuals and work groups, 
and whether there is a relationship between these and other predictive factors in the 
climate–behaviour relationship. Additional investigation of how facilitators and 
barriers might intersect with cultural maturity could provide further insight into an 
organisation’s cultural journey.  
Finally, future research in safety culture should extend upon the insights gained 
in the final study of this research program. The application of VIE theory to 
understanding safety motivation in this sample of workers was particularly 
illuminating in understanding how safety culture barriers operate at an individual 
level. Further, the framework allowed a structured examination of how safety 
performance standards, individual expectancies and perceptions of valued outcomes 
interact to influence safety behaviours at work. Future research could explore 
potential interventions designed to increase instrumentality and identify relative 
valence of outcomes available to workgroups and individuals. Interventions may also 
consider varying the source of rewards and feedback to determine the relative impact 
on motivating safe behaviours.  
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7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDUSTRY 
The fourth objective of this research program was to translate research findings 
into applied recommendations for improving safety culture and related outcomes 
within the industry. A number of practical implications have already been presented 
throughout the thesis, and further recommendations are made here.  
The findings from this research suggest that safety climate should be measured 
periodically to determine perceptions of management commitment to safety. 
Although this study cannot establish causality, previous studies using the same 
measures have found that safety climate is a good predictor of future safety 
performance. Additionally, measures of safety motivation should be included in 
workforce safety climate surveys, alongside complementary measures of motivation 
and situational constraints or barriers. Further, the connection between supportive 
leadership and employee motivation should be emphasised, particularly in initiatives 
targeting frontline supervisors.  
As previously discussed, the construction industry is a team-based, diverse and 
dynamic environment, which requires personal motivation and supportive leadership 
to negotiate the variety of physical and mental demands of the workplace. As safety 
behaviour is motivated work behaviour, it is important to explore the mechanisms 
through which employees are encouraged to be safe at work. The results of Study 
Three highlight that safety decisions are not made in isolation, and that competing 
demands and priorities affect an individual’s motivation to perform safety 
behaviours. Frontline supervisors are critical in communicating organisational and 
personal safety values and in modelling required safety behaviours. Thus, 
organisations should receive a return on investment in terms of safety outcomes for 
individuals and the organisation, by providing supervisor training and support to 
facilitate effective safety communication and employee safety motivation.   
7.7 CONCLUSION 
This thesis contributes to the theoretical and practical understanding of safety 
culture within the Australasian construction and mining industry, and has relevance 
for the international body of research on safety culture. The exploration of safety 
culture in the participating organisation was guided by an integrated theoretical 
framework that offered a comprehensive view of safety culture, climate and 
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behaviour, as well as the factors influencing the relationship between these 
constructs. Balancing theoretical and applied understandings of safety culture is 
important to informing future safety culture interventions that may reduce workplace 
safety incidents and improve safety at work. The findings from this thesis have a 
number of theoretical implications for how safety culture and climate research is 
conducted in Australia and internationally, as well as implications for industry 
approaches to safety culture measurement and improvement, with a view to 
influencing safety outcomes for individuals, the organisation and the industry more 
broadly.  
As previously discussed, the size and complexity of the researched 
organisation has meant that the research findings are particularly important to the 
Australasian construction and mining industry. However, the implications may be 
relevant to construction and mining globally. As companies become more globalised 
so do their workforces and many of the challenges faced by the current organisation 
are also of concern to international employers. Large organisations contend with 
complex organisational structures and separation between senior management and 
frontline workforces. Big construction projects often rely on local contractors to 
complete various phases of work, and the findings of this research suggest that 
ensuring consistent safety messages through the levels of safety leadership across 
contractors should be a priority for all major industry employers.  
The research program has offered an important contribution to the research 
objectives under investigation. First, the program aimed to gain an insight into how 
safety culture is understood in theory versus how it is applied in practice. The results 
from the three studies show that theoretical definitions of safety culture are less 
relevant in an industry context, and more relevant are the tangible expressions of 
safety culture in the workplace. Gaining this understanding early in the research 
process is helpful in ensuring appropriate measures are used and in interpreting both 
qualitative and quantitative results. Whilst this sample may have had a unique 
understanding of safety culture, shaped by individual and shared experiences with 
safety in organisations, the importance of laying this foundation in the relevant 
context is highlighted for future researchers across industries and countries.  
Second, the research program aimed to explore workforce differences in 
perceptions of safety culture across the organisation. The results illustrate that 
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frontline workers and supervisors are distinct from middle and senior managers in 
their perceptions of safety climate and personal safety motivation. Middle and senior 
management have higher perceptions of climate and report higher personal safety 
values. Additionally, the results suggest some differences in climate and motivation 
perceptions across different functional areas in the organisation. In contrast, the 
facilitators and barriers to safety culture were perceived similarly across the safety 
leader and workforce samples in Studies One and Two, which is an important 
leverage point for future safety interventions in the organisation.   
Third, the research program examined the relationship between safety culture 
and safety behaviour, and investigated additional factors that influence this 
relationship. The results suggest that the current focus on safety climate and safety 
motivation is warranted in safety culture research, and that these factors can explain 
a notable amount of variance in self-reported safety behaviours. Whilst stage of 
change (readiness to take action to reduce personal risk) and personal recognition 
(supervisor’s recognition of an employee’s efforts) were not predictive of safety 
behaviour in this sample, there is still value in considering a number of influencing 
factors in the climate–behaviour relationship, as it is far from conclusively defined.  
Finally, the research program aimed to translate these research findings into 
applied recommendations for improving safety culture and related outcomes within 
the industry. A number of important recommendations have been made regarding: 
the approach to safety culture research within the industry; the importance of gaining 
a foundational understanding of safety culture meaning amongst leaders; the 
relevance of considering the barriers and facilitators to safety culture development 
and maintenance in order to contextualise safety culture findings; the significance of 
encouraging the internalisation of organisational safety values to personal safety 
motivation for employees; and in supporting supervisors around their safety 
leadership in order to realise improved safety outcomes for the individual, 
organisation and industry. 
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Appendix A 
Participant information sheet for Study One interviews 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
Reducing workplace incidents: Bridging the gap between safety culture 
theory and practice 
(Study 1a - Interview stage) 
Research Team Contacts 
Sarah Biggs – PhD Candidate James Freeman – Senior Research 
Associate 
Centre for Accident Research and Road 
Safety 
Centre for Accident Research and Road 
Safety 
Phone  (07) 3138 4583 Phone  (07) 3138 4677 
Email  s2.biggs@student.qut.edu.au Email  je.freeman@qut.edu.au 
  
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD project for Sarah Biggs. The project is 
funded by [the organisation]. The funding body will not have access to individual data 
obtained during the project, but will receive results in de-identified, group form. 
 
The purpose of this project is to explore individual’s experience of safety culture in the 
organisation, with a view to identifying the key factors that assist in creating and 
maintaining a positive safety culture, and providing guidelines on what sorts of programs or 
other interventions might be useful for this.  
 
The research team requests your assistance because your expert views on safety culture are 
important to gaining a picture of how safety culture is experienced and understood at Leighton 
Contractors Pty Ltd. The information gained in this early stage of the research will inform the 
direction of the rest of the project.  
 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can withdraw 
from participation during the project without comment or penalty. Your decision to participate 
will in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or with [the 
organisation]. 
Your participation will involve an interview that will take approximately 45 minutes of your 
time. The interview will include questions around your views on what safety culture is and the 
factors that contribute to a positive safety culture. (An example question is “In your opinion, 
what are the key factors that contribute to a positive safety culture?”). You will be invited to 
participate in the interview via email, and the interview will take place in an office space 
convenient to you, or over the phone. Your contact details will be retained for the purpose of 
inviting you to participate in a follow-up round.  
You be contacted again in a few weeks via email, phone or mail to be invited to participate in a 
follow-up round that will include a short-form questionnaire. Your participation in this follow-up 
round will also be voluntary. Your contact details will not be used for any other purpose and will 
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not be retained once the study is completed.  
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
It is expected that this project may not directly benefit you in the short term. However, it may 
benefit you indirectly through the development of guidelines to assist in improving safety 
culture programs and initiatives and potentially safety outcomes in your workplace.    
RISKS 
The risks associated with your participation in this project are considered low. You may 
experience discomfort in sharing your responses, and in discussing work-related matters whilst 
at work. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially and will be made anonymous when 
transcribed.  Responses will be de-identified before results are analysed. To ensure that we 
have adequately recorded your comments during the interview, we will report back to you to 
verify your comments prior to their inclusion in the analysis.  
The interview may be recorded in order to capture the information accurately. These audio 
recordings will only be accessed by the research team, and will not be used for any other 
purpose. The recordings will be destroyed after the contents have been transcribed. It is 
possible to participate in the project without being recorded. Please indicate this preference 
prior to the commencement of the interview.    
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Due to the nature of the project, prior to the commencement of the interview, the interviewer 
will ask you to provide your verbal consent to participate. In using verbal consent, we will not 
require recording of your name or any other identifying details.  
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
Please contact the researcher team members named above if you would like further 
information about the project. 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to researcher integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  
However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project 
you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research project 
and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information.  
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Appendix B 
Study One interview schedule 
 
 Initial Interview Schedule 
1 How would you define safety culture? 
2 In your opinion, what are the key factors that contribute to a positive 
safety culture? 
3 As an outsider looking in, where would I find/see safety culture? 
4 Who is (a) important and (b) responsible in creating a safety culture in this 
organisation? 
5 What are the barriers to a) creating and b) maintaining a positive safety 
culture? 
6 How can safety culture be enhanced? 
7 What is your opinion of this organisation’s safety culture status/maturity? 
8 What programs or initiatives do you currently have in place around safety 
culture? 
9 Do you know of any programs/initiatives run by other organisations that 
might work in this organisation?  
10 What else could the organisation do to improve safety culture? 
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Appendix C 
Participant information sheet for Study One (b) short-form questionnaire 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
Reducing workplace incidents: Bridging the gap between safety culture 
theory and practice 
(Study 1b: Short-form questionnaire stage) 
Research Team Contacts 
Sarah Biggs – PhD Candidate 
Centre for Accident Research 
and Road Safety 
Phone  (07) 3138 4583 
Email  
s2.biggs@student.qut.edu.au 
Jeremy Davey – Professor 
Centre for Accident Research 
and Road Safety 
Phone  (07) 3138 4574 
Email  j.davey@qut.edu.au 
Tamara Banks – Post-doctoral 
Fellow 
Centre for Accident Research 
and Road Safety 
Phone: 3138 4963 
Email: t.banks@qut.edu.au 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD project for Sarah Biggs. The project is 
funded by [the organisation]. The funding body will not have access to individual data 
obtained during the project, but will receive results in group form. 
 
The purpose of this project is to explore individual’s experience of safety culture in the 
organisation, with a view to identifying the key factors that assist in creating and 
maintaining a positive safety culture, and providing guidelines on what sorts of programs or 
other interventions might be useful for this.  
 
The research team requests your assistance because your views on safety culture in your 
workplace are important to this research. This stage of the project is looking to reach consensus 
on key issues around safety culture that have arisen from previous interviews.  
 
PARTICIPATION 
This is the follow-up questionnaire that you were previously informed of during your 
interview with Sarah Biggs about safety culture.   
Your participation in this project is voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can 
withdraw from participation during the project without comment or penalty. Your decision 
to participate will in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or 
with [the organisation]. 
 
This stage of the project involves the submission of anonymous (non-identifiable) 
information in the form of a short questionnaire. Because there is no way for us to identify 
you by your completed questionnaire it should be noted that it will not be possible to 
withdraw, once you have submitted (as we will not know which questionnaire was yours). 
 
Your participation will involve completion of an online questionnaire that can be accessed 
via a link sent to your email address from the Research Team. The short questionnaire will 
take approximately 15 minutes to complete and will ask you to rate or rank various 
statements around safety culture that have arisen from previous interviews with yourself 
and other employees of the organisation. An example question is, “In your opinion, which 
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of the following are the most important leadership factors for positive safety culture in the 
organisation?” 
 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
It is expected that this project will not directly benefit you in the short term. However, it may 
benefit you indirectly through the development of guidelines to assist in improving safety 
culture programs and initiatives and potentially safety outcomes in your workplace.    
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this 
project. You will be asked about your views on safety culture in your workplace, based on 
themes already raised in previous interviews on the topic.   
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses are anonymous and will be treated confidentially.  The names of 
individual persons are not required in any of the responses. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
The return of the completed questionnaire is accepted as an indication of your consent to 
participate in this project. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
Please contact the research team members named above if you would like further information 
about the project. 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to researcher integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  
However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project 
you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research project 
and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information 
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Appendix D 
Study One online questionnaire (hardcopy version) 
 
 
Survey Title: Understanding of Safety Culture 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Project Title: Reducing workplace incidents: Bridging the gap between safety culture theory 
and practice 
 
Research Team contacts:  
Sarah Biggs, PhD Candidate, Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety – Queensland, 
Ph: 07 3138 4586, Email: s2.biggs@student.qut.edu.au 
Jeremy Davey, Professor, Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety – Queensland, Ph: 
07 3138 4574, Email: j.davey@qut.edu.au  
 
Description: 
This short questionnaire forms part of the first study in a PhD project for Sarah Biggs. The 
project is funded by [the organisation]. The funding body will not have access to individual 
data obtained during the project, but will receive results in group form. 
 
The purpose of the project is to explore individual’s experience of safety culture in the 
organisation, with a view to identifying the key factors that assist in creating and 
maintaining a positive safety culture, and providing guidelines on what sorts of programs or 
other interventions might be useful for this.  
 
The research team requests your assistance because your views on safety culture in your 
workplace are important to this research. This stage of the project is looking to clarify the 
key issues around safety culture that have arisen from previous interviews.  
 
Participation:  
This is the follow-up questionnaire that you were previously informed of during your 
interview with Sarah Biggs about safety culture.   
 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can 
withdraw from participation during the project without comment or penalty. Your decision 
to participate will in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or 
with [the organisation]. 
 
This stage of the project involves the submission of anonymous (non-identifiable) 
information in the form of a short questionnaire. Because there is no way for us to identify 
you by your completed questionnaire it should be noted that it will not be possible to 
withdraw, once you have submitted (as we will not know which questionnaire was yours). 
 
Your participation will involve completion of an online questionnaire that can be accessed 
via a link sent to your email address from the Research Team. The short questionnaire will 
take approximately 15 minutes to complete and will ask you to rate or rank various 
statements around safety culture that have arisen from previous interviews with yourself 
and other employees of the organisation. An example question is, “In your opinion, which 
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of the following are the most important leadership factors for positive safety culture in the 
organisation?” 
 
Expected benefits:  It is expected that this project will not directly benefit you in the short 
term. However, it may benefit you indirectly through the development of guidelines to 
assist in improving safety culture programs and initiatives and potentially safety outcomes 
in your workplace.  
   
Risks:  There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your 
participation in this project. 
Confidentiality:  All comments and responses are anonymous and will be treated 
confidentially.  The names of individual persons are not required in any of the responses. 
 
Consent to participate:  The return of the completed survey is accepted as an indication of 
your consent to participate in this project. 
 
Further information:  Please contact the researcher team members named above if you 
would like further information about the project.  
 
QUT is committed to researcher integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  
However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the 
project you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research 
project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. 
 
About You  
1.  Please select the most appropriate description of your current role in the organisation. 
(Check all that apply) 
 Senior Executive     
 Alliance Project Manager   
 Project Manager    
 Safety Manager     
 Corporate Manager    
 Construction Manager    
 Building Manager     
 Zone Manager    
 Operations Manager    
 Plant Manager     
 Site Supervisor     
 Other:  Please specify   
 
2.  Please select your Division (Pick one or specify ‘other’) 
 Construction     
 Resources     
 Investment and Facility Management  
 Industrial and Energy    
 Telecommunications    
 Other:  Please specify  
 
   
Key factors for positive safety culture  
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The following factors were raised during the interviews as critical to positive safety culture. 
Based on the previous interview responses, the factors have been organised into three 
categories: Organisational Factors; Leadership Factors; and Workforce Factors. 
 
Organisational Factors 
3.  In your opinion, which three (3) of the following are the most important organisational 
factors for positive safety culture in the organisation? (Please select 3 checkboxes.)  
 
 The organisation has a clear stance on safety     
 The organisation’s systems and frameworks support the desired safety culture 
 Safety roles and accountabilities are clearly defined    
 Safety is fully integrated in organisational documents, processes and systems 
 The organisation has a system for reporting on and learning from safety 
experiences 
 The organisation’s business operating structure (eg. Divisions) supports safety goals
  
 Communication channels are effective for safety messages   
 Safety policies are consistently applied across business units in the organisation  
 Business units customise safety policies to meet the needs of their business  
 
Leadership Factors 
4. In your opinion, which three (3) of the following are the most important leadership 
factors for positive safety culture in the organisation? (Please select 3 checkboxes.) 
 
 Leaders have a clear understanding of safety culture    
 Leaders can articulate a clear vision and shared values around safety  
 Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety     
 Leaders encourage personal accountability in relation to safety  
 Leaders listen to workers’ ideas and concerns about safety   
 Leaders support workers to “take safety on” in difficult situations  
 Leaders provide practical support for safety 
       
Workforce Factors 
5. In your opinion, which three (3) of the following are the most important workforce 
factors for positive safety culture in the organisation? (Please select 3 checkboxes.) 
 
 Workers understand what safety culture is about    
 Workers understand what safety means for them personally   
 Workers are involved in decisions about safety    
 Workers are involved in improving safety processes    
 Workers receive formal off-the-job safety training    
 Workers receive on-the-job safety training    
 Workers “look out for each other” on the job     
  
 
Evidence of key factors in the organisation  
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6. In your opinion, currently, how evident are the following Organisational Factors in your 
organisation?  
 
Nev
er 
evid
ent 
Rare
ly 
evid
ent 
Occas
ion-
ally 
evide
nt 
Some
times 
evide
nt 
Ofte
n 
evid
ent 
Mostl
y 
evide
nt 
Alwa
ys 
evide
nt 
The organisation has a clear stance on 
safety 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The organisation’s systems and 
frameworks support the desired safety 
culture 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Safety roles and accountabilities are 
clearly defined  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Safety is fully integrated in 
organisational documents, processes 
and systems 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The organisation has a system for 
reporting on and learning from safety 
experiences 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The organisation’s business operating 
structure (eg. Divisions) supports safety 
goals  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Communication channels are effective 
for safety messages 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Safety policies are consistently applied 
across business units in the 
organisation  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Business units customise safety policies 
to meet the needs of their business 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. In your opinion, currently, how evident are the following Leadership Factors in your 
organisation? 
 
Nev
er 
evid
ent 
Rare
ly 
evid
ent 
Occas
ion-
ally 
evide
nt 
Some
times 
evide
nt 
Ofte
n 
evid
ent 
Mostl
y 
evide
nt 
Alwa
ys 
evide
nt 
Leaders have a clear understanding of 
safety culture  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Leaders can articulate a clear vision and 
shared values around safety 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Leaders demonstrate commitment to 
safety 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Leaders encourage personal 
accountability in relation to safety 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Leaders listen to workers’ ideas and 
concerns about safety 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Leaders support workers to “take 
safety on” in difficult situations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Leaders provide practical support for 
safety 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. In your opinion, currently, how evident are the following Workforce Factors in your 
organisation? 
 
Nev
er 
evid
ent 
Rare
ly 
evid
ent 
Occas
ion-
ally 
evide
nt 
Some
times 
evide
nt 
Ofte
n 
evid
ent 
Mostl
y 
evide
nt 
Alwa
ys 
evide
nt 
Workers understand what safety 
culture is about  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Workers understand what safety 
means for them personally  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Workers are involved in decisions 
about safety 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Workers are involved in improving 
safety processes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Workers receive formal off-the-job 
safety training 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Workers receive on-the-job safety 
training  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Workers “look out for each other” on 
the job 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Barriers to Safety Culture    
The following barriers to creating and maintaining safety culture were raised during the 
interviews.  
 
9. In your opinion, which five (5) of the following are the most significant barriers to safety 
culture in the organisation? (Please select 5 checkboxes.)  
 Competitive nature of the industry      
 Complexity of safety legislation       
 Poor regulatory system for industry      
 Competing business priorities eg. production versus safety   
 Financial costs associated with safety      
 The challenge of “Keeping it fresh”      
 Difficulties with subcontractor management and operations   
 Not enough safety resources       
 Maintaining a high level of safety awareness even when incidents aren’t occurring 
 Low levels of competency in safety leadership roles   
 Too much change too quickly       
 Transiency of the workforce       
 Excessive workload        
 “Bad attitudes” about safety       
 Too much paperwork        
 
Enhancing safety culture in the organisation   
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Several suggestions were made during the interviews about what the organisation should 
do in the future to enhance safety culture in the organisation.  
 
10. In your opinion, which of the following are most important to enhancing safety culture 
in the organisation in the next few years? (Please select no more than 3 checkboxes.)  
 
 Managing safety culture as a change process 
 Making sure the business is ready for relevant safety culture initiatives   
 Identifying and supporting change agents/ champions across the organisation 
 Having clear and simple safety messages 
 Communicating organisational safety priorities  
 Defining safety leadership roles and accountabilities  
 Having a framework for enforcing safety accountabilities  
 Ensuring the systems support the desired safety culture   
 
11. Please provide any further comments here.  
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Appendix E 
Comparison of survey respondents 
Note: The previous organisational survey used as comparison was called the 
‘Your Say’ survey, and included measures of general organisational culture and 
employee attitudes. This survey was conducted in 2010 is not connected to the 
current research in any way – it only serves as a comparison.  
  
Gender of Survey Respondents    
 
Gender Number % Your 
Say 
% 
Male 2520 86 80 
Female 417 14 18 
TOTAL 2937   
Missing  20   
 
The majority of respondents were male (86%) which is similar to the 2010 Your Say respondent 
profile (80%).  
 
Age of Survey Respondents 
 
Age 
Category 
Number % Your 
Say 
% 
15-19yrs 20 .7 .7 
20-29yrs 648 23.3 22.5 
30-39yrs 773 27.7 30.5 
40-49yrs 777 27.9 25.4 
50-59yrs 446 16.0 
19.4 60-69yrs 119 4.3 
70-89yrs 3 .1 
TOTAL 2786 -  
Missing 171 -  
The majority of survey respondents were between 30 and 50 years of age, with an average age of 
39 years. Age distribution was very similar to the 2010 Your Say respondents.  
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Freq. % 
Your 
Say 
% 
57 1.9 2.5 
173 5.9 8.3 
299 10.
1 
9.7 
34 1.1 0.9 
107 3.6 2.3 
407 13.
8 
14.1 
399 13.
5 
20.4 
1146 38.
8 
39.6 
205 6.9 - 
54 1.8  
TOTAL 
2881 
  
Missing  76   
The majority of survey respondents were wages employees (40%) and ‘other’ managers 
(15%). Subcontractors accounted for 7% of the sample. Thirty-four senior managers 
completed the survey – representing just over 1% of the sample.  Sample percentages were 
very similar to the 2010 Your Say sample, however a greater proportion of Your Say 
respondents were ‘other salaried employees’.   
 
 
Freq. % 
Your 
Say % 
1402 47.4 40.9 
1299 43.9 51.7 
26 0.9 1.3 
105 3.6 3.6 
11 0.4 - 
TOTAL  
2843 
  
 Missing  
114 
  
   
The great majority of survey respondents worked full-time, with 47% working shifts, and 
44% working standard hours. Part-timers and casuals accounted for 1% and 4% of the 
sample respectively. Sample percentages were similar to the 2010 Your Say sample; 
however more of the Your Say respondents were non-shift workers.  
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Tenure (Length of Service) 
 
Type of Tenure Number of 
responses 
Average Lowest Highest 
Role Tenure 1175 3.36 
(3 years, 4 months) 
0* 40.42 
Organisational 
Tenure 
1274 3.85 
(3 years, 10 
months) 
0* 34.17 
Industry Tenure 905^ 7.80 
(7 years, 10 
months) 
0* 51.33 
*    The data here include subcontractors, which is why the lowest reported tenure is zero.  
^    It should be noted that many respondents chose not to provide tenure details. For example, a third 
did not provide details of industry tenure.  
 
Role Tenure – all respondents 
 
 
Category Number % 
< 3 mths 41 3.5 
3-12 mths 125 10.6 
1-2 yrs 384 32.7 
2-5 yrs 402 34.2 
5-10 yrs 155 13.2 
10-15 yrs 43 3.7 
15-20 yrs 14 1.2 
20-25 yrs 3 .3 
25+ yrs 8 .7 
Total 1175  
   
 
Average role tenure was just over 3 years, with 67% of respondents having been in their 
current role between 1-5 years.  (Note, this data was not collected in the Your Say survey, so 
cannot be compared).   
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Organisational Tenure – all respondents 
 
 
Category Number % Your 
Say 
% 
< 3 mths 43 3.4 7.7 
3-12 
mths 
97 7.6 21 
1-2 yrs 360 28.3 14.6 
2-5 yrs 474 37.2 36.6 
5-10 yrs 212 16.6 12.2 
10-15 yrs 52 4.1 4.3 
15-20 yrs 21 1.6 1.6 
20-25 yrs 7 .5 0.8 
25+ yrs 8 .6 0.6 
Total 1274   
    
Average organisational tenure was just over almost 4 years, with 37% of respondents having 
been in the organisation between 2-5 years.  The tenure profile of the 2010 Your Say 
respondents was slightly different, with respondents on average having had less time with 
the organisation (21% less than 12 months).  
 
Industry Tenure – all respondents 
 
 
Category Number % 
< 3 mths 12 1.3 
3-12 mths 38 4.2 
1-2 yrs 166 18.3 
2-5 yrs 265 29.3 
5-10 yrs 210 23.2 
10-15 yrs 76 8.4 
15-20 yrs 36 4.0 
20-25 yrs 32 3.5 
25+ yrs 70 7.7 
Total 905  
   
Average industry tenure was almost 8 years, with half of the respondents having been in the 
industry between 2-10 years.  (Note, this data was not collected in the Your Say survey, so 
cannot be compared).   
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Appendix F 
Participant information sheet for Study Two survey—managers 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Reducing workplace incidents: Bridging the gap between safety culture 
theory and practice 
(Study 2 – Quantitative Safety Culture Survey) 
 
Research Team Contacts 
Sarah Biggs – PhD Candidate Tamara Banks – Post-Doctoral Fellow 
Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety 
Phone  (07) 3138 4583 Phone  (07) 3138 4963 
Email  s2.biggs@student.qut.edu.au Email  t.banks@qut.edu.au 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD project for Sarah Biggs. The project is funded by 
[the organisation]. The funding body will not have access to individual data obtained during the 
project, but will receive results in group form. 
The purpose of this project is to explore individuals’ experiences of safety culture in the organisation, 
with a view to identifying the key factors that assist in creating and maintaining a positive safety 
culture, and providing guidelines on what sorts of programs or other interventions might be useful 
for this. This particular study is looking at how perceptions of safety are related to safety behaviour 
and other organisational and leadership factors. 
The research team requests your assistance because it is important to gain as many views as possible 
from various parts of the organisation to explore how safety culture is viewed in the organisation.  
 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can withdraw from 
participation during the project without comment or penalty. Your decision to participate will in no way 
impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or with [the organisation]. This project involves 
the submission of anonymous (non-identifiable) information in the form of a survey. Because there is no 
way for us to identify you by your completed survey it should be noted that it will not be possible to 
withdraw, once you have submitted (as we will not know which survey was yours). 
Your participation will involve completion of a survey to be completed in your own time and 
returned via an online mechanism or via a self-addressed envelope to QUT. The survey will take 
approximately 25 minutes to complete. The survey includes questions about your work role, your 
perceptions of the organisation and safety at your workplace, and your safety behaviour. An 
example statement about your perceptions of safety is “management considers safety to be 
important” (rate level of agreement from 1-5). 
 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
It is expected that this project will not directly benefit you in the short term. However, it may benefit you 
indirectly through the development of guidelines to assist in improving safety culture programs and 
initiatives and potentially safety outcomes in your workplace.    
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this project. You 
will be asked to share your thoughts and opinions about safety in your workplace, and your specific 
responses will not be seen by anyone in the organisation.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses are anonymous and will be treated confidentially.  The names of individual 
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persons are not required in any of the responses. 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
The return of the completed survey is accepted as an indication of your consent to participate in this 
project. 
 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
Please contact the research team members named above if you would like further information about the 
project. 
 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to researcher integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you do 
have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the QUT 
Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The Research Ethics Unit is 
not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial 
manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information. 
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Appendix G 
Participant information sheet for Study Two survey –workers 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Reducing workplace incidents: Bridging the gap between safety culture 
theory and practice 
(Study 2 – Quantitative Safety Culture Survey) 
 
Research Team Contacts 
Sarah Biggs – PhD Candidate Tamara Banks – Post-Doctoral Fellow 
Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety 
Phone  (07) 3138 4583 Phone  (07) 3138 4963 
Email  s2.biggs@student.qut.edu.au Email  t.banks@qut.edu.au 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD project for Sarah Biggs. The project is funded by 
[the organisation]. The funding body will not have access to individual data obtained during the 
project, but will receive results in group form. 
The purpose of this project is to explore individuals’ experiences of safety culture in the organisation, 
with a view to identifying the key factors that assist in creating and maintaining a positive safety 
culture, and providing guidelines on what sorts of programs or other interventions might be useful 
for this. This particular study is looking at how perceptions of safety are related to safety behaviour 
and other organisational and leadership factors. 
The research team requests your assistance because it is important to gain as many views as possible 
from various parts of the organisation to explore how safety culture is viewed in the organisation.  
 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can withdraw from 
participation during the project without comment or penalty. Your decision to participate will in no way 
impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or with [the organisation]. This project involves 
the submission of anonymous (non-identifiable) information in the form of a survey. Because there is no 
way for us to identify you by your completed survey it should be noted that it will not be possible to 
withdraw, once you have submitted (as we will not know which survey was yours). 
Your participation will involve completion of a survey to be completed in your own time and 
returned via an online mechanism or via a self-addressed envelope to QUT. The survey will take 
approximately 15 minutes to complete. The survey includes questions about your work role, your 
perceptions of the organisation and safety at your workplace, and your safety behaviour. An 
example statement about your perceptions of safety is “management considers safety to be 
important” (rate level of agreement from 1-5). 
 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
It is expected that this project will not directly benefit you in the short term. However, it may benefit you 
indirectly through the development of guidelines to assist in improving safety culture programs and 
initiatives and potentially safety outcomes in your workplace.    
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this project. You 
will be asked to share your thoughts and opinions about safety in your workplace, and your specific 
responses will not be seen by anyone in the organisation.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
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All comments and responses are anonymous and will be treated confidentially.  The names of individual 
persons are not required in any of the responses. 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
The return of the completed survey is accepted as an indication of your consent to participate in this 
project. 
 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
Please contact the research team members named above if you would like further information about the 
project. 
 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to researcher integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you do 
have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the QUT 
Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The Research Ethics Unit is 
not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial 
manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information. 
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Appendix H 
Email invitation for Study Two survey – managers 
 
Welcome to the 2011 [organisation name] Safety Culture Survey.  
As you all know “Safety & Health above all else” is our number one value at [the 
organisation]. We are continually looking for ways to improve our performance. Safety 
Culture Surveys give us an opportunity to understand the shared attitudes and beliefs of 
our people; they provide a baseline for ongoing cultural development.   
An independent research team from the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) is 
helping us conduct the [Organisation name] Safety Culture Survey.  
What is the survey about? 
The survey asks about your opinions, perceptions and experiences of safety at work.  An 
information sheet is attached to this email, and it explains the survey and your participation 
in more detail.   
Why is it important?  
The survey will help to identify what is working and what is not working, so that we know 
where to target our safety initiatives.  
How do I complete the survey? 
You can complete the survey by clicking on the link below:  
Managers: http://survey.qut.edu.au/survey/172929/f6c7/ 
 
We look forward to receiving your thoughts and opinions and encourage everyone to 
participate and play an active role in shaping our future. 
Who should I contact if I have any questions or concerns? 
Please contact one of the QUT research team members if you have any questions or 
concerns about your participation in this survey.  
Sarah Biggs – PhD Candidate Tamara Banks – Post-Doctoral Fellow 
Centre for Accident Research and 
Road Safety 
Centre for Accident Research and 
Road Safety 
Phone  (07) 3138 4583 Phone  (07) 3138 4963 
Email  s2.biggs@student.qut.edu.au  Email  t.banks@qut.edu.au  
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Appendix I 
Email invitation for Study Two survey – workers 
 
Welcome to the 2011 [organisation name] Safety Culture Survey.  
 
As you all know “Safety & Health above all else” is our number one value at Leighton 
Contractors. We are continually looking for ways to improve our performance. Safety 
Culture Surveys give us an opportunity to understand the shared attitudes and beliefs of 
our people; they provide a baseline for ongoing cultural development.   
An independent research team from the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) is 
helping us conduct the [organisation name] Safety Culture Survey.  
What is the survey about? 
The survey asks about your opinions, perceptions and experiences of safety at work.  An 
information sheet is attached to this email, and it explains the survey and your participation 
in more detail.   
Why is it important?  
The survey will help to identify what is working and what is not working, so that we know 
where to target our safety initiatives.  
How do I complete the survey? 
An electronic version of the survey is attached to this email. Please answer all questions in 
the survey and return the completed survey to your Divisional Safety Manager in the 
internal mail or directly to Sarah Biggs via post to the address below. 
If you prefer, you can also complete an online version of the survey by clicking on the link 
below:  
http://survey.qut.edu.au/survey/173066/1cbc/ 
We look forward to receiving your thoughts and opinions and encourage everyone to 
participate and play an active role in shaping our future. 
Who should I contact if I have any questions or concerns? 
Please contact one of the QUT research team members if you have any questions or 
concerns about your participation in this survey.  
Sarah Biggs – PhD Candidate Tamara Banks – Post-Doctoral Fellow 
Centre for Accident Research and 
Road Safety 
Centre for Accident Research and 
Road Safety 
Phone  (07) 3138 4583 Phone  (07) 3138 4963 
Email  s2.biggs@student.qut.edu.au  Email  t.banks@qut.edu.au  
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Appendix J 
Hardcopy version of Study Two survey 
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Appendix K 
Participant information sheet for Study Three group interviews 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Interview – 
Reducing workplace incidents: Bridging the gap between safety 
culture theory and practice (Study 3) 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1000000944 
RESEARCH TEAM  
Principal 
Researcher: 
Sarah Biggs, PhD Candidate, QUT 
Associate 
Researcher: 
Dr Tamara Banks, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, QUT 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD project for Sarah Biggs.  
The purpose of this project is to explore individual’s experience of safety culture in 
the organisation, with a view to identifying the key factors that assist in creating 
and maintaining a positive safety culture, and providing guidelines on what sorts of 
programs or other interventions might be useful for this.  
The research team requests your assistance because your views on safety culture in 
your workplace are important to this research. This stage of the project is looking to 
further explore some of the issues raised in the safety culture survey just conducted 
in your organisation. You may have been involved in previous stages of the research 
program. If this is the case, your participation to date is very much appreciated, and 
we would also value any further input you would like to provide in this stage of the 
research.  
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can 
withdraw from participation during the project without comment or penalty. If you 
withdraw, on request any identifiable information already obtained from you will be 
destroyed. Your decision to participate will in no way impact upon your current or 
future relationship with QUT or with [the organisation]. 
Your participation will involve an interview that will take approximately 30 minutes 
of your time. The interview will include questions around your views on certain 
issues around safety in the organisation, and about how safety is approached in 
your workplace. (An example question is “What do you think motivates workers to 
behave safely?”) The interview will take place via telephone or in an office space, 
and at a time convenient to you. 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
It is expected that this project will not directly benefit you in the short term. 
However, it may benefit you indirectly through the development of guidelines to 
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assist in improving safety culture programs and initiatives and potentially safety 
outcomes in your workplace.    
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your 
participation in this project. You may experience minor discomfort in sharing your 
responses, and in discussing work-related matters whilst at work. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially.  The project is funded by 
[the organisation]. The funding body will not have access to individual data 
obtained during the project, but will receive results in group form. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Due to the nature of the project a verbal consent mechanism will be used. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require any further information please contact one of the 
research team members below. 
Sarah Biggs – PhD Candidate Tamara Banks – Postdoctoral Research 
Fellow 
Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety–Qld – Faculty of Health – QUT  
07 3138 4583  s2.biggs@student.qut.edu.au 07 3138 4963 t.banks@qut.edu.au 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  
However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of 
the project you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the 
research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial 
manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project 
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Appendix L 
Group interview schedule—frontline supervisors 
 
 
Introductory statements 
 Introduce self, group, and topic for the day. 
 Reminders about confidentiality and voluntary participation.  
 Permission to record the session.   
 
Safety performance 
1. What level of safety performance does the organisation expect of you?  
2. What level of performance do you expect of your direct employees?  
[Finish this section with a summary of what has been determined as the desired level 
of safety performance] 
 
Effort and Expectancy 
3. What do you expect employees to do to meet safety performance standards? 
4. How do you communicate this to your employees?  
 
Instrumentality, Outcome and Valence 
5. What sorts of rewards are valued by your employees?  
6. Do you have discretion/choice in the sorts of rewards that you can provide to 
employees?  
7. Do you think that there is a clear link between safety performance and valued 
positive outcomes for employees?  
8. How do you explain/communicate the outcomes associated with safety 
performance?  
9. How does safety compare to other organisational goals such as productivity? 
10. Are there rewards associated with other types of performance that are more 
valuable to employees?  
a. If so, how do you manage this potential conflict?  
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Situational facilitators/constraints 
11. How does your project manager assist you in encouraging safe behaviour?  
a. Prompts: Does it work?  Why/not? What else could they do?  
12. How does senior management assist you in encouraging safe behaviour? 
a. Prompts: Does it work?  Why/not? What else could they do?  
13. How effective are the organisational safety policies in encouraging people to 
be safe at work?  
14. What sorts of things make following safety rules and participating in safety 
activities difficult?  
a. How do your employees manage these? 
b. What can supervisors do to help manage these? 
15. What do you think is the influence of workmates on the safety behaviour of 
your employees?  
a. How do you encourage or discourage this influence?  
16. Are there other influences outside of work that affect your employees’ safety 
behaviour?  
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Appendix M 
Group interview schedule—frontline workers 
 
Introductory statements 
 Introduce self, group, and topic for the day. 
 Reminders about confidentiality and voluntary participation.  
 Permission to record the session.   
 
Safety performance 
2. What is expected of employees around safety?  
a. Prompts: What does your supervisor/ PM/ MD expect?  
3. When people talk about safety and safe behaviour, what do you think of?  
4. What do you think is good safety behaviour? 
a. Prompts: Following safety rules and participating in safety activities 
[Finish this section with a summary of what has been determined as the desired level 
of safety performance] 
 
Effort and Expectancy 
5. What kind of things do people need to do to meet that level of safety 
performance?  
a. Prompts: wearing PPE, attending toolbox talks etc 
6. What sort of effort is involved?  
7. If you do those things, will you meet safety performance expectations? Or are 
there exceptions? 
a. Example for clarification: you might attend every toolbox talk but this 
may not be monitored and rewarded by supervisors 
 
Instrumentality, Outcome and Valence 
8. What happens when you have good safety performance [use their language 
from above]?  
a. Prompts: are you less likely to get hurt/more likely to be promoted or 
rewarded?  
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9. What sorts of outcomes (positive or negative) are linked to that level of 
performance? 
10. Are the outcomes/rewards valued?  
 
11. How does safety compare to other organisational goals such as productivity? 
12. Are there more valuable rewards for other types of performance? 
13. Are there examples of good safety performance NOT being rewarded?  
 
Situational facilitators/constraints 
14. What do you think about your supervisor’s commitment to safety? 
 
15. What does your immediate supervisor do to encourage you to be safe at 
work?  
a. Prompts: Does it work?  Why/not? What else could they do?  
16. What does your Project Manager do to encourage you to be safe at work? 
b. Prompts: Does it work?  Why/not? What else could they do?  
17. What are senior management doing to encourage you to be safe at work? 
a. Prompts: Does it work?  Why/not? What else could they do?  
 
18. Are there organisational policies that influence how you do your work safely? 
a. What aspects of those policies encourage you to be safe? 
b. What aspects of those policies don’t encourage you to be safe?  
 
19. What makes following safety rules and participating in safety activities 
difficult in your work?  
a. How do you manage these? 
 
20. How do your peers/workmates influence your safety behaviour at work?  
21. Are there other influences in your life that make you want to be safe at work?  
 
 
